Former Generals, Intel Officials on The Quint’s Pathankot Coverage

Experts - former intelligence officers to former army generals - are split in their opinion of Pathankot attack ops.

With the dust settling on the combing operations in the Pathankot air force station, experts, including former intelligence officers and former army generals, are split on whether it was a success or failure.

Some experts have picked holes in the government’s narrative and the operational decisions of the forces involved in the counter-terrorist operation.

All of them, however, are unanimous in their view that Punjab Police SP Salwinder Singh’s abduction and eventual release is decidedly fishy.

1. Ops Successful as Damage Contained: C Uday Bhaskar

Hoping that appropriate lessons will be learnt and policy correctives swiftly applied in light of the Defence Minister’s admission of security gaps, C Uday Bhaskar writes,

Based on the information now available in the public domain, it is evident that the one area where the Indian security establishment could have done better is in the intelligence (or intel) domain.

Read the complete article here.

2. The Pathankot Attack was a Disgrace For Us: Lt General HS Panag (Retd)

The operation was a disaster from the word go, writes former Northern Army Commander Lt General HS Panag (Retd). In a short and concise piece he rips apart the manner in which the operation was conducted. Panag is particularly scathing in his remarks against National Security Advisor Ajit Doval.

The villain of the piece seems to be Doval, followed by the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army. What was the NSG doing in a purely military installation? The time is not far when we will take orders from the Home Minister, the National Security Advisor or the police. Once again we have become the laughing stock for the whole world, and given our weaknesses on a platter to the ISI.

Read the complete article here.

3. Beyond Pathankot Attack: Well-Trained SWAT Teams Are the Need of the Hour: Vappala Balachandran

Incidents similar to the Pathankot attack in India’s neighbourhood had a far more devastating effect, writes former RAW official Vappala Balachandran, mentioning attacks in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

According to Balachandran, unlike 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the IC-814 Kandahar hijacking, Pathankot witnessed prompt response with the proactive deployment of NSG commandos.

It needed the 26/11 attack to compel the Government of India to create more NSG hubs and ask the states to train their own SWAT teams. Even that does not seem to have been adequate as the flushing-out operations at Pathankot air base had started only after the NSG had arrived. When the Mumbai police found themselves incapable of handling the 26/11 attacks they immediately summoned the army and navy SWAT teams.

Read the complete article here.

4. Pathankot Attack Leaves Behind Some Uncomfortable Questions: Kanwar Sandhu

The veteran Punjab-based journalist seeks answers to a few uncomfortable questions arising after the attack, including the need to deploy the NSG, despite the presence of army troops specially trained in anti-insurgency operations.

He asks,

• Do we know the route taken by the terrorists before they stormed the Dinanagar police station in July last year and has that route been plugged?
  
• Did the Punjab Police take remedial security steps in the 40-50 km hinterland area to prevent infiltration by terrorists?
  
• Why were quick reaction teams (QRTs) not stationed in each of the defence installations in addition to the Defence Service Corps (DSC) personnel, who are on static duty with routine weapons?
  
• Why was the task given to the National Security Guards (NSG), which is manned, trained and equipped to tackle only specific targets?
  
• Why did the Defence Minister, army and air force chiefs and the western army commander not put down their foot on the issue of sending NSG commandos?

Read the complete article here.

5. Probing Suspect Gurdaspur SP May Open Can of Worms: Vipin Pubby

Focussing his attention on the Punjab Police, equipped with his decades-long experience of reporting in Punjab, Vipin Pubby echoes other experts’ doubts over Gurdaspur Superintendent of Police (Headquarter) Salwinder Singh. Pubby also feels enough steps were not taken to seal the sensitive air force station to prevent the terrorists from entering.

Read the complete article here.

6. Why This Hysteria?: Amar Bhushan

Don’t panic, avoid covert retaliation and continue talking to Pakistan, writes former top RAW counter-intelligence officer Amar Bhushan.

This idea is maddening. If you practice this, you will be branded, not a victim, but a promoter of terrorism with far-reaching, adverse consequences for your economy, your defence preparedness and your quest to be counted in the comity of nations. The only way you can prevent another Pathankot is by remaining eternally vigilant against both your internal and external enemies.

Read the complete article here.

7. Why Did CCS Not Meet Through Pathankot Terror Attack? - Chandan Nandy

While the CCS did not meet in the course of the three days when a battalion-strong group of soldiers muddled their way before finally eliminating six terrorists in the Pathankot air force base, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval alone took operational decisions, choosing to wear a general’s hat rather than an advisor’s, writes The Quint’s Chandan Nandy.

Pathankot exposed that Doval could not objectively define which type of military operation would be the most effective in liquidating the terrorists in the shortest possible time and with a minimum body count.

Read the complete article here.