The US military action in the early hours of 3 January, to extricate Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Adela Flores from Caracas, was a spectacular tactical success. The US objective and strategy beyond Maduro’s removal remains unclear as yet. It ill behooves a great power to undertake military action unless its objective is transparent both to its own people and the rest of the world.
The stated US objective of only bringing Maduro and his wife to US justice on narcotics charges is untenable.
Is the aim, therefore, to show that US President Donald Trump is willing to go to any length to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains the US backyard? Or is it more limited to gain complete control of Venezuela’s oil reserves which are the largest in the world? There is no clarity on these points though it seems that the US wants to ensure both objectives.
US Must State its Intentions
A great power should state its aim clearly, even if it obfuscates somewhat on strategy. The international community should be aware of the strategy to achieve the objective. In the Venezuela case, that means that the US should have clarified its objectives and strategy in the wake of the Maduro extraction from Venezuela. Here there is confusion.
In his media briefing on 3 January, President Donald Trump said that the US would “run” Venezuela. He indicated that Venezuela’s Vice-President Delcy Rodriguez had, in a conversation with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, indicated that she would cooperate with the US on the next steps in Venezuela. However, he hinted that Maduro’s associates may not be acceptable. He also signalled that Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth would work out future steps.
Delcy Rodriguez has become the interim President with the approval of Venezuela’s constitutional court. She has publicly said that Maduro remains the country’s President. Meanwhile, Rubio has insisted that this was a ‘counter-narcotics’ operation, not an invasion of the country. He also said that the US wants Venezuela’s policies to change and that the embargo on its oil would remain.
This indicates that it is through threats and pressures that Rubio wants to either engineer a change in the ruling elite or change the policy direction of the elite itself on relations with the US, including the involvement of its companies in Venezuela’s oil industry. However, there is a gap between Trump and Rubio’s remarks on US strategy on how to proceed on Venezuela.
Before Maduro, it Was Mosaddegh
Currently, Venezuela does not contribute more than one percent of the total oil supplies to the global oil market. This is because its oil industry has become run down as a result of US sanctions and Venezuela’s own mishandling of its oil sector. Venezuela nationalised its oil industry in 1976, which was till then essentially controlled by US oil companies. It set up its own company, the Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA), to manage its hydrocarbon industry.
The PDVSA entered into contractual relations with US oil companies to explore oil deposits and develop upstream and downstream oil industries. These companies had the expertise and technology to do so which PDVSA lacked. This system continued for decades.
In 2007 Venezuela’s leftist President, Hugo Chavez, ordered new contracts to be signed between PDVSA and the US oil companies which would increase PDVSA’s profits and substantially lower those of the oil companies. Some US companies resisted and their assets were ‘expropriated’ by Venezuela.
US administrations could have treated these issues as commercial disputes but obviously did not do so. Now, it has led President Trump to assert that Venezuela had taken over ‘our oil’.
Trump posted on Truth Social on 17 December that he was imposing a blockade of all oil tankers going in and out of Venezuela. He also asserted that the armada surrounding Venezuela would continue “Until such time as they return to the United States of America all of the Oil, Land and other Assets that they previously stole from us”.
The US idea that Venezuela’s 2007 action against its oil companies was unacceptable was akin to Britain’s attitude in the period 1951-1953 when Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh acted against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The British government had a controlling 51 percent share in the company managing Iran’s main natural resources.
Mosaddegh decided to nationalise the oil sector. During two tumultuous years, the British and the Americans intervened in Iranian politics to ensure that Mosaddegh was compelled to leave the Prime Minister’s post in 1953.
The West-backed Shah of Iran was restored to full power. He brought back the control of the foreign oil companies in the country’s oil sector. Mosaddegh was imprisoned and later remained under house arrest till his death in 1967.
The approach of a developed country towards a developing country witnessed in the 1950s is being repeated more than seven decades later. As Mosaddegh was, now Maduro will remain unfree for the remainder of his life. The difference is that the former was in his own country while the latter and his wife will spend many long years in a US prison. The chances of his acquittal are nil.
Modalities of Regime Change
All major powers consider regimes changes when their interests demand so. This has been seen through history. The modalities of executing them and of what is done to the ousted ruler obviously depend on the particular situation and the norms of the times.
After World War II, regime change was generally undertaken through promoting a coup. This was the case in 1973 when the CIA used the Chilean army to oust the elected leader, Salvador Allende. He was killed while opposing the military action. In other instances, the leader was hunted down through an invasion.
In two instances though, the major power took direct action. This was witnessed in 1979 when Soviet troops killed the Afghan strongman Hafizullah Amin or in Iraq when Saddam Hussain was captured and executed after a case against him in the local courts.
The action taken against Maduro sets a new and dangerous precedent. Its implications in terms of international law have not been thought through. The US position that it does not recognise Maduro as a legitimate leader will not wash because he was recognised so by the United Nations.
India's Stance
India did not reject the results of the controversial 2024 Presidential elections. It therefore continued to recognise Maduro as the legitimate President of Venezuela. This is implied in Indian embassy in Caracas’s writeup of March 2025 on India-Venezuela relations.
It noted “Vice President Delcy Rodriguez…visited Delhi on 11-14 February 2025 to participate in the India Energy Week.” At the same time India drastically reduced its import of Venezuelan oil. It did so to adhere to US sanctions on Venezuela. India’s caution was also witnessed in its response to Maduro’s extrication. It does not wish to take on President Trump at a time when it is facing 50 percent tariff imposed on its exports to the US.
In keeping with this approach, India merely stated “Recent developments in Venezuela are a matter of deep concern.” Besides, that it is “monitoring the evolving situation.” It called for dialogue for peace and regional stability. India also emphasised its “support for the well-being and safety” of the Venezuelan people.
Taken together, this diplomatic-speak amounts to an expression of pious wishes and underlines a desire not to offend Trump. India has, therefore, opted to look out for its interests rather than focus on international norms and law. It is not very different from the approach India had taken in the 1950s with Mosaddegh, whom it had supported but had also remained cautious of censuring Britain to maintain its non-aligned stance.
While this may be a legitimate approach for India, Venezuela’s future remains full of imponderables.
(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs. He can be reached @VivekKatju. This is a personal blog, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)