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International gold prices have had a roller-coaster ride over the past year.
At the end of September 2025, the gold prices were about $3,900 per ounce (equals 28.35 grams)
In February 2026, it peaked to $5,278 per ounce
It has since been falling in a volatile manner—dipping to $4,052 in July; rising to $4,607 in August; and falling to $3,892 on 9 November 2026
The Indian government and regulatory agencies grew increasingly concerned as India's fascination with gold adversely affected the external merchandise deficit, forex reserves, and government finances. Retail investors also began taking risky bets. Consequently, several policy and regulatory measures were introduced to curb gold purchases, imports, and investments.
The government discontinued the Sovereign Gold Bond scheme in 2024-25. In May 2026, it raised the Basic Customs Duty (BCD) on gold imports from 5 percent to 10 percent—and the Agriculture Infrastructure and Development Cess (AIDC) from 1 percent to 5 percent, making effective import duties 15 percent from 6 percent.
With Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) on gold import, effective duties on gold import are currently as high as 18.4 percent.
With effect from 1 October 2026, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) prohibited advance remittances for gold imports, with limited exemptions. The RBI also recently proposed that gold exchange-traded funds (ETFs) could be prohibited from investing in physical gold—and instead be required to hold RBI-issued tradable gold receipts. The RBI has also stopped buying gold for its forex reserves.
In September 2026, India’s gold imports plummeted to $1.8 billion from $9.61 billion in the same period last year, and in October, to $5.51 billion from $14.72 billion in October 2025, bringing down total gold imports to $24.78 billion in April-October 2026 from $41.24 billion in the same period last year.
The overall merchandise trade deficit in the first seven months of 2026-27 remains higher than in the previous year ($218.15 billion against $198.78 billion in 2025-26, an increase of 9.4 percent). Gold imports had risen to $72 billion in 2025-26 (from $58 billion in 2024-25), largely on account of the substantial rise in international gold prices.
In 2025-26, gold imports accounted for about 9.3 percent of total imports. This year, over the first seven months, their share in total imports has fallen to only 4.7 percent ($24.78 billion out of total imports of $527.21 billion).
Look at electronics. While exports went up from $26.28 billion in April-October 2025 to $38.61 billion in April-October 2026, an impressive growth of 46.9 percent, electronics imports also went up from $65.67 billion to $95.64 billion in the same periods, almost at the same growth rate of 45.65 percent. In terms of absolute deficit, electronics trade deficit increased by as much as $17.65 billion.
What India gained in terms of lower gold imports, it lost in terms of higher electronics imports. Still, it is good to see gold imports coming down and helping improve the merchandise trade balance. How long this situation will last is difficult to say.
Gold has a substantial direct impact on total forex reserves as it forms a significant component of these reserves. On 6 November, the RBI held $104.48 billion in gold reserves, which was $2.21 billion more than the value of its gold reserves a week earlier, but $10.6 billion less than their value at the end of March 2026.
The value of the RBI's gold reserves is clearly exposed to national and international gold prices. As gold prices have come down since the end of March 2026, the RBI has lost about 10 percent of the value of its gold reserves in seven months. Last year (March 2025 to March 2026), the value of its gold reserves had gone up by 45 percent (from $78.18 billion to $113.52 billion).
Lower imports of gold have an indirect beneficial impact on the RBI’s forex reserves—lower gold imports lead to a lower current account deficit and lesser pressure on the RBI’s reserves. That, however, has to be seen in the overall movement of the current account, capital account, and balance of payments.
Rising gold prices last year led to a shooting up of gold loans by non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) and banks. NBFCs' outstanding gold loans at end of September 2026 at Rs 3.74 lakh crore was 66 percent higher than at end of September 2025.
This substantial growth in gold loans was driven by two factors.
First, with the gold value rising, NBFCs can grant higher gold loans [current RBI regulations allow 85 percent loan to value (LTV) ratio for loans up to Rs 2.5 lakh; 80 percent LTV between Rs 2.5 lakh and Rs 5 lakh; and 75 percent LTV for loans higher than Rs 5 lakh].
Second, when gold prices go up, many investors, fascinated with gold and looking to make quick buck, tend to take gold loans against their existing gold and buy more gold from the loan taken, repeating the cycle a few times over. This convergence of interest helps build large outstanding gold loans portfolio.
There are signs of emerging stress in gold loans portfolios of both banks and NBFCs, with delinquencies also rising.
The international gold prices have fallen by more than 25 percent of their peak in February 2026. Indian gold prices reflect international gold prices, rupee dollar exchange rate, and tax incidence. Indian gold prices have also fallen by about 25 percent from their peak of about Rs 1.8 lakh per 10 grams to less than Rs 1.4 lakh per 10 grams currently.
The loans taken at peak prices are not covered by their LTV. The borrowers might be tempted to default such gold loans. The lenders have always had a problem in selling the gold of non-performing accounts. They tend to prefer extending the loan maturity or re-greening it.
Gold prices are quite unpredictable as these depend upon how the central banks—particularly Chinese and Russian—act, and investors' animal instincts. The gold loans portfolio are indeed in a state of bother for both the borrowers and the lenders.
The World Gold Council (WGC) provides estimates of net gold bullion imports into India on a quarterly basis. It combines the official as well as unofficial/smuggled imports.
Gold smuggling/unofficial imports is clearly on the rise, largely because of high customs duties and restrictions on payments/advance remittance through banks.
There is increasing evidence of some of the smuggled/undeclared gold getting caught at airports; though the seized quantities are no match for the estimated unofficial quantities.
There is clear evidence that the policy and regulatory package to clamp down on gold imports, while it has resulted in a reduction of official import bill, has not really delivered taking everything into consideration.
High customs duties have never worked. They need serious reduction.
Gold policies and regulations need a structural reset keeping in consideration human behaviour and the nature of the gold asset.
(Subhash Chandra Garg is the Chief Policy Advisor, SUBHANJALI, and Former Finance and Economic Affairs Secretary, Government of India. He's the author of books such as 'The $10 Trillion Dream Dented, 'We Also Make Policy', and 'Explanation and Commentary on Budget 2025-26'. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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