What If India Got PoK Back? It May Not Be in Its Interest

Suppose PoK actually became available to India, would taking it over necessarily be in India's national interest?

Imagine, for a moment, that Pakistan's control collapses and India finds itself in possession of PoK. The celebrations would be spectacular and the television pictures unforgettable. And then the bills would arrive.

(Photo: Kamran Akhter/The Quint)

On one of my annual visits to London, I dropped into the Red Lion, the pub tucked away between Downing Street and the Houses of Parliament, where Winston Churchill was known to tipple. Whether he stopped there on his way to work or on his way home, I have no idea. Knowing Churchill, probably both.

After surveying the pub’s interiors, I found myself on a barstool next to a Pakistani Punjabi. He came from Jhelum district—the very area from which both my parents had fled as refugees during Partition. That discovery produced instant bonhomie.

As usually happens when an Indian and a Pakistani find themselves sharing a drink, the conversation soon turned to the familiar lament: how wonderful it would be if our two countries were friends; how ordinary people on both sides wanted peace; and how governments, armies and vested interests kept the hostility alive.

“It is the Kashmir issue that stands in the way,” he said. “I say, give it to India. Pakistan should be happy to get rid of the Mirpuris—the Kashmiris on our side. Thankless bumpkins. Trouble-makers. London is full of them. These people are so venomous that everyone shuns them. I am sure the Kashmiris on your side can't stand them either.”

The extraordinary turmoil now convulsing Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) got me thinking about this conversation.

What If PoK Came Back?

For nearly eight decades, India's position on Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has been admirably uncomplicated: the territory belongs to India.

Parliamentary sentiment has repeatedly reflected that position, and Indian law continues to embody it. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 24 seats in the J&K Legislative Assembly remain vacant for the areas presently under Pakistani occupation.

But there is a question that Indian strategic discourse rarely asks aloud. Suppose Pakistan-occupied Kashmir actually became available to India— would taking it over necessarily be in India's national interest?

The present unrest in PoK makes the question less theoretical than it once appeared.

The Joint Awami Action Committee has mobilised thousands over economic grievances, political representation and Islamabad's interference in local affairs. Recent elections have been accompanied by deadly violence, with Reuters reporting more than 40 deaths. The movement has survived arrests, communications restrictions and its proscription by the authorities. 

Some protest leaders have even appealed to India. For Indian nationalists, this might appear to be history knocking on the door. India should be careful before answering it.

PoK and the Valley: Political and Identity Differences

The people living on the other side of the Line of Control are not one homogeneous population waiting patiently for India to come and rescue them. The former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was never homogeneous. It contained Kashmiris, Dogras, Paharis, Gujjars, Baltis, Ladakhis, Shinas, Burushos, and several other communities, speaking different languages and following different cultural and political traditions.

Take Mirpur. Historically part of the Jammu region rather than the Kashmir Valley, its predominant language belongs broadly to the Pahari-Pothwari linguistic continuum and is quite different from Kashmiri, or Koshur, spoken in the Valley. There have also long been differences in political outlook and identity between the Valley and the western Jammu districts of Poonch and Mirpur. 

It is said that Sheikh Abdullah influenced Jawaharlal Nehru to halt the Indian Army's advance during the 1947-48 war and accept the UN-monitored ceasefire, thereby leaving large parts of the princely state - including Mirpur and what subsequently became PoK - in Pakistani hands.

There is no documentary evidence establishing that Abdullah persuaded Nehru to do this, and I would not present it as historical fact. But one can understand why the allegation arose. Sheikh Abdullah’s political base was overwhelmingly in the Valley, while his National Conference had considerably less political traction in Jammu, Poonch and Mirpur. In his eyes, the territory that went to Pakistan was less a loss than a case of good riddance.

None of this means that Mirpuris are somehow less Kashmiri, or that Kashmiris in the Valley are superior to them. It simply means that there isn't one single Kashmiri identity neatly waiting on both sides of the LoC to be reunited. Yet Indian discourse often speaks about “Kashmir” as though it were one social and political entity. It isn't. Absorbing PoK into India is not going to produce any political or cultural harmony.

Pakistan Has Made This Mistake Before

Pakistan itself once made precisely this assumption. In 1965, Islamabad launched Operation Gibraltar on the belief that infiltrators entering Indian-controlled Kashmir would spark a popular uprising against India. The uprising never came. Instead, local people reported infiltrators to Indian authorities, and the operation ended in failure.

