Caste Abuse in Private Space: Why the Court is Mistaken
The courts' recent readings of the SC/ST Act lack an on-ground understanding of caste oppression, and hierarchies.
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On 4th June, the Karnataka High Court through a bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna, observed that the SC/ST Act doesn’t apply in cases where abuses are hurled between partners in a private place. The Court was hearing a petition for quashing of the chargesheet against a husband who was accused of hurling casteist abuse along with demands of dowry.
While Justice Nagaprasanna upheld the criminal proceedings in IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, the judgment delivered by him denied the occurrence of a caste atrocity. Surprisingly, the judge cancelled the charges of atrocity not because the abuse did not occur, but rather, it occurred in private and within “four walls of a house”.
Excerpt from the judgment rationalising the cancellation of offences under the SC/ST Act
(Manikiran G.C. vs State of Karnataka and Anr. 2026)
(Source: Website of the Karnataka High Court)
Beneath this observation, this article argues, lies a socially insensitive reading of a caste atrocity. While dealing with cases of caste atrocity between individuals, the courts use Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, to examine if the incident can be penalised as an atrocity. This happens even if the police have lodged the case under the SC/ST Act.
These two clauses of the SC/ST Act, as the judiciary looks at it - lay down conditions for the application of the act. Section 3 lays down the punishment for the offences of atrocities, and clauses (r) and (s) of the act bring in the condition of ‘place of occurrence’. According to the Apex Court, a caste abuse can only be categorised as such if it has occurred “in any place within public view”. However, while dealing with this provision, the courts often read it narrowly, which aids the accused to escape the conviction.
Similarly, in this case, the bench of the Karnataka HC quashed the charges under the act, even after noting the occurrence of abuse. The judgment, therefore, not only miscomprehended casteist abuse but also interpreted the provision narrowly and put a higher burden of proof on the victim to prove if the incident occurred in a “place within public view”.
Along with noting the abuse, the judge also recorded that neighbours heard the abuses since the husband was so loud and still did not accept the testimony of them as witnesses.
Even though this judgment is itself egregious, this article argues that this is not a one-time occurrence but a frequent sighting. The judges test any “alleged” incident on the conditions laid out in Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act instead of the nature and occurrence of the abuse. This test denies the significance to the abuse and its harm and rather gives more importance to the location of abuse.
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
Karnataka High Court bases its observation on a recent Supreme Court judgment. In the judgment, the Apex Court held -
Therefore, the judiciary has reiterated multiple times that in order to be tried under the Act the incident must have been committed in a “place within public view”. While this condition looks like a neutral provision, it has instead become a judicial weapon to deny the occurrence of atrocity and – by extension – justice to the victims of caste abuse.
What does “Within Public View” mean?
According to the Apex Court, a place is taken to be ‘within public view’ only if it has a possibility of ‘public’ spectatorship for the incident. In other words, if the incident occurs at a location which cannot be viewed by any member of the ‘public’, it cannot be charged as an atrocity in the Act.
In this way, in cases where the locations of the incidents do not meet the judges’ discretion, the acts are not categorised or penalised as atrocities. As the Court does so without going into the objectives of the legislation, this formulation turns the principle of rule of law upside down.
Unchecked individual discretion - here, the discretion to treat an incident as an atrocity - contradicts the core principles of the rule of law, as it risks leading to arbitrary power. Therefore, as a result, using this discretion, judges have denied even office spaces and balconies as places within public view.
In Girija Kumari case, Justice N.V. Anjaria, while explaining the application of the act, noted that the place of occurrence must be “a place within the public gaze”.
For him, ‘a place where a public eye has access to notice what happened there, or what had taken place’ can only be regarded as a ‘place within public view’.
The condition of being “within public gaze” and expressions like “a public eye must have access” represent an almost voyeuristic interpretation of the law.
Stressing too much on the place of occurrence, therefore, defeats the purpose of the Act to provide “relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences”. The judges through their discretion and interpretation restrict the potential of the act to provide justice and punish injustice.
For instance, while recording the above-mentioned observation, Justice Anjaria denied that an atrocity can occur in familial relationships based on the location of the incident - a balcony and in front of friends of the victim - which, according to the bench, does not fall within public view.
Reiterating the Supreme Court's stand and following the exact precedent line-up, the Karnataka HC cancelled the charges under the Act by denying the testimonies of neighbours who heard the husband hurl abuse. Therefore, now as it stands, offences committed in ‘private’, even if heard by the public, don’t invite the application of the act and are not treated as atrocities.
Justice Nagaprasanna, while applying the rationale of the Girija Kumari judgment, did not find ‘hearing of abuse’ to be within the public gaze.
From Book to the Field: What the Judiciary must do
In Scheduled Castes, Reservations and Religion, Professor Tanweer Fazal, writes:
For Fazal, the court misreads the issues related to caste due to this “textual reading”. He further locates this reading as a continuation of “colonial categories and oriental constructs”. The colonial practice of working through clean categories still continues to “inform much of our comprehension of social processes and institutions”. Even though the ground realities hardly fit into these categories, the misreading still prevails in the behaviour of courts.
The continuous use of colonial categories becomes apparent from the use of HH Risley, the 1901 Census Director’s work People of India in the Chinthada Anand vs State of Andhra Pradesh 2026 judgement of the Supreme Court. The Apex Court denied SC status and protection to a Dalit pastor who had converted to Christianity, relying on Risley’s understanding of caste to bar Dalit Christians from protection under the SC/ST Act.
Furthermore, the impacts of this (mis)reading get amplified within the judicial order. When the Supreme Court misreads the issue, and the law surrounding it, the trickle-down effect is even more tragic.
In the Girija Kumari case, the Apex Court reversed the verdicts and observations of the Rouse Avenue District Court and the Delhi High Court which allowed for the accused to be charged under the Act.
This tendency of overturning verdicts creates a chilling effect on lower courts. The lower courts are sometimes better agencies to make decisions in such cases, at least at the chargesheet level. These courts are closer to the details of the incident and the politics surrounding the relations between accused and victim.
The absence of a “field perspective”, as Fazal calls it, leads to a problematic comprehension. The courts must understand caste as a social institution rather than only a manifestation of abuse. By examining the law and the incident with an understanding of how caste relations and atrocities work on the ground, the courts can deal with issues of atrocity better.
Therefore, to begin with, the Supreme Court must comprehend ‘public’ socially.
Caste as a field of socialisation is itself an aspect of ‘public’. The segregation and discrimination stem out of relationships that are built on hierarchy; abuse, stems from this hierarchy.
The courts must therefore make themselves adept at a field understanding of caste and law in order to deal with the cases of caste abuse.
(The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. He writes on caste, constitution and their interface in the judiciary. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)