Beyond Pathankot Attack: Well-Trained SWAT Teams Need of The Hour

Beyond the NSG’s action nothing much could have been done in blunting the Pathankot attack, by Vappala Balachandran

It is true that Pathankot could have been handled better if we had learnt lessons from the July 27, 2015, Gurdaspur attack. We can only heave a sigh of relief by comparing Pathankot with similar incidents in our neighbourhood. In Sri Lanka 20 military aircraft were destroyed, 24 damaged and 30 airmen killed during two LTTE suicide raids on Katunayake and Anuradhapura Air bases in 2001 and 2007 respectively.

In Pakistan, 18 naval personnel were killed and two surveillance aircraft destroyed during the 2011 Taliban attack on Mehran naval base. Twenty-five soldiers were killed in an attempt by the Taliban to storm into the Badaber air base near Peshawar in September 2015.

Considering the above experience, should we not compliment our security personnel for avoiding a blood bath at Pathankot and saving our vital air assets?

Hits and Misses

Another improvement in our response was the quick dispatch of NSG commandos to Pathankot, avoiding delays as was witnessed during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks or the December 1999 IC-814 Kandahar hijacking. The delay in 1999 was attributed to the bungling by the central Crisis Management Group which had similarly failed in summoning the army speedily during the 1984 riots. There is no doubt that the presence of NSG at Pathankot had contributed in a big way in blunting the attack of terrorists who could have otherwise gone on a rampage.

Having said this, some features of this attack are deeply troubling. A report on January 5 said that Punjab Police were given intelligence alerts five days before the strike about such a possibility on New Year’s Eve. Although this was not a “place specific” alert, the Punjab police should have strengthened their border posts since Pakistani terrorists had sneaked in through that route during the July 27, 2015, Gurudaspur attack.

Learning Lessons

• Unlike 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the IC-814 Kandahar hijacking, Pathankot witnessed prompt response by sending NSG commandos
  
• Despite the intelligence alerts not being “place specific”, the Punjab Police should have strengthened the border posts
  
• Merely blaming the BSF for infiltration does not absolve the local police of its responsibility
  
• Similarly, the BSF should not have allowed the malfunctioning of thermal imagers as is being alleged
  
• Pathankot experience should make us realise that better-trained SWAT teams are needed at more strategic places
  

Blame Game Should Stop

Merely blaming the Border Security Force (BSF) for infiltration does not absolve the local police of its responsibility. Similarly the BSF should not have allowed the malfunctioning of thermal imagers as is being alleged. Since drug smuggling is rampant on Punjab border, it is quite possible that terrorists might have bribed their way repeatedly with their stock of arms, posing as drug carriers for storage in secret dumps.

It would appear that plugging the gaps was not seriously contemplated earlier. Only now a high level joint BSF-Punjab Police survey was done to plug the riverine gaps near Ujh and Tarna rivers which are 50-60 meters wide.

Gurdaspur SP’s Unbelievable Story

The story of Gurdaspur Superintendent of Police seems incredulous. He claims to have been gagged and tied up by the terrorists before they hijacked his official vehicle. Pakistan trained terrorists do not show that type courtesy in other cases like the Mumbai 26/11. My professional experience tells me that it is a long standing rule in all states that police vehicles should be driven only by official drivers. In this particular case, the SP’s friend was driving that vehicle.

What exactly they were doing in this area when there was a state wide terror alert? If he was on “undercover” duty to watch illegal activities like drug smuggling, was it advisable on his part to travel in a big SUV with a conspicuous roof top blue beacon even if it was not operating?  These strange features in this incident have perhaps made the senior officers to doubt his version.

Also watch Abducted in Pathankot, SP’s Friend Recounts the Horror

Need To Re-Strategise

It needed the 26/11 attack to compel the Government of India to create more NSG hubs and ask the states to train their own SWAT teams. Even that does not seem to have been adequate as the flushing-out operations at Pathankot air base had started only after the NSG had arrived. When the Mumbai police found themselves incapable of handling the 26/11 attacks they immediately summoned the army and navy SWAT teams.

The army told them that they had no SWAT teams nearby. They only sent their troops for cordon & patrolling operations, which the police were already doing. The Naval “Marcos” came in much later but could not overwhelm the terrorists until the NSG came.

The Pathankot experience should make our civil and defence security managements to realise that better-trained SWAT teams are needed at more strategic places so that they do not have to wait for the NSG to arrive.

(The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and a member of the High Level Committee which enquired into the police performance during 26/11 Mumbai)

Also read Pathankot Air Base Attack: Why This Hysteria?

Probing Suspect Gurdaspur SP May Open Can of Worms