The death sentence awarded to Sheikh Hasina, former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, is a seismic political event that will be seared into the nation’s collective memory for a long time. Its tremors will be felt through the country’s institutions even if the death sentence is never executed.
Ironically, Hasina has now fallen victim to the system she created by weaponising the judiciary against her political opponents. She established the International Crimes Tribunal in 2009 after her party, the Awami League (AL), won a landslide victory, promising to prosecute those accused of war crimes during the Liberation War of 1971.
The ICT sent at least six top leaders of the Jamat-e-Islami (JeI) to the gallows for collaborating with the Pakistan Army. She thus dismantled the party’s top leadership before deregistering it and banning it altogether.
The same ICT has now convicted Hasina for “crimes against humanity” related to the 2024 student uprising.
Guilty and Condemned
The tribunal has found her guilty of ordering or enabling a violent crackdown that killed over 1,400 people. For her detractors—the JeI, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the students who bore the brunt of Hasina government’s brutal targeting of dissent—this is poetic justice.
Apart from a few Molotov cocktails lobbed and burning of some stationary buses before the verdict, there has been a general absence of public protest or mass unrest afterwards. The public seems to believe that the charges against Hasina are credulous.
The ICT concluded that ultimately it was Hasina who had the command responsibility for the atrocities perpetrated by the security forces. This was based on exhaustive evidence, including videos (verified by international organisations and the media) of excessive use of force by the law enforcement agencies; shooting down of unarmed protestors and firing from helicopters unmindful of small children in their line of fire.
Audio recordings of telephone conversations of Hasina—she talked on open telephone lines, little suspecting that her own people were recording her calls—showed her and her aides complicit in the use of excessive force despite the massive loss of lives.
The tribunal held that she did not take any steps to pull back the security forces even when the consequences of their brutal crackdown were evident to her.
It will make no difference to the general public even if the international community condemns the ICT as a kangaroo court, and its processes lacking proper defence, accountability and transparency.
For the public the verdict may be seen as a form of “closure”, especially for those who saw Hasina’s regime as repressive.
No Incentive for Supporters
From all accounts, no major mass mobilisation is likely. Hasina’s party is rudderless as most of its top leaders have run away from the country. Many of her former allies have distanced themselves from her or joined other political formations. The AL has also been banned from contesting elections and there is, therefore, no incentive to mobilise the people by those partymen who remain in the country.
The general elections are expected in the first half of February next year. Now, with the conviction, no major hurdles against holding the elections remain. All the political parties want elections on schedule and the interim government also seems in a hurry to demit office, having failed to administer the country with any degree of success.
All political parties, except the student-led National Citizens’ Party, have signed the “July Charter”, an 84-point political declaration and reform blueprint. This is a comprehensive reform agenda negotiated between the interim government of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yusuf and the political parties.
Along with the general election early next year, it has been agreed that the people will simultaneously vote in a referendum to implement the broad recommendations of the July Charter. They will be expected to answer “yes or no” to four complex questions: about institutionalising a caretaker government and election oversight; bicameral legislature; judicial independence and oversight; and the decentralisation of administrative and fiscal authority. The verdict of the referendum will be considered for implementation by the new parliament.
Time for Bangladesh to Heal
With the Hasina verdict behind and the 2026 election before them, political space will open up for competing narratives and notions of systemic change among different parties.
The public appetite for systemic change has been whetted, making the referendum a central issue in the election campaign. Political parties will now have to demonstrate to the voters that they have the track record, intention and capability to make the required Constitutional changes.
The emotions associated with the toppling of the Hasina regime may fuel voter turnout especially among the first-time voters and the youth yearning for change from successive regimes that have tended to turn vindictive and authoritarian. With over 60 percent of Bangladesh’s population under 35 years of age, it remains to be seen where the vote of those disillusioned by traditional politics and hungry for change will go.
As of now it is widely expected that the BNP, which has a rare opening to reclaim political space, has more than even chances of returning as the single largest party. The JeI is energised after the 2024 fall of the Hasina regime and is expected to make modest gains, leveraging the collapse of the AL and Hasina's death sentence. However, its controversial legacy and limited youth appeal (even though its youth wing won the Dhaka University elections recently) is likely to constrain its performance.
The National Citizens Party, led by the 2024 students’ protest leaders, is not expected to do well as its aggressive messaging may appeal to urban and semi-urban voters disillusioned with traditional political parties but it also could alienate moderate voters. It also does not have a popular base or organisational structure in the rural areas.
The dark horse in the race is the Jatiya Party (Ershad) that has significant regional influence in the Rangpur area. If it is able to attract the AL voters who have nowhere to go then it may emerge as the main Opposition party in the new parliament. A lot may depend on India, which some Bangladeshi observers believe, may advise the remnants of the AL voters on which party to choose.
India-Bangladesh Ties Likely to Sour Further
Meanwhile, the death sentence to Hasina had placed India-Bangladesh relations under severe strain. There is already a diplomatic standoff over her extradition. It will worsen further as despite the 2013 extradition treaty India can refuse the extradition because the treaty contains an exception saying, “Extradition may be refused if the offence for which it is requested is an offence of a political character.”
India has not condemned the verdict outright and has only taken note of it, saying, “As a close neighbour, India remains committed to the best interest of the people of Bangladesh, including in peace, democracy, inclusion and stability in that country.” India has therefore said that it will “always engage constructively with all stakeholders.”
It seems India does not want the future of bilateral cooperation held hostage to the Hasina verdict.
India clearly has an obligation to shelter Hasina and keep her safe. It also seems to have decided not to deal with the interim government with any seriousness, waiting for an elected government to take charge early next year.
The upcoming election offers an opportunity to Bangladesh’s political parties to make a clean break from the past. They now need to reframe their own histories, mobilise support for systemic change and shape their narratives for a stable and democratic transition.
(The writer is a senior journalist based in Delhi. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)