The gunfight in Kokernag area of South Kashmir stretched for 7 days –making it one of the longest operations in Jammu & Kashmir in recent years.
The exchange with the highly trained militants occupying a mountain spur with a steep uphill approach which led to heavy casualties from the forces’ side has raised speculations whether militants in Kashmir are increasingly relying on new strategy of operating away from the populated areas, and hunkering down amidst deeply forested regions looking for what experts have called "tactical advantage.”
At least, four big gun battles in the year 2023 have clearly demonstrated that against the backdrop of precipitously declining insurgency levels, militants are trying to restrategise and recalibrate their modus operandi to adjust to the changing demands of time.
And if they are getting sufficient room to navigate and plot more deadly attacks, even if they are numbering in single digits, that is a grim indication of a mismatch between the narrative that the government seeks to set and the reality of militancy on ground.
A Saga of Ambushes
In April earlier this year, five Army Personnel with Rashtriya Rifles (RR) unit were killed when militants near Bhimber Gali area of Poonch district ambushed their vehicle, taking advantage of rains and low visibility.
A few days later, another big attack took place in the Kandi forest area of Rajouri district. The army units were conducting a combing operation in the area when militants who were safely ensconced in a cave under the canopy of dense forests, detonated an improvised explosive device.
The attack in which five Army personnel were killed was claimed by an affiliate group of Jaish-e-Mohammad and was perpetrated by a group of Pakistani militants.
Last month in Kulgam district’s Halan forest area, militants injured three Army personnel who later succumbed during their treatment in the hospital. Before that in October 2021, J&K saw another of the longest gunfights when a 17-day-long encounter in Narkhas forest area of Mendhar in Poonch ended with the killings of 11 Army personnel.
Together, these gunfights have already tipped the casualty scales on the side of Jammu which now accounts for three times more killings of security personnel than Kashmir.
The Counter Assaults
The Kokernag gunfight of last week involved a local militant Uzair Khan and one foreign mercenary who has not yet been identified. Police sources told The Quint the three Army personnel who were killed at the site had their weapons taken away. The body of the third Army soldier Sepoy–Pradeep Patel who was part of the Sikh Light Infantry of the 19 Rashtriya Rifles was recovered on 18 September.
The 33-year-old Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) who was also among the dead was first to be rescued. His evacuation was assisted by the Gujjar tribes who live nearby, sources said.
The gunfight ended after forces pressed drones and bombarded the area with heavy ammunition after which the patch of the dense forest where militants were believed to be hiding caught fire. Later, the forces recovered the charred bodies of militants.
Security experts told The Quint that a range of factors are behind the latest mishaps including a sense of complacency among the security establishment.
“It’s about the continuity of the level of alertness,” said Shesh Paul Vaid, former Director General of Police J&K, suggesting that the extraneous factors may have put a strain on the level of preparedness of the forces. “This year we had important G20-related meetings in Kashmir, and the Amarnath pilgrimage also concluded recently. Terrorists must have come from somewhere and were looking for quick action.”
The former DGP said that the Kokernag operation showed that militants were now gravitating towards the jungle and mountain areas. “This is actually a new trend. We saw its beginnings four years ago when a similar gunfight took place in the Handwara area of North Kashmir resulting in the killing of a colonel and one officer.”
A Successor Trend of Hybrid Militancy?
Over the last few years, as the Union government stepped up a wider crackdown over what it called the 'ecosystem of militancy', marked by action against not just the militants but also those found aiding militancy in ways big and small. The clampdown did result in a decline in the overall militancy but was also accompanied by a change in tactics.
The last two years saw the older form of militancy morph itself into a secretive effort characterised by young teenagers with no previous “adverse” record being found involved in several high-profile targeted killings.
The security forces have termed it "hybrid terrorism.” The years 2021 and 2022 saw a large number of killings of J&K Police personnel members of minority communities, and alleged informers in which investigators found that the teenage neophytes dabbling in militancy had a significant role to play.
A New Pattern
But more concerted actions over the last few months have resulted in such activities coming down. What appears to have been a notable consequence is that the wiping out of militant infrastructure from populated areas has now been followed by a new trend where militants have started relocating to forests and hills.
“The pattern is already there now,” said Ajay Sahni, the Executive Director at the Institute of Conflict Management, New Delhi. “These incidents took place in the past as well but they were part of a larger number of other incidents. Today, an incident of this nature occurs when there is almost no other activity. So this stands out.”
Sahni said that in terrains such as the Gadole forest area where the gunfight took place last week, the “hidden approach” of forces was not possible. “Senior-most officers were clustered in the first place, they all went down in one first burst of gunfire from terrorists,” he said. “The error is that officers were clustered on a very difficult approach. Normally this is not done. They must have been spread out. It seems that because of security forces’ sense of domination over that place, a feeling of complacency appears to have taken hold.”
The Perennial Autumn Escalation
The period of late summer is usually the time when forces expect a spike in militant activities. Last year, between September and October months, there was a sudden burst in militant-related violence on the heels of Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s three-day visit to J&K.
Around six gun battles, five attacks, two mystery murders – including that of a top-ranking police officer and one civilian killing stood in sharp contrast against what was a perfectly peaceful September month.
Similarly in October 2021, a series of killings including that of a Kashmiri Pandit chemist, a Hindu teacher, and a Sikh school principal in Srinagar prompted security forces to ramp up security all over the region and even got the Union government to rush additional troops.
The Gadole encounter is also coming at the same time this year and is accompanied by other incidents. Police sources told The Quint that two grenade attacks in Srinagar and one in Lelhar in Pulwama had taken place over the last few days. In Srinagar, a CRPF vehicle also captured an attack by a masked individual on a CCTV camera.
Not an “Ambush”
J&K Police recently instructed its former officers to desist from terming the Kokernag gunfight as an “ambush” suggesting that it was not the fair characterisation of the term, as it was the security forces who launched the operation on the receipt of information about the militant presence.
But experts have said that the attack stands out for a variety of reasons. “They (J&K Police) may call it anything. But prowling amidst the safety of dense cover and then inflicting heavy damage indicates that certainly something has happened which is not usual,” Vaid said.
There’s also been speculation whether militants have managed to generate a "deceptive intelligence” and lured the forces into a location where they had a tactical advantage, though the police strongly deny it.
“Such a proposition can be confirmed or denied by whoever is investigating it,” Sahni, the Counter-terrorism Expert, said. “Prima facie, there’s no reason to believe betrayal is part of the failure.”
He said that the militants had already taken up a secure spot from where they could see the full line of approach. “They already have tactical advantage. Why would anyone need to sabotage or betray intelligence?” Sahni said.
Senior J&K Police officials who spoke to The Quint anonymously, however, said that this spell of gunfights in forests was actually proof that security forces have made it impossible for militants to carry out activities in populated areas as a result of which they are forced to flee to higher reaches.
“It's a temporary change in tactic,” the officer said. “In barely a weeks’ time, we will have snowfall in higher areas and these people will have to return.”
(Shakir Mir is an independent journalist. He tweets at @shakirmir. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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