Last month, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan with a far-reaching clause akin to Article 5 of the NATO Agreement. It establishes a trilateral collective-defence framework whose operative sentence reads: “An armed attack on one signatory shall be regarded as an attack against them all.”
The agreement, signed on 7 August, was already being touted as “Islamic NATO”. However, in less than a month, seeds of doubt have begun to sprout.
Collective-defence pacts are meant to deter wars. Yet, if signatories make sweeping promises without the military integration, decision-making mechanisms, and escalation controls needed to carry them out, the limits of these promises come under question.
In the absence of these clearly established mechanisms, the agreement is facing serious difficulties in responding to an escalating confrontation. Its strategic significance, therefore, depends less on the declaration of mutual commitment than on whether its members can translate political solidarity into credible and coordinated capabilities for deterrence and escalation management.
Political Solidarity vs Credible Deterrence
Each signatory has different strategic motivations.
Saudi Arabia seeks greater regional leverage and enhanced deterrence to protect its economic transformation and critical national infrastructure.
Turkey seeks a cooperative framework to manage regional spillover, counter unfavourable strategic shifts, and align its industrial and military capabilities with those of its partners.
Pakistan, the only nuclear power among the three, aims to leverage its nuclear and conventional military capabilities while deepening economic and defence ties with major West Asian countries.
But the central challenge for them lies in converting political solidarity into a sufficiently credible and flexible deterrence without creating commitments that outpace their capacity to act.
The important question, therefore, is whether the ambiguity surrounding how these capabilities might be employed together is sufficient to make potential adversaries, including Iran, Israel, or the Houthis, less willing to test the resolve of any one member.
Divergent Priorities
Although all three countries have emphasised political solidarity in response to growing uncertainty across the region, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement remains largely a political commitment and lacks some of the military mechanisms necessary for sustained coordination.
The pact is laden with symbolic significance as the three possess military capabilities which are not complementary. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial financial muscle and advanced Western-origin air and missile defence systems. Turkey offers a military industrial base that manufactures advanced drones and missile systems and is a part of NATO, but is increasingly shifting towards indigenous technologies. Pakistan contributes a large military force, primarily operating Chinese equipment, with significant combat experience and a nuclear arsenal.
The fact is that defence-industrial cooperation does not automatically produce military interoperability. Building interoperability across these disparate architectures will require years of investment in common communication standards, data links, doctrines, and training. If effectively integrated, these capabilities could pose the threat of collective retaliation. But this interoperability and integration remain the pact’s most difficult and consequential challenge.
The threat perceptions and strategic priorities are divergent. Riyadh remains primarily concerned with Gulf security and the protection of critical infrastructure from the Houthis, while Ankara’s concerns extend across Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus, Greece and the Caucasus. Islamabad remains heavily focused on India.
These divergent priorities raise questions among potential adversaries about whether all three members would incur the costs and risks necessary to defend one another.
No wonder External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, when asked about India’s reaction to the agreement said:
“There are live military situations which each of the signatories face, what has the Mecca pact done in response to that?”
The Gap
In the aftermath of the agreement, regional actors continued to challenge the security arrangement.
The Houthis attacked Saudi strategic targets, including crude oil tank farms in Jazan and Abha on 8 September, as well as facilities belonging to state oil giant Aramco. Israel struck Abu Duhur Air Base, near the Turkish border, shortly after Turkish security officials had visited the area as part of Ankara’s effort to support the development of Syria’s post-civil-war military capabilities. None of these attacks triggered the mutual security promises of the agreement.
The Houthis’ lightning advance along Yemen's Red Sea coast, which included Perim Island in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab and Mocha, apparently with direct guidance from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, opened a new front in Iran's war with the US, while also bringing the Houthis into direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia.
On 2 September, Mohsen Rezaei, Iran’s Security Chief, wrote on X, “You will soon witness that Iran’s new strategy across the battlefield, diplomacy, and countering the economic siege will shatter your foundations.”
