Mercifully, the Pathankot operation against the terrorists is over. Unfortunately, the damage in terms of human lives lost is colossal. The six terrorists managed to snuff out seven lives of our valuable security personnel. There is little disagreement that since they managed to infiltrate one of the front line air bases of the country they could have caused even more damage, especially to the IAF’s vital assets like aircraft, helicopters and missiles.
Had they entered the residential area, they could have killed some of our highly trained and valuable fighter pilots and ground staff. But, as in the case of the Dinanagar terrorist attack in July last year, this too would vanish from media radars in the next few days. However, the incident will leave behind some uncomfortable and nagging questions that beg answers, lest there is yet another repeat of such an operation in future.
Dinanagar Attack Probe
One obvious question is: what happened to the inquiry into the Dinanagar attack? Do we know the route of ingress that the terrorists had taken before they stormed the Dinanagar police station and has that route been plugged? What steps, if any, were taken since that attack to beef up the first line of border defence manned by the Border Security Force (BSF)?
The second nagging question is: since the terrorists struck deep inside Indian territory, did the Punjab Police take remedial security steps in the 40-50 km hinterland area to ensure that in case the terrorists manage to infiltrate the border, they are stopped in their tracks soon after? Did the authorities explore the possible terrorist-drug-police nexus?
Vital Installations’ Security
The other question that automatically comes to mind is whether our vital defence installations like air and missile bases are adequately secured against guerrilla attacks? This should have been foreseen in the light of the earlier attacks on military installations in India, including the September 2013 attack on Samba-based 16 Cavalry, a tank regiment. Four army men, including the unit’s second-in-command, were gunned down in the attack.
Some Uncomfortable Questions
- Do we know the route taken
by the terrorists before they stormed the Dinanagar police station in July last
year and has that route been plugged?
- Did
the Punjab Police take remedial security steps in the 40-50 km hinterland area
to prevent infiltration by terrorists?
- Why were quick reaction teams (QRTs) not
stationed in each of the defence installations in addition to the Defence
Service Corps (DSC) personnel, who are on static duty with routine weapons?
- Why was the task given to
the National Security Guards (NSG), which is manned, trained and equipped to
tackle only specific targets?
- Why the defence minister, army and air force
chiefs and the western army commander did not put down their foot on the issue
of sending NSG commandos?
Quick Reaction Teams
Similarly, our security establishment should have been alert in the wake of such attacks taking place on a regular basis in Pakistan. The Badaber air base near Peshawar was attacked in September last year and attacks on Karachi naval dockyard and Peshawar Army Public School took place in 2014.
The question that arises is: in the light of such attacks why were quick reaction teams (QRTs) not stationed in each of the defence installations in addition to the Defence Service Corps (DSC) personnel, who are on static duty with routine weapons?
NSG Over Army Special Forces
Four, the manner in which the Pathankot attack was handled raises an important question of operational nature. Since the attack occurred within a defence establishment, why was the obvious not done – requisitioning the army to neutralise the terrorists who were spread out in the huge area of the IAF station? Why was the task given to the National Security Guards (NSG), which is manned, trained and equipped to tackle only specific targets?
In case of the Pathankot attack, the operational responsibility should have automatically gone to the General Officer Commanding of the Pathankot-based 29 Division. The GOC of the Division could have used elements of the NSG for specific tasks, if required. Though, as per my understanding, an infantry division is a complete fighting unit in every respect and even has tank and missile components.
Also watch Pathankot Attack: Defence Minister Admits to Security Gaps
No Insistence
One has heard of the army being requisitioned in aid of civil power but not vice versa, as it appears to have been done in this case. I say this because though the NSG’s action groups are primarily made up of army personnel, it is a force that functions under the Union home ministry. I wonder how and why the defence minister, army and air force chiefs and the western army commander did not put down their foot on the issue? The question is not of “turf” but of operational propriety and effectiveness.
This is not to run-down the NSG in any way. It is a very fine force and its men did a fine job under the circumstances. But the NSG should be used only when required against specific targets and in civilian areas. While propping up the NSG, let us not lose sight of the fact that the army has its own highly trained special forces (SF).
One such unit is based in Udhampur, which is just a short distance from Pathankot. Most SF units, besides the infantry and Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions, have been “blooded” in J&K anti-insurgency operations. What happened at the Pathankot air base was just an extension of what they have been battling in J&K. In order to come out victorious with as little collateral damage as possible in such guerrilla skirmishes it is important to get our operational drill right.
(The writer is a Chandigarh-based journalist who is a defence and security analyst)
Also read Why Did CCS Not Meet Through Pathankot Terror Attack?
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