Pakistan had assumed that because Kashmiris were unhappy with India, they would naturally welcome Pakistan. They didn't. There is a lesson here for New Delhi: people who dislike the government ruling them do not necessarily want the government next door.

The anger against Islamabad today is very real. But India should resist the temptation to mistake hostility towards Pakistan for an embrace of Indian nationalism. The demands of the Joint Awami Action Committee centre largely on electricity, flour prices, taxation, political representation, elite privileges, infrastructure and local autonomy. These are not necessarily the demands of people waiting for the Indian Army to arrive; they are the demands of people who want their own government to work.

India Would Inherit The Problem

Imagine, for a moment, that Pakistan's control collapses and India finds itself in possession of PoK. The celebrations would be spectacular and the television pictures unforgettable. And then the bills would arrive.

India would inherit roads that need rebuilding, hospitals that need upgrading, schools that need funding, electricity systems that need investment, pensions that need paying and an administration that needs to be integrated. The people would quite reasonably expect better services than they received under Pakistan. If India says, “You are Indians and this is Indian territory,” it cannot very well add, “Please wait while we find the money.”

The Indian taxpayer would inherit the responsibility.

And then there is the security problem. India has spent more than three decades fighting terrorism and insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. Would it voluntarily acquire another huge territory in which Pakistan has every incentive to create an insurgency? At present, Pakistan has to send militants across the LoC. After annexation, it would have the much easier task of supporting people already living inside India who might be persuaded that New Delhi had simply become the new occupier. The Pakistani Army has considerable experience at this game. Why would India voluntarily give it a larger playing field?

And Then There Is China

The problem becomes even more complicated when we move north. Gilgit-Baltistan is not simply an extension of Mirpur or the Valley. With Shina, Baltis, Burushos, Wakhi, and Khowar speakers, and containing substantial Shia, Sunni, Ismaili, and Nurbakhshi populations, it is a complex mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities occupying some of the most difficult terrain imaginable. And sitting right beside it is China.

The Karakoram region and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor give Gilgit-Baltistan enormous strategic importance. If India attempted to recover the territory militarily, the issue would no longer be merely India versus Pakistan. China would have a direct strategic interest in the outcome, and India could find itself exchanging one difficult frontier for two.

Why Rescue Pakistan From Its Kashmir Problem

For decades, Pakistan has told the world that it is the champion of Kashmiri self-determination. Now people in Pakistan-administered Kashmir are protesting against Pakistan, exposing the contradiction themselves. Why should India rush to rescue Islamabad from this embarrassment?

Every protest in Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, or Rawalakot raises an awkward question: if this really is “Azad Kashmir”, why does Islamabad have to use force to keep its people quiet? India may actually gain more from allowing Pakistan to stew in this contradiction than from removing it. 

Absolutely not. India's historical and territorial claim should remain intact. The Indian position does not have to disappear merely because India decides that physically acquiring the territory is not worth the price.

A territorial claim is an instrument of statecraft. It does not necessarily have to become an operational order to the Army. India can continue to regard the entire former princely state as Indian territory, refuse to recognise Pakistani sovereignty over it and continue to raise the issue internationally. And, perhaps most importantly, it can continue to speak for the rights of the people living there.

The Smarter Move

Nationalism likes photographs of soldiers raising flags over places that have been lost. But governments have to deal with the morning after.

If India ever acquired PoK, it would acquire not merely mountains and territory but millions of people with complicated histories, different identities, and very reasonable expectations. It would acquire a new security problem, a massive development bill and potentially a confrontation with China.

So perhaps the most useful question is not, “Is PoK ours?” India has already answered that. The question is, “Would getting it make India stronger?” The answer may well be no.

India should defend the Line of Control, expose Pakistani repression, support the democratic aspirations of people across it and retain its territorial claim. But it should think very carefully before turning a claim into an acquisition.

My Pakistani beer-mate in the Red Lion may have been wrong about almost everything he said about Mirpuris. But perhaps, after a few pints, he accidentally stumbled upon one uncomfortable truth: Sometimes, a territory is more valuable as a claim than as a responsibility.

(The author is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and Explorers Club USA, and Editor of ‘Indian Mountaineer’. He is also the founder of Bharatiya Yuva Shakti, an organisation that ensures good leadership at the village level. He tweets @AkhilBakshi1. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)