The rebel MLAs approached the Supreme Court back in July to challenge the delay in deciding their resignations. The apex court held then that the Speaker could not be forced to deliver a decision on the resignations within a set timeframe as the Constitution indeed allowed him to conduct an inquiry.

However, the Bench headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi also held that while the Speaker decided on the resignations, the MLAs could not be forced to take part in any Assembly proceedings, including a trust vote in HD Kumaraswamy’s government, which was to take place in the subsequent days.

However, the Bench headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi also held that while the Speaker decided on the resignations, the MLAs could not be forced to take part in any Assembly proceedings, including a trust vote in HD Kumaraswamy’s government, which was to take place in the subsequent days.

The rebel MLAs were therefore able to skip the crucial trust vote, leading to the end of the coalition government, consequently allowing BJP leader BS Yeddiyurappa to form the government. By the end of July, Kumar had disqualified the 17 rebel MLAs under para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India – the dreaded anti-defection law. He expressly clarified it meant they would cease to be members of the Karnataka Legislative Assembly “till the term of the incumbent Assembly of Karnataka”.

Paragraph 2(1)(a) deals with defection where a legislator “voluntarily gives up” membership of their political party.

Paragraph 2(1)(b) deals with defection where a legislator “votes or abstains from voting ... contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs” without permission.

Under normal circumstances, the 17 rebel MLAs could have been disqualified based on the second option, however, this wasn’t possible in light of the Supreme Court’s order. Instead, the Speaker construed the MLAs resignation not just from the Assembly but from their respective political parties as well – thereby violating paragraph 2(1)(a). The Supreme Court has previously held that such a disqualification can happen even if the legislator hasn’t submitted an express resignation from their party in so many words. Voluntarily giving up membership can also be inferred from the legislator’s conduct, therefore Speaker Ramesh Kumar was well within his rights to disqualify the MLAs based on his assessment of the resignations. The Tenth Schedule says that the decision of the Speaker in such cases will be final, and till 1992, included a provision which said that no court would have jurisdiction over any cases regarding disqualification. However, the Supreme Court struck off that paragraph in the landmark Kihoto Hollohan case, and said that there could be judicial review of a Speaker’s order. This doesn’t mean the court can overturn any order by the Speaker – this can only be done where there is some ‘perversity’ or ‘illegality’ to the decision of the Speaker, as opposed to an examination of whether the Speaker was right to consider whether the legislator had resigned or not.

“Therefore, neither under the Constitution nor under the statutory scheme is it contemplated that disqualification under the Tenth Schedule would operate as a bar for contesting re-elections.”

“It is clear that nothing can be added to the grounds of disqualification based on convenience, equity, logic or perceived political intentions.”

“From the above, it is clear that the Speaker, in exercise of his powers under the Tenth Schedule, does not have the power to either indicate the period for which a person is disqualified, nor to bar someone from contesting elections.”