Aerodomes to Airports: India's Wartime Runways Now Face Geopolitical Stress Test

Pakistani airspace closure & West Asia crisis have significantly changed economics of long-haul flights from India.

With the progressive establishment of new private airlines in the early 1990s, the  pressure to expand all the existing airports grew.

(Photo: Kamran Akhter/The Quint)

The growth of aviation from its inception at Kitty Hawk, US, in 1903 to the present time has been consistent and rapid. It was driven initially by the demands of global warfare, and the consequential need for quick connectivity and accessibility to distant battlefields and remote border areas. World War I saw the first use of aircraft for light bombing and aerial surveillance. With the growth of national air forces and the resultant conflict in the air, World War II saw the emergence of metal bodied aircraft and the jet engine.

This defence imperative pushed the early financing of technology, and created the consequent aircraft manufacturing capability and capacity. As this reduced aircraft costs, and increased their range and payloads, the immediate applications for civilian use were apparent.

Further growth has since been driven by the huge commercial applications in the civilian market for air connectivity. Tourism has been a major beneficiary of this evolution.

The concurrent growth of an upwardly mobile middle class has tapped into the parallel development of multimedia advertising that is now universal in its reach and appeal. Over the last 75 years, the result has been the literal explosion in the demand for business and leisure travel across the globe. Responding to this has been the number and size of medium and large airports across all continents.

India is a vivid case in point. 

Early Shoots of Aviation in Colonial India

The Juhu Aerodrome was established in Mumbai in 1928 largely because of geography, commerce, and colonial priorities Mumbai (then Bombay) was already one of the busiest ports in India under British rule, and a hub for trade and shipping. Aviation was seen as a natural extension of this sea and land connectivity. The Juhu area offered relatively open, flat and cheap land near the urban centre which was suitable for building runways in the early days when aircraft were light and landed at low (70-90 kmph) speeds, so the runway infrastructure needed  was rudimentary. 

As a major administrative and commercial center for the British, placing the first civil aerodrome in Bombay aligned with their focus on connecting imperial trade routes. 

Moreover, the city had strong industrial and financial sectors, making it a logical choice for early aviation experiments and commercial flights. The is why JRD Tata flew the first airmail service from Bombay to Karachi in 1932.

Calcutta (Kolkata) was the capital until 1911 and remained important for eastern trade, especially with Burma and Southeast Asia. However, by the late 1920s, the British were shifting focus westward, where Bombay’s port connected more directly to Europe via the Suez Canal.

Delhi had become the political capital in 1911, but it lacked the industrial and commercial infrastructure that Bombay already had. Aviation was initially driven by commerce, not politics, so Delhi was not the first choice. 

After Juhu Aerodrome (1928), the next major aerodromes in India were the Dum Dum Airport in Calcutta (expanded in the 1930s), and Willingdon Aerodrome in Delhi in 1930, followed by Santacruz Airport in Bombay (1942). These reflected colonial priorities—Calcutta for eastern trade, Delhi for administration, and Bombay for western commerce.  

As civil aviation expanded after Juhu Aerodrome (1928) and Dum Dum Airport (Calcutta), the British colonial government recognised the need for a dedicated department to plan, coordinate, and finance further growth of airports across the country.

Governing the Air

The Civil Aviation Department was created under the Ministry of Communications, and a full time Director of Aerodromes was appointed. His role was to oversee the development and regulation of aerodromes across the country, ensuring uniform standards and coordinating with both commercial and military aviation needs.

Unfortunately, the exact name of the first Director is not well‑documented in publicly available sources, but the position was created as part of the colonial government’s effort to institutionalise aviation governance. 

The Willingdon (now Safdarjang) Aerodrome was set up in 1918, and the first flight was an airmail service connecting Delhi with other parts of India. In the 1920s–30s, it hosted air shows and became Delhi’s first civil aerodrome, providing vital connectivity for the Viceroys and the Government of India (GOI) with London. 

In the 1930s, Begumpet was set up by the Nizam, and Madras aerodrome was also built by the GOI. This widespread establishment of small aerodromes necessitated the formation of the DGCA in 1934. Set up next to the Willingdon Airport(now Safdarjang), it was one of the first Aviation Regulatory bodies in the world. 

Shortly thereafter, Jodhpur was set up by Maharaja Umaid Singh, initially as a Flying Club, and this was later expanded by the RAF during WW2. That is how the first IAF Pilot Training Academy was set up there. 

The Willingdon Aerodrome was used extensively during World War II, leading to the acquisition of 5,200 acres of land at Palam, and the creation of an Air Force base there. Later, the strategic value of air power was driven home when Safdarjang Aerodrome was used for emergency operations in Kashmir in 1947. At Independence in 1947, the Ministry of Civil Aviation was created in recognition of the growing role of aviation in communications, security, and commercial development across the nation. 

As the domestic and international air traffic from and through Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras grew rapidly in the 1960s, the IAAI was registered in January,1972 under the International Airports Authority Act, 1971 under the Ministry of Civil Aviation 

Its primary objective was to grow, operate, improve, and administer the major international airports in India. It took over the expansion, development and management of Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata. In 1991 Trivandrum was upgraded to international status and added to the IAAI. 

The IAAI’s responsibilities included:

• Oversight of domestic and international passenger services through these airports.

• Cargo handling and amenities 

• Airline operations support 

• Ensuring compliance with international civil aviation standards 

Politics and Administrative Legacy

In response to numerous demands for air connectivity in the rest of the country, many tier one and two cities and towns were connected to the metropolitan centres in the early 1960s so as a logical extension of this, the National Airports Authority (NAA) was established in 1986 to develop and manage around 56 small airports/airfields in these cities and towns as well as to expand and develop civil enclaves in the defence airports at Goa and Pune. 