On 10 September, Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Sajjad Haider Khan said there had been no discussions about a military reaction under the Mecca Agreement in response to the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia.
He said, “When time comes, (we) will act under the agreement.” Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that the three countries “did not need to respond to aggression with aggression”.
The Mecca agreement is an umbrella agreement, “purely for defensive purposes”, and aimed primarily at strengthening regional peace and stability.
The absence of a coordinated military response from the three partners beyond conventional diplomatic condemnations illustrates the gap between political statements, and military action. Unless the pact develops mechanisms for joint planning, intelligence sharing, military exercises, and coordinated responses to aggression, its declaratory commitment may remain insufficient to establish credible collective deterrence.
Each of these countries has regional issues, be it with Yemen, Greece, and Cyprus or India. In a case of conflict, members would be forced to choose between the alliance’s credibility and their own economic and geopolitical interests. There is thus a wide gap between political ambition and military response.
Implications for India
When you analyse the Mecca Pact, one question that crops up is: who will provide security to whom? How will the arrangement work?
The three countries in question are not neighbouring states. They have no land borders with one another. Then how exactly are the security guarantees expected to be delivered? None of them can boast of superpower status with unlimited military hardware.
To evaluate how capacities and capabilities affect the Mecca agreement in general, and India in particular, we must look at how the alliance is structured. A simple answer to this can be derived from an analysis of the overall military capability of each of the nation states.
The land forces are weighted towards Pakistan, with approximately 600,000 troops, followed by Turkey with 400,000 troops and Saudi Arabia with 200,000.
In the air forces, the Turkish Air Force leads with a modernised, heavy-lift transport fleet. Its inventory includes 10 Airbus A400M Atlas strategic airlifters. Each A400M can carry 116 fully geared paratroopers or up to 37 tonnes of cargo. Turkey also has approximately 19 C-130s. A standard C-130 can carry 92 ground troops or 64 paratroopers. There are also 52 CN-235 aircraft, each of which can carry up to 44 troops.
Therefore, there is an estimated single-wave troop lift of about a brigade-minus. They also have a mixed bag of 13-15 fighter aircraft squadrons.
Saudi Arabia has an estimated 30-plus Lockheed C-130 Hercules and C-130J Super Hercules variants, as well as six Airbus A330 MRTT (Multi-Role Tanker Transport) aircraft. Each A330 can also be configured to fly up to 300 fully equipped troops, thereby giving it an estimated single-wave troop lift of less than a brigade. They have 15-17 squadrons of relatively modern American and European fighter aircraft.
Pakistan has roughly 16 Lockheed C-130 Hercules variants, four Ilyushin Il-78 aerial tankers, and some CN-235 and Y-12 utility aircraft used for short-range movements. Its total estimated single-wave troop lift is less than two battalions. Its fighter squadrons total almost 25 squadrons, comprising mainly legacy fighters, but also including F-16s, JF-17s, and J-10CEs.
The naval lift capabilities of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan could dramatically expand the scope of the defence agreement. However, other than Turkey, the naval assets of the other two countries are comparatively nascent in size and designed for domestic security challenges. They are not classically designed for “out-of-area contingencies”.
Turkey has the most sophisticated naval projection capability. The TCG Anadolu, a multi-purpose amphibious assault ship, acts as a floating command centre. It can carry a fully equipped battalion-sized marine task force of 940 troops, along with tanks and landing craft. It can deploy armed drones, like the Bayraktar TB3, giving it precision-strike capabilities during a naval deployment without needing land-based aircraft, but it is a drone carrier, not an aircraft carrier. Turkey fields several large tank landing ships (LSTs), each capable of carrying 350 troops and up to 20 MBTs (main battle tanks).
Thus, the naval forces of each country are designed to meet specific regional security requirements. While inter-operability is possible, any such employment would create critical voids in the already limited naval assets.
