Delhi Blast Tests India's Post-Operation Sindoor Modi Doctrine

As of now, the “T” word or “terrorism” has not been uttered by Indian officials who are still talking about a blast.

Delhi has been a major target of terrorists since the mid-1990s to about 2010.

(Photo: PTI/Aroop Mishra/The Quint.)

In nuclear weapons theory, there is something called a “use it or lose it” dilemma. Something like this seems to have confronted Dr Umar Nabi Bhat, who worked as a physician at the Al Falah Hospital in Faridabad, and is accused of triggering the Red Fort blast on Monday, 10 November that killed him and at least a dozen people.

The reasoning goes that after he had heard of the arrests of the fellow doctors of his terrorist “module”, he decided that the device needed to be used, or it risked being lost since his arrest was probably imminent.

Dr Umar had escaped the police dragnet on 9 November and early morning the next day, he entered Delhi in an i20 car. What he did in the ensuing period is not clear, except that he spent three hours at a parking lot near Sunehri Masjid in Chandni Chowk. At 6.42 pm he emerged from it to join the traffic on the main road, going past the Red Fort, and at 6.52 pm the car exploded.

We are still uncertain about the nature of the device that exploded. Was it a poorly fabricated device that was unstable? After all, no ballistic materials—shrapnel or ball bearings—were found. Was the entire car rigged as a bomb? Was Dr Umar shifting the terrorist cache of ammonium nitrate and other materials to another place after the arrests of his fellow Al Falah doctors when the explosion took place? Or, was it a deliberate strike at a crowded area when there is peak traffic?

Tip of the Iceberg 

The twists and turns of just how that happened is consuming the efforts of a clutch of investigating agencies. But one thing is clear. The blast was the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

The module’s plans, as indicated by the seizure of over three tonnes of explosive material, suggest it could have led to a spate of deadlier bombings across the country. While figuring out just what may not be easy, getting answers is important considering that a reported 13 persons were killed and many more injured by the blast. And, equally important, it is the first major terror incident in New Delhi in 14 years.

The intensity of the explosion made it evident right away that this was no gas-tank or cooking-cylinder blast. However, the government for reasons best known to itself, chose to soft-pedal the terror connection, initially taking the high-minded approach that they would not say anything till they had conducted a thorough investigation.

As of now, the “T” word or “terrorism” has not been uttered by officials who are still talking about a blast. The person who could have thrown light into the motives, the driver of the car, died in the explosion. But the police have now drawn the connection between the terrible event with a sequence of arrests that resulted in a police operation initiated by Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Police, which deserve considerable credit for the subsequent developments.

In Nowgam in mid-October, a police officer noticed a number of new Jaish-e-Muhammad posters that had come up. That led to an investigation that led to the arrest of Dr Adeel Majid Rather who worked in a Saharanpur hospital on 6 November. Two days later, three other doctors, working at the Al Falah Hospital in Faridabad—Dr Muzammil Ahmed Ganai, Dr Shaheeen Shahid Ansari—were picked up.

In addition to the doctors, a number of other people were arrested on Tuesday in the Valley. Among them are Maulvi Irfan Ahmad Wagay, who may have been the key in the radicalisation of the doctors. Thereafter, three others were arrested, Arif Nisar Dar, aka Sahil, Yasir ul Ashraf and Maqsood Ahmad Dar aka Shahid, all residents of Nowgam, Zameer Ahmad Ahanger of Ganderbal.

Dr Umar’s movements, including during the three hours when he waited for something or someone at a parking lot nearby, remain a puzzle. There were many prime targets around, yet he decided to go somewhere with the explosive, and it is entirely possible that it exploded prematurely.

Perhaps there were one or two people in the group who knew how to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs). But since the key operatives were medical doctors, it would essentially suggest that this was could be an amateur group which had not quite learnt how to fabricate the IEDs because the device that exploded may have been highly unstable and had no shrapnel or ball-bearings usually included to make the outcome of a blast deadlier.

There is, however, little doubt that the gang had grand plans and that we should be thankful to J&K Police for rumbling on to the module and wrapping it up in good time. After all, they had the wherewithal—three tonnes of explosive material, including 350 kg of ammonium nitrate, as well as other chemicals, reagents, electronic circuits batteries, wires, remote controls, and metal sheets to fabricate hundreds of IEDs. Also found in the raids were an AK-47 rifle, a Krinkov assault rifle, and two pistols and ammunition.

India in a Tricky Spot Post Operation Sindoor

Delhi has been a major target of terrorists since the mid-1990s to about 2010. The list of blasts that took place and the casualties it caused is lengthy. In April 1996 a blast in a Paharganj hotel took the lives of 17 people, both tourists and locals. In May, a blast in Lajpat Nagar market using high-powered RDX killed 13 people. There were a number of blasts in the ensuing years, but the casualties were low.

But in October 2005, blasts in Sarojini Nagar and Paharganj led to the deaths of nearly 70 people. Then in September 2008, coordinated blasts in Connaught Place, Karol Bagh and Greater Kailash led to the deaths of over 30 people. The last major bomb blast in Delhi was the briefcase bomb at the Delhi High Court, killing some 15 people and injuring over 60 in September 2011.

There are two possible consequences that arise from the 10 November blast.

First, that this was potentially a Pakistani action which was carefully camouflaged to be shown as a local Kashmiri one. If the Pakistani hand is detected, it will have drastic consequences.

In the wake of Operation Sindoor, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had declared that in the future India would give a fitting reply to all acts of terrorism, and that “we will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.”

Since Operation Sindoor had been merely been suspended, India could well choose to resume it, though the geopolitical moment is probably not propitious for India.

But the second possibility is equally troublesome: that this was a purely Kashmiri operation, suggesting that the terrorism has developed deep roots in the state. Those arrested will face the law of the land, but what will the government do about the kind of radicalisation that has led to the 10 November tragedy?

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)