It was also entrusted with the responsibility of running the national Air Traffic Control system, and of training air traffic controllers. For this, the Civil Air Traffic Control Academy (CATC) was set up at Allahabad.

It has been continuously expanded and upgraded since, to keep pace with the modernisation of equipment, and the increasingly complex ATC systems needed to cope with high-density traffic, and synchronisation with the latest aircraft communications needs. With the significant and growing international air traffic through and overflying India, it was also essential to harmonise and synchronise our air traffic control practices and communications with the continually evolving global norms. 

At that time, the then volume of traffic handled by these smaller airports was unable to generate positive cash flows. While the IAAI, which was handling around 85 percent of the total domestic traffic and all of the international traffic, was able to consistently generate positive cash flows, the surplus was inadequate to cover the large fresh investments needed for major expansions and upgradation of its major airports. 

Political pressure to merge the two authorities was a natural consequence, but there was reluctance to cede control of the airports and to sharing expansion and investment decisions with private partners by taking the next step to reduce Government ownership.

Moreover, the legacy issues and the complexities of merging two large cadres of the IAAI and NAA raised administrative problems. In addition was the politically sensitive issue of eliminating duplication of jobs in the merged organisation in the interests of efficiency. These issues had been foreseen and raised in policy discussions between the IAAI and the Ministry of Civil Aviation in 1992. 

The IAAI had then suggested that, as a first step, a single entity, the AAI, be set up with 100 percent government equity. Then, as an immediate priority, Bombay and Delhi should be spun off with private partners, with AAI retaining only 26 percent in these joint ventures. Apart from attracting fresh capital, doing so would free up decision-making and ease the solution of a long-standing problem of massive encroachment of IAAI land by squatters.

The Privatisation Era

With the progressive establishment of new private airlines in the early 1990s, pressure on the expansion of all the existing airports grew further, and the merger of IAAI and NAA in 1993 became inevitable. By itself, the merger did not solve the problem of getting adequate investment capital, or speed up decision-making on new airport projects. 

While the merger was done in April 1995, the previously mentioned complexities of merging two different organisational cadres, was a major barrier for progress. So, in the short term, IAAI and NAA operated as independent divisions of the newly formed AAI. While an interim merger of cadres was initiated in 2003, the final integration was possible only in 2005. 

The first breakthrough in achieving the primary objective of opening up airports to private investment, however, came with government approval to construct a new airport at a greenfield site at Bangalore in partnership with consortium of L&T, Siemens, and Zurich Airport in 2004. A similar approval was granted the same year to set up a new green field airport at Hyderabad in partnership with the GMR group.

Then, in 2006, in partnership with the GVK Group, Bombay Airport was privatised, and Delhi was similarly privatised in partnership with the GMR group, with the AAI retaining 26 percent equity in both joint venture companies. The remaining 74 percent were held by private consortiums, led by the GMR group for Delhi, and led by the GVK Group for Bombay. The GVK stake was later acquired by the Adani Group. 

The dramatic benefit of these policy changes is there for all to see- India’s new airports today are among the best in the world, and acknowledged to be so! However, this golden era of infrastructure excellence is now facing an unprecedented stress test.

The same forces of geography and global connectivity that once turned sleepy aerodromes into international gateways are now being weaponized by geopolitics. The soaring trajectory of Indian aviation is no longer just a matter of domestic policy or private efficiency; it is becoming increasingly tethered to the stability of distant borders. As airspace becomes a tool of diplomacy and fuel costs mirror the volatility of global conflict, the industry must pivot from a strategy of pure expansion to one of high-stakes resilience. 

Aviation and Geopolitics

The ongoing closure of Pakistani airspace and tensions in West Asia have fundamentally changed the economics of long-haul flights from India. Rerouting around restricted airspace is adding 30 to 90 minutes to most Europe-bound flights, with some ultra-long-haul routes extending flight times by two to four hours. Industry reports estimate the Pakistan airspace ban alone could cost Air India up to $591 million over a 12-month period due to increased fuel burn and payload restrictions. 

Longer routes require more fuel, forcing airlines to reduce passenger or cargo capacity to maintain safe take-off weights and directly hitting the "per-seat" revenue model.

Fuel is no longer just a major expense; it has become the dominant cost factor: aviation turbine fuel prices in India surged over 114 percent by early April 2026, crossing Rs 2 lakh per kilo-litre in some regions. Historically, fuel accounted for 30–40 percent of an airline's operating costs. In the current climate, it has climbed to a staggering 55–60 percent.

This sharp spike has led to a 40–50 percent surge in airfares on sensitive routes like Europe and Singapore, resulting in over 10,000 flight cancellations across the sector as demand reacts to the higher prices. 

In fact, Europe has seen a slash in short haul traffic with large scale cancellation of flights, and AI has recently announced cancellation of 400 flights to its international destinations. 

To prevent a total industry shutdown, the Indian government introduced an emergency measure in April 2026 to cap domestic ATF price hikes at 25 percent per month. 

The AAI and MOCA need to urgently consult with all their associates—partners, airlines, travel companies, financiers, and other airports across Europe and West Asia to evolve a common approach to mitigate these problems, which will clearly continue over the short term. 

In the fluid situation created by the ongoing hostilities, predicting the future seems impossible, yet given the airport investments at stake, a strategy for the immediate future is essential. While informal discussions are doubtless already ongoing, discourse in the public domain is also essential to promote debate and, eventually, shared clarity on the next steps. 

(Vijay Mathur is a Defence/Aviation Advisor and Consultant. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint does not endorse or is responsible for the same.)