Day two of the Iran-US ceasefire is not particularly heartening. Israel conducted its deadliest bombardment of Lebanon on Wednesday, 8 April, and Iran threatened to once again block the Strait of Hormuz, which would effectively unravel the ceasefire.
The Iranians and the Pakistanis say that the ceasefire included the fighting in Lebanon, while the Israelis deny this. The Americans seem to be waffling on this point, but they will have to make up their mind because if guns in Lebanon are not silenced, the ceasefire and future talks will be imperilled.
The reason is clear. The Hezbollah has entered the war in Iran’s favour, and Tehran cannot now leave them to their own fate. Second, and equally important, is the fact that if fighting in Lebanon continues, it has the capacity of undermining the ceasefire on the Iran front.
A Fragile Path to Negotiation
In the meantime, both sides are going through with plans to begin their talks in Islamabad from Friday, 10 April. Indications are that the talks will follow the Geneva format in February. They will be indirect to start with, with Pakistan carrying proposals and responses from one side to the other. Subsequently, the two could have face-to-face talks.
That the talks will have considerable heft is evident from the US decision to have its Vice President JD Vance lead its delegation. Who will helm the Iranian side, however, is not clear so far.
Given the wide gulf that separates the American and Iranian positions, a hard-headed assessment would be that the fighting between them could resume sooner, rather than later. What would be needed is the ability to make compromises, which, in turn, means the ability to make key concessions.
Iran is seeking guarantees against attacks in the future. Such a commitment can only be enforced through a superpower.
Will China step in to underwrite it, in the manner that the USSR did so for Cuba in the 1960s?
Will the Iranians, in turn, agree to commitments they had apparently been ready for—to never make a nuclear weapon and reduce their stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium to 3-4 percent suitable only for nuclear power, and have the agreement supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Will the US and the world accept Iran’s demand for charging tolls for the use of the Straits of Hormuz?
Many suggest that it may be too early to declare ‘victory’ or ‘defeat’ for either side. This could well be true, but the fact is that the Americans, after repeatedly threatening to wipe out Iran, eventually agreed to a ceasefire. Why?
Not out of any high sense of morality or ethical concerns which they had already demonstrated they had none. But because of the realities on the ground.
Why the US Blinked
An all-out attack on Iran’s power plants and electrical grids, railroad systems, and desalination plants would have led to Iranian retaliation in similar facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar. It would have led to the destruction of the entire oil infrastructure or refineries, pumping stations, oil fields and the like. In effect, the entire West Asia, an area of considerable prosperity, would have been reduced to ruin, which would have led to a global recession.
This is where the US and Israeli war aims diverged. The US wanted to come out tops—neither high oil prices nor the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz mattered to them. In fact, its participation in the war was largely on account of Israel.
But while the US wanted regime change and a check on Iranian nuclear and missile programmes, the Israelis will not be satisfied till the Islamic Republic is removed root and branch—and replaced by a regime that would not even be a potential threat.
This divergence is the ceasefire’s central fault line. Without bridging it—through difficult compromises on security guarantees, nuclear constraints, and regional de-escalation—the talks in Islamabad risk becoming little more than a brief interlude before the next round of escalation.
A Shifting Regional Order
The coming days will test whether the parties can move beyond posturing. A two-week pause is better than continued war, but it is no substitute for a sustainable settlement. If the guns in Lebanon are not silenced and the underlying grievances remain unaddressed, this truce may prove to be nothing more than a momentary breather.
But, regardless of the developments in the coming days, one thing is clear. The West Asia paradigm has shifted.
The relationship between the Gulf and Iran has changed, and so has that between the US and the region. When negotiations begin, the US will have to confront the fact that far from being dictated to, Tehran is a capable, hard-headed rival.
One of the big gainers in this process is Pakistan. Its role has not been that of a traditional mediator, but as a conduit that facilitated the ceasefire and could now do the same for a peace settlement. But it’s not an India-Pakistan thing. India is unlikely to have offered itself as a mediator. Because of Kashmir, New Delhi has been traditionally chary of mediation as a tool of international relations.
Regardless, India has not come out shining from this war. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel, his embrace of Benjamin Netanyahu, and his medal from the Knesset were poorly timed since preparations for the war were no secret.
To top this, India did not issue a condolence as soon as Ayatollah Khamanei was killed. This would be normal protocol, but it was ignored for reasons best known to South Block. The third issue was the sinking of the Iranian ship that was returning from an event at Vizag. India’s strategic autonomy seems to be sagging—and is in need of urgent repair.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece and views expressed are the author's own. The Quint does not endorse or is responsible for them.)