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As the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) completes a century, public discussion often treats its longevity as proof of success. Media coverage emphasises expansion, presence across states, and proximity to political power. Yet, in a democracy, endurance alone reveals little about real influence or social acceptance. A clearer picture emerges when attention is paid to the resistance the RSS has faced across regions, social groups, institutions, and even within its own organisational structure.
This resistance exposes limits and tensions that narratives of uninterrupted growth tend to overlook.
Understanding the RSS’ impact requires examining not only where it has grown, but also where it has struggled. These include districts where shakhas stagnated or contracted, periods of declining participation, uneven generational renewal, and sustained pushback from universities, state institutions, civil society, and courts.
The shakha, the local branch where swayamsevaks meet regularly, is often described as the backbone of RSS outreach. Official figures do indicate long-term expansion.
Daily shakhas reportedly increased from about 39,823 in 2010 to roughly 70,000 by 2020. However, this growth has not followed a steady upward trajectory. By 2021, the number had fallen sharply to approximately 55,652 before rising again to 83,129 by early 2025 during centenary mobilisation efforts.
This fluctuation is significant. The decline in 2021, coinciding with the pandemic, demonstrated how daily voluntary participation can be vulnerable to disruption and internal disengagement. The subsequent surge reflects organised recruitment drives linked to the centenary rather than consistent organic growth.
More than 10,000 shakhas were reportedly added between March 2024 and March 2025 alone. Such spikes inflate headline figures but do not necessarily indicate sustained grassroots attachment. Even where shakha numbers have increased officially, growth remains uneven.
A further structural constraint lies in the age profile of RSS leadership. While the organisation rejects the characterisation of being an ageing body, many senior office-bearers remain in their fifties and sixties, with formal retirement mandated only at the age of 75 years. This slows generational turnover in positions of influence.
Recruitment campaigns increasingly target younger volunteers, with individuals aged 25 to 40 forming the bulk of new entrants in some reported years. However, advancement into leadership roles remains limited and uneven. As a result, long-serving activists sometimes withdraw from active engagement due to fatigue, even as official shakha counts rise. Leadership renewal, though frequently emphasised, continues to lag behind organisational expansion.
Kerala provides one of the clearest examples of sustained resistance to the RSS. Despite hosting over 5,000 RSS shakhas, among the highest concentrations relative to population, the organisation has struggled to convert organisational density into political or cultural dominance. Electoral outcomes continue to favour Left and secular formations, indicating a persistent gap between infrastructure and ideological acceptance.
This resistance was visible in June 2025 when student organisations led by the Students’ Federation of India (SFI) protested outside Kerala University and Raj Bhavan against the display of portraits of RSS ideologues, including MS Golwalkar and KB Hedgewar, inside the governor’s official residence.
Kerala has also witnessed resistance to RSS-linked educational interventions. In earlier instances, parent groups and political organisations opposed the circulation of textbooks linked to Vidya Bharati in government schools, alleging historical distortion and ideological indoctrination. The backlash prompted official scrutiny and withdrawal of unauthorised material. These episodes show how state institutions, student bodies, and civil society repeatedly assert limits on RSS influence even where organisational infrastructure exists.
Opposition here is ideological rather than episodic. RSS training camps and public events routinely face objections from Dravidian parties, student groups, and civil society organisations. In districts such as Krishnagiri, parties including the DMK, Dravidar Kazhagam, and Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) have submitted formal memoranda opposing RSS camps, citing threats to social harmony and incompatibility with Tamil Nadu’s anti-caste political culture. While such camps may proceed under police protection, persistent objections signal a refusal to normalise Hindutva politics in the public sphere.
The resistance faced by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders aligned with the RSS ecosystem—during public meetings and cultural events—reflects these broader ideological boundaries rather than personal rivalry alone.
For over three decades, Piyush Manush has positioned himself as an individual citizen confronting what he describes as organised communal polarisation linked to the RSS ideological ecosystem. His sworn statement before the judicial magistrate in Salem details sustained engagement in environmental protection, resistance to illegal mining, opposition to land acquisition, and campaigns against corporate pollution. These efforts are framed as exercises of constitutional duty rather than expressions of institutional power.
Manush situates his activism within the historical trauma of Partition, which he identifies as the most devastating consequence of communal hatred. Citing Article 51A of the Constitution, he argues that preventing the recurrence of such violence is a civic obligation. Central to his account is his challenge to what he alleges are misinformation campaigns by senior BJP leaders in Tamil Nadu aimed at provoking communal hostility.
According to Manush, portraying the dargah as an encroachment risked igniting mass violence. He has repeatedly approached courts after police declined to act on complaints alleging hate speech. In two instances, he secured sanction to prosecute under IPC Section 153, with one case contributing to a Madras High Court judgment clarifying the legal threshold for hate speech.
Despite a century of organisational expansion, RSS-aligned forces continue to face resistance that is often local, procedural, and quietly effective, particularly when attempts are made to convert social tensions into communal flashpoints.
In Tamil Nadu, FIRs were registered against H Raja and K Annamalai for their role in inflaming tensions around the Thirupparankundram issue. Legal intervention curtailed attempts to escalate the matter into wider conflict.
Similarly, communal mobilisation was attempted after an elderly Muslim Gulf returnee built a memorial for his wife that was described as a mosque-like structure. Timely intervention prevented escalation and halted calls for demolition. In another case, allegations that a student’s suicide was linked to religious conversion by nuns were formally declared false by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights after persistent follow-up.
Universities remain among the most persistent sites of resistance to the RSS and its student affiliate, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP). In West Bengal, this resistance has been particularly visible. At Jadavpur University, repeated attempts by the ABVP to gain organisational control have faced sustained opposition from student bodies such as the SFI and AIDSO. University authorities have at times restricted permissions for RSS-aligned events citing law and order concerns.
At Jawaharlal Nehru University, protests against alleged ABVP violence and intimidation have repeatedly drawn police intervention. In Hyderabad’s English and Foreign Languages University, opposition to ABVP disruptions around Palestine solidarity events led to campus unrest and formal complaints. Earlier precedents at the University of Hyderabad, FTII Pune, and Banaras Hindu University continue to shape campus resistance to ideological appointments and moral policing.
Historically, the Indian government imposed restrictions on government employees participating in RSS activities to preserve bureaucratic neutrality. Though later debated, the ban reflected institutional restraint on RSS penetration into state machinery.
Resistance has also emerged within the Indian diaspora in the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia. Sikh, Dalit, and progressive Hindu groups have protested RSS-linked events, sometimes prompting civic authorities to withdraw permissions.
After 100 years, the RSS commands a vast organisational network and significant institutional influence. Yet, its trajectory is not one of unbroken consolidation. Fluctuating shakha numbers, uneven generational renewal, internal disengagement, and sustained regional and institutional resistance point to clear structural limits.
Quiet declines and dismantling of the RSS barely make it to mainstream news because it doesn’t leave records of high-scale events. In a democracy, such contestation is not a failure. It is the most accurate measure of an idea’s limits. RSS’ limits are increasingly revealed through institutional friction.
Even with ideological reach and political proximity to power, outcomes touching justice, ecology, and constitutional balance remain subject to correction by courts, civil society, and public scrutiny. These interventions were responses to pressure generated outside organisational control. They suggest that influence does not automatically translate into moral consensus or institutional compliance. A 100 on, the RSS confronts a boundary it cannot easily cross: constitutional processes and public legitimacy continue to operate as autonomous forces, limiting the extent to which ideological ecosystems can settle every contest in their favour.
(Meenakshi Jha is an educator and freelance aspirational writer. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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