Over two months since the Pahalgam attack, Indian Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) Rajnath Singh participated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) Defence Ministers' meeting on 26 June in Qingdao, China.
In his address at the event, he spoke candidly and directly about the terrorist attack, emphasising how “the pattern of this attack matches with Lashkar-e-Taiba's previous terror attacks in India." He went on to say “India launched Operation Sindoor to exercise its right to defend against terrorism and deter cross-border terrorist attacks by dismantling terrorist infrastructure”.
The Indian media highlighted that Singh refused to sign the text of the declaration that was to emerge from the meeting. This was not factually correct because SCO decisions are taken by consensus.
As India and Pakistan could not resolve their differences on references to the Pahalgam attack and the 11 March Jaffar Express attack in Pakistan by Balochi insurgent groups, there was no declaration available for signature.
What India and Pakistan Want
Pakistan obviously wanted a formulation that would implicate India, even if indirectly, of helping Balochi insurgents. It also would have wanted Pahalgam’s location to be mentioned in the ‘disputed’ territory of Jammu and Kashmir. No Indian minister or diplomat can ever agree to such formulations.
On its part, India would have desired that its right to use force against terrorist attacks be recognised. That, the Pakistanis cannot accept.
In such a situation, it becomes impossible to find common language to satisfy the parties and attempts at making a declaration are abandoned.
As China plays a major role in the SCO, its iron brother Pakistan was batting on a friendly diplomatic wicket in Quingdao. Despite that, it could not have its way in the face of Indian resistance to its formulations. At the same time, it must be admitted that India’s attempts to get countries to condemn or even criticise Pakistan, by name, for supporting terrorist groups which are located on its territory and undertake terrorist attacks against India, seldom succeed.
This has also been witnessed in Indian diplomatic efforts after the Pahalgam attacks which led to Operation Sindoor.
The seven all-party delegations that visited over thirty countries effectively conveyed the country’s determination to respond with the use of force against terrorist attacks from Pakistan. Their official interlocutors in all these countries invariably condemned the Pahalgam terrorist attack. They also forcefully emphasised that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations was unacceptable. They, nevertheless, shied away from going beyond this.
This is because countries not involved directly in a dispute seldom wish to take sides. Hence, they take cover behind generalities.
Additionally, they also do not want to get involved in territorial status issues between contending parties. If they do so, it is a clear sign of wishing to build ties with one of the parties even at the expense of offending the other.
In this context, it would be interesting to observe how Indian diplomacy handled its territorial status and the issue of Pakistani terrorism bilaterally with different countries during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visits abroad.
At the same time, how did India handle these matters in multilateral meetings such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) summit and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) Foreign Ministers recent meeting in Washington?
Domestic Rhetoric vs International Relations
India’s position on the status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir and now the Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh are enshrined in its Constitution. They are an integral part of the Indian Union. At the same time, part of their territories are under the control of Pakistan and China. India is committed to recover them through peaceful means.
With Pakistan, the modalities of peaceful negotiations on these territories are mentioned in the Simla Agreement of 1972.
India’s Constitutional position on these territories is sacrosanct for this nation but it is not so recognised by many countries and also the United Nations (UN). They, in fact, consider these territories 'disputed', though they seldom highlight this fact.
Countries seek to cushion their positions in soft language so as not to give offence to India. As for the UN and some countries they refer to the part of the Union Territories with India as 'Indian-administered' and that with Pakistan as 'Pakistan-administered'. Naturally, India correctly refers to the parts under Pakistani control as Pakistani-Occupied-Kashmir or PoK.
The Pahalgam attack occurred in J&K. Naturally, during Modi’s recent visits to Cyprus, Croatia, Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina the Pahalgam attack and the unacceptability of a state using terrorism as an instrument of policy was highlighted by India.
It is instructive to observe how Pahalgam was mentioned in the joint statements relating to these visits because they give an indication of how these countries view the territorial status of J&K.
The India-Cyprus joint statement which issued on 16 June after Modi’s meeting with its leaders in Nicosia stated:
“Cyprus expressed solidarity and unwavering support to India in its fight against cross-border terrorism. The two leaders strongly condemned the gruesome killing of civilians in the recent heinous terrorist attacks in Pahalgam, J&K, India.”
The India-Croatia joint statement which came out after Modi visited Zagreb on 19 June stated Modi thanked "Prime Minister Plenković and Croatia for the support and solidarity extended in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, India, on 22 April 2025.
Both sides condemned terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including transnational and cross-border terrorism”. But there is a subtle difference between the two regarding the status of J&K.
The Cyprus statement makes it clear that both leaders jointly hold J&K as Indian territory. This is as clear a position on J&K’s territorial status as there can be. The Croatian joint statement contains Modi’s assertions. But the Croatian leaders have not joined him in it. However, the fact that Croatia allows it to be included is diplomatically a good signal to India, even if it has not gone as far as India would have liked.
Modi visited Ghana on 3 July. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website does not mention any Indo-Ghana joint statement. It does contain a list of activities that the two countries will undertake jointly.
Significantly, the Trinidad and Tobago joint statement issued on 4 July contain the following formulation on terrorism: “The two leaders acknowledged the common threat posed by terrorism to peace and security. They reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism. They declared that there could be no justification for terrorism, including cross-border terrorism."
It does not refer to the Pahalgam attack at all. This is truly intriguing.
Modi visited Argentina on 6 July. He held discussions with the Argentinian President, Javier Milei. A PMO media release notes he "thanked President Milei for the strong condemnation of the barbaric terrorist attack in Pahalgam and appreciated Argentina’s solidarity for India in its fight against terrorism. The two leaders agreed that terrorism poses a grave threat to humanity and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen the global fight against the menace”.
It is noteworthy that the location of Pahalgam is not mentioned.
All in the Name?
The BRICS and the QUAD declaration regarding the Pahalgam attack mention as the attack in Jammu and Kashmir. They follow the UNSC Presidential statement issued immediately after the attack which called it so. It did not use any adjectives to denote the status of J&K.
This is creative multilateral diplomacy for it allows both parties to define its status in the light of their positions. Pakistan, which is a member of the UNSC, went along with the Presidential statement.
All in all, the discussion on J&K’s territorial status shows that only Cyprus gave India full satisfaction.
This does not mean, of course, that India will ever accept that the constitutional status of the two UTs will not remain forever. But it does show that most countries do not want to take sides in such issues.
The bilateral and multilateral statements do not mention Pakistan by name. They do sometimes mention cross border terrorism, which India holds as a code word for Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India. However, this is no substitute for directly naming Pakistan.
The diplomatic world is largely grey. It is seldom black and white, as India’s experience post Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor shows.
(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs. He can be reached @VivekKatju. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)