Theoretically speaking, if the alliance had to deploy a joint task force tomorrow, it would be safe to assume that Pakistan can provide raw manpower for dispatch to a regional staging ground, for which combined heavy lift capability would be required.
Such a deployment would face interoperability challenges because it would entail a mix of Western (Airbus, Lockheed) and Eastern (Ilyushin) aircraft. The combined naval sealift assets could be used to sustain medium-scale military operations over limited periods.
Who Is the Pact Really Meant to Deter?
The next question is which country they expect to pose a common threat. Israel? Or Iran? A simultaneous offensive from both Turkey and Pakistan could pose a major threat to Iran. However, there have been no deliberate attacks on targets inside Turkey or Pakistan by Iran recently. In fact, Iran has reportedly been invited to join the trilateral agreement.
Israel does not share land borders with all three. That leaves India.
Let us break down this security matrix as probably perceived by Field Marshal Asim Munir. He hopes that in case of an Operation Sindoor-type conflict with India, Turkey would immediately reach out to assist Pakistan. So, Turkey would indirectly be at war with India. But Turkey is a part of NATO, and would India like to be at war with a NATO-backed country?
The other partner is Saudi Arabia. If Pakistan is at war with India, then Saudi Arabia will support Pakistan, and therefore also be indirectly at war with India. The net security provider to Saudi Arabia is the USA. If Saudi Arabia is at war, then by virtue of their security agreement the US too would enter the war.
Now look at this from a hypothetical context. India, in response to any Pahalgam-like misadventure by Pakistan, would launch Operation Sindoor II. (India has already stated that Operation Sindoor is unfinished business.) Asim Munir will hope that such a response would draw Saudi Arabia and Turkey into the conflict, and if they do, then indirectly their net security providers would also be drawn into the conflict. Though this may sound absurd, and whether it will happen or not is conjecture, the possibility theoretically exists.
Asim Munir is taking on a role in regional politics that he cannot sustain. Sooner or later, the veil will drop and his reality will be exposed. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are too involved in their own security issues to jump in aid of Pakistan. With the absence of land borders between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, their combined military capability and lack of compatibility, one can safely assume that the Mecca agreement is not an immediate threat to India.
India must continue to analyse the collective ground, air, and naval capabilities of all three countries to arrive at logical and militarily sustainable conclusions. While doing so, there should be no let-up in modernising our military hardware. With the kind of mindset of our neighbour, we cannot afford to wish away the threat. Instead, we must prepare for the worst.
India’s Diplomatic Options
India has to reconstruct its stand on “strategic autonomy.” This is a time to make friends. The India-Saudi relationship, for example, has always been good. Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently visited Saudi Arabia in 2025. This bilateral relationship must be strengthened.
India-Turkey relations hit an all-time low given Turkey's open support to Pakistan over Kashmir and during Operation Sindoor last year. However, there is room for improvement, for which efforts must be made.
Overall, the diplomatic effort towards the whole of West Asia needs recalibration. Sustained efforts with Iran will help nullify any adversity that the US-Israel-Iran war might have caused.
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defence cooperation is nothing new. They have had written agreements for decades. Pakistan has traditionally had a military presence in Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey actively supported Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pak war, by providing fighter planes and other military wherewithal. There was no Mecca Agreement then. Therefore, India can surely expect similar support in any future Indo-Pak war. However, given their own regional security issues, anything substantial may not be practical in the present scenario.
As deduced that unless the agreement’s political commitments are matched by credible capabilities and mechanisms for coordination, the Mecca agreement risks overpromising while underdelivering. Such a gap could not only weaken its deterrent value, but also complicate crisis management.
No wonder the pact currently appears less like the foundation of a new deterrence architecture and more like a high-stakes political experiment. Its significance should therefore be assessed realistically rather than on the basis of promises it has not been designed to fulfil. It remains, like a rainbow in the sky, on a sunny day.
(The authors are retired Major Generals of the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)