The massive blast in a car in the busy Chandni Chowk-Red Fort area of Delhi that killed at least eight people and injured 20 others has left searing questions in its wake about the state of security in the national capital. Coming just months after Operation Sindoor when India openly declared action against perpetrators of terror acts against it, the Delhi blast has left a resounding echo of doubts.
The intensity of the blast, which occured at a busy area on a weekday evening, was so severe that it damaged many other cars in the vicinity and shattered windows of houses, located far away from the site of the blast. Eyewitnesses and victims have been recounting the horrific moment when the blast took place, catching everyone off guard and sending body parts flying like shrapnel.
The blast, however, has not left any craters, nor emitted any shrapnel. This has lead to doubts over whether the blast was caused by a bomb or improvised explosive device (IED), which indicates a terror attack, or if it was caused due to the vehicle's CNG cylinder exploding.
Eyewitness accounts indicate that the massive fire subsequent to the blast was the reason for damage to the vehicles in the vicinity, leading to severe burns to the injured and deceased.
Terror Attack or CNG Cylinder Blast? What We Know So Far
The jury is still out to ascertain whether this is a terror-related incident or an accident caused by the CNG blast. All indicators so far point towards the fact that it is a terror-related incident carried out by a suicide bomber. Most of the accused apprehended so far belong to Kashmir, indicative of the involvement of Kashmiri militants and their handlers who are most likely based in Pakistan.
The forensic experts, however, have to ascertain the nature of the explosive used because even though it was of heavy intensity, it didn’t create either a crater or produce shrapnel.
Detailed investigations will be required to ascertain the linkages with the recoveries of ammonium nitrate and other combat-usage material from different cities in various states. Meanwhile, Delhi Police on Tuesday, 11 November registered an FIR pertaining to the explosion in which the incident was called a "bomb blast", invoking the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, or UAPA, to probe the matter.
The police have traced the route of the Hyundai i20 car, believed to be involved in the explosion, from Faridabad in Haryana to Delhi’s Red Fort with the help of CCTV footage and data from a toll plaza. Incidentally, the blast occurred hours after Jammu and Kashmir Police recovered nearly 3,000 kg of explosives from two residential buildings in Faridabad, leading police to probe potential links.
The blast, coming barely six months after the Pahalgam terror attack, is ominous, and some very important aspects of the incident need to be analysed and introspected upon.
This is the first incident of this type in the interior of the country after a long time. The last such attack in Delhi was in September 2011, in front of the Delhi High Court. This incident, taking place after 14 years, could be aimed at conveying a message to the authorities that the terror modules in the country continue to remain active, and that authorities cannot afford to let their guards down.
It is to be noted that in his address in Bhutan's Thimphu, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of the blast and referred to it as a "conspiracy", adding that perpetrators will be punished.
Faridabad-Kashmir Connect
The J&K and Faridabad Police and other officials told media on Monday, 10 November that they had busted an “interstate and transnational terror module”, arrested seven people, and seized 2,900 kg of IED-making material in the past 15 days.
The press conference and other communications to media announcing the apprehension and seizure of material should have been avoided till the time all linkages were not established and different modules busted, or neutralised.
In all probability, if there indeed is a link, the attack was carried out by the suicide bomber after having discovered that several of their accomplices were apprehended, along with vast quantities of material which could be used for explosives as well as accessories for detonating them.
In that case, the hunger for limelight and credit in this ongoing investigation launched by the J&K Police in conjunction with police of other states led to its undoing. It likely prompted the perpetrators to carry out this heinous act, lest they too be detected and neutralised.
The second lesson that must be learned is that all pieces of information should be carefully collated and analysed. In this case, the Chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Maulana Masood Azhar, is said to have made a statement a couple of days ago to the effect that India will be "taught a lesson". Could that have had any bearing, given the key accused—a doctor from Pulwama—in the explosives seizure in Faridabad is being reported to have JeM links?
Even Lt Gen Manoj Kumar Katyar, Western Army Commander under whose jurisdiction the Delhi area falls, is said to have made a statement roughly a month ago about a potential attack that militants may carry out in some spectacular action in and around Delhi.
That the Intelligence agencies failed to correlate these bits of information does not speak highly of their skills.
Intelligence-Police Lapses
Another question that arises is, how were the accused able to collect such large quantities of ammonium nitrate without anyone coming to know of it? This is similar to Pulwama in February 2019, when 40 CRPF personnel were killed by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber ramming his vehicle into a CRPF bus. Then, too, terrorists had managed to collect huge quantities of explosives without the Intelligence and security agencies getting a whiff of it. This is a serious lapse that keeps happening repeatedly.
Intelligence is not the function of Intelligence agencies alone. Even beat constables are responsible for observing and ascertaining criminal or potentially dangerous patterns in their respective areas.
They must develop reliable contacts within the community who will report any suspicious activity to them. It is a fact that the police is beset with manpower deficiency. However, their leadership must proactively work towards optimising policing and honing up the skills of ordinary police personnel.
In this case itself, the CCTV camera footage reportedly indicates that the alleged suicide bomber was sitting in the car used for the blast for over three hours in a parking lot. Had the police personnel of the area been alert, the tragedy could have been averted.
Next, the attitude of the entire system towards security is lacklustre. With the recovery of such large quantities of combat material and apprehensions of alleged conspirators in Faridabad, just about 60 km from Delhi, the Delhi Police should have been more alert.
It may be noted that over the period of the last three decades, most terror-related incidents in Delhi have taken place in and around Red Fort.
The Delhi Police should have deployed all manpower and technical resources to secure Delhi. Instead, they were perhaps busy providing security to the road show of Chief Minister Rekha Gupta, accompanying candidates to file nomination for the upcoming municipal elections. The day before the ghastly incident, the police were busy restraining the protestors against pollution. These peripheral duties dissipate their numbers needed for their core function of policing and providing security to the population.
They must set their priorities right. Any amount of retribution will not bring those dead back to life. We need to work on the philosophy that prevention is better than cure.
(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)