UN's Corridor Plan for Myanmar Can Become a Headache For India. Here's Why

India must watch the US-China strategic rivalry playing out in Myanmar and in an increasingly inimical Bangladesh.

Some strategic experts have warned that the so-called humanitarian corridor may actually be part of a US proxy war against China’s influence in Myanmar.

(Photo: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

Bangladesh has agreed in principle to a controversial UN proposal for a so-called humanitarian corridor from Cox’s Bazar to the Rakhine state of Myanmar. The humanitarian corridor will apparently deliver aid to the civilian (non-Rohingya) population of the Rakhine state affected by the civil war. The rebel Arakan Army, fighting the Myanmar military junta, controls most of the Rakhine state.

Although Bangladesh officials are offering mixed signals on the corridor in the face of political opposition, once implemented, it could evolve into an arena for the playing out of US-China rivalries.

A Safe Passage for Rohingyas Unlikely

The corridor was originally conceived as a safe passage for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh. After a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report in 2024 about a silent famine in the Rakhine, it seems to have been repurposed for supplying food, medicine, and other essentials to the (non-Rohingya) population suffering there. 

Although UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres insists this will not detract from eventual safe repatriation for Rohingyas, that is unlikely.

The region is under the Arakan Army’s control and the terror it unleashed against the Rohingyas led to many of them fleeing to Bangladesh. 

Some strategic experts have warned that the so-called humanitarian corridor may actually be part of a US proxy war against China’s influence in Myanmar. 

The Bangladesh Army has already secured a site, the river port of Silkhali. Personnel from the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) stationed at Hawaii will provide logistics and security for the corridor and the internally displaced people in the Rakhine. How they will be deployed inside Myanmar without getting embroiled in a military conflict remains unclear.

Since the UN has no boots on the ground, it will only bring the essential aid to Silkhali. The logistics of taking the aid across the corridor and deciding to whom it will be delivered will be left to the USARPAC.

The Arakan Army, as the only functioning authority in the Rakhine state, will be the likely recipient, further consolidating its position.

The Chinese Connect

The Rakhine’s geostrategic importance for China cannot be underestimated. It will play an increasingly critical role in providing ports, gas pipelines and energy security to China, and be its gateway to the Indian Ocean. 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative has two sea corridors: the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which begins in Xinjiang and ends in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port; and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which begins in Yunnan and ends at the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port in the Rakhine. The CMEC is designed to be a lifeline to energy-starved Western China.  

The Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline already transports Middle East gas and oil from Kyaukphyu to Yunnan in China.  

China's long-term lease on the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port will be important in helping it bypass the traditional sea routes through the Strait of Malacca, a potential choke point that can be controlled by the US.

Although Kyaukphyu is officially a commercial project, strategic experts are apprehensive that it may be repurposed for military use. 

China provides financial and military support to Myanmar’s military junta to retain its geopolitical leverage. According to unconfirmed reports it may be safeguarding its investments in the Rakhine by also indirectly helping the Arakan Army. The Rakhine humanitarian corridor thus has the potential to destabilise China’s game plans.  

Aside from big power rivalries playing out in Myanmar, the decision of Bangladesh to support the corridor is fraught with several problems. 

Firstly, the corridor violates international law as it lacks Myanmar’s consent, especially since Bangladesh recognises the government in Yangon.  

Secondly, the Arakan Army, which is expected to be the recipient of the humanitarian aid, has had links with the Chinese supported United Wa State Army in Myanmar and may, therefore, be an unreliable partner for the UN and the US. 

Most significantly, the unelected interim government of Muhammad Yunus has no mandate to take critical foreign and security policy decisions.

The corridor is being set up outside of established international frameworks and lacks transparency and accountability within Bangladesh. Its blueprint as well as its regulatory and security mechanisms have not been made public. 

Bangladesh Remains Unstable While US Watches

Instead of focusing on the sole designated task of the interim government to hold democratic elections, the Yunus government is embroiling Bangladesh in geopolitical games with uncertain benefits. Experts in Bangladesh have warned that the corridor may become a precedent for similar intervention in Bangladesh itself under similar justifications. 

Domestically, the Yunus government is also inviting global players to participate in strategic projects – the Chittagong and Mongla Ports are in the process of being leased out to foreign companies despite opposition and international consultants are being asked to restructure the stock market. The interim government seems not to feel the need for a national consensus on seminal geopolitical matters. 

Meanwhile, US officials have been visiting Bangladesh regularly.

They have held meetings not only with Bangladesh officials but also with representatives of the United League of Arakan (ULA), a political wing of Arakan Army as well as the Chin National Front (CNF), the political front of the Chin National Army. Together they are part of the United Nationalities Federal Council, a coalition of non-Burman ethnic groups demanding autonomy within a more federal system in Myanmar. 

Given these developments, the Rakhine is likely to become one of the arenas of US-China strategic competition with the Arakan Army and Bangladesh as mere proxies in this game. 

India needs to pay close attention to the geopolitical games in Bangladesh. The Chin state of Myanmar not only adjoins the Rakhine state but also abuts Mizoram. The Chins and Mizos consider themselves tribal kin with different nomenclature in the two countries.  

Mizoram currently hosts about 30,000 Chin refugees who fled the conflict in Myanmar, in defiance of the Central government in Delhi. What happens to the Chins in Myanmar, therefore, cannot leave Mizoram unaffected especially since the Arakan Army is reportedly also capturing Chin areas. 

More importantly, as regional geopolitical dynamics change because of the humanitarian corridor it could also adversely impact India’s access to Myanmar’s Sittwe port in the Rakhine.

India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that will connect India’s northeastern states to the Bay of Bengal bypassing Bangladesh, has seen disruptions by the Arakan Army. 

India should pay close attention to the US-China strategic competition playing out in Myanmar and in an increasingly inimical Bangladesh. There could be a cost to pay, particularly in India’s restive northeastern states. 

(The writer is a senior journalist based in Delhi. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)