Why Kuki-Zomi Are Resisting Amit Shah's Call to Reopen Roads in Manipur

Centre's push for 'free movement' in Manipur undermines the growing political assertions of the Kuki-Zomi people.

Amid Centre's push for 'free movement', Manipur remains divided on ethnic lines.

(Photo: Namita Chauhan/The Quint)

After a period of lull following the long overdue resignation of former Chief Minister N Biren Singh, Manipur is on the churn again with the Kuki-Zomi communities back on the streets against the Centre’s attempts to enforce free movement and impose ‘normalcy’.

Kuki-Zomi groups across the state have gone on an indefinite strike against Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s directives for peace, which include disarmament, restoration of free movement of vehicles across Manipur and dismantling of the community-led “checkpoints” to guard the buffer zones that have cropped up between the hills (where the Kuki-Zomi live) and the valley (inhabited by the Meitei).

This standoff, however, is not just about roads. It is about the future of the Kuki-Zomi demand for Separate Administration (SA) and whether the BJP is quietly moving to neutralise it under the guise of restoring normalcy.

The tragic killing of a protester has added fuel to fire. The ongoing protests symbolise a defining moment in the Kuki-Zomi people’s fight for political autonomy, highlighting the deep tensions between their assertion of control and the Indian government's attempt to enforce state authority. 

Why Kuki-Zomi are Opposing 'Free Movement' Directive

The demand to open up roads runs counter to the very foundations of the SA demand. For 22 months, the Kuki-Zomi community has maintained physical and political control over certain areas, considering them part of a future autonomous administration. Allowing free movement means accessing Meitei-majority areas, state forces, and actors whom the Kuki-Zomi perceive as aggressors.

More crucially, this move threatens to undermine whatever leverage they have gained over the past two years. Control over key routes has been a negotiation tool—giving it up now, especially without a formal settlement, could weaken their position in future talks with New Delhi. The violent response to this directive indicates how deeply entrenched the fear of state reoccupation is within the Kuki-Zomi community.

This concern is echoed in official press releases from the Kuki-Zo Council (KZC) and the Zomi Council (ZC), both of which have issued strong statements rejecting the 'free movement' directive. On 8 March, KZC issued a statement condemning the government's decision to impose free movement.

It also questioned the use of force by security forces, which allegedly led to the death of 36-year-old Lalgun Singsit and serious injuries to over 50 women, escalating further tensions. The Council reaffirmed that peace cannot be forced upon an unwilling community and called for a political resolution before any movement directive is enforced.

The ZC also pointed out in a 7 March press statement that reopening roads in the current state of political fragility would jeopardise peace rather than restore it. The Council said that allowing mass public movements at this stage, including purported peace marches, could risk provoking violence and should be reconsidered by the government. These statements reflect a fundamental flaw in the government's approach: rather than fostering peace through genuine negotiation, the Centre is trying to enforce normalcy through unilateral action.

BJP Changing Tracks

Under former CM Singh, the Manipur government was visibly pro-Meitei, and the Centre, by default, had to engage with Kuki-Zomi demands to maintain a semblance of balance. However, with Singh gone and President's Rule in place, the BJP now controls both the narrative and the strategy.

Instead of accommodating Kuki-Zomi aspirations, the Centre is trying a more strong-arming approach ostensibly directed at restoration of law and order. This move may suggest the BJP is quietly stepping away from any serious consideration of the SA demand.

The imposition of the President's Rule itself was fraught with dissatisfaction, particularly over Singh's retention as ‘caretaker CM’. This decision led to widespread unease among the Kuki-Zomi and other hill communities, who saw it as an indication of the Centre not taking their grievances seriously.

Further complicating matters is the role of Manipur's current Governor, AK Bhalla, who has previously overseen controversial BJP policies such as the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).

In contrast, the former Governor, Anusuiya Uikey, was more closely aligned with the Indian National Congress (INC), which created a barrier to the BJP's complete control of Manipur's governance. The current Governor's alignment with the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has only deepened the distrust among the Kuki-Zomi.

Kuki-Zomi Political Awakening: Addressing Decades of Neglect

Though the current crisis is nearly two years old, the neglect of hill communities has been decadal. Historically, Kuki-Zomi groups have remained outside the mainstream political structure of India, often operating in isolation from national parties and power centres. This conflict has galvanised their political consciousness, forcing them to organise, articulate demands, and demand a separate political future.

The drive to open up buffer zones and state transit routes appears just as arbitrary and sudden as the early violence of May 2023. While the Centre presents this as a pragmatic solution, it ignores the fact that hearts and minds in Manipur remain deeply divided. All sides seek peace, but the terms and conceptions of peace differ acutely.

For the Meitei, peace means a fully integrated Manipur, where all citizens, including themselves, can move freely and reclaim access to all state regions.

However, this vision comes with a risk of economic and cultural dominance, as capitalist investments, real estate expansion, and resource extraction could overwhelm the indigenous tribal communities in the hills. The influx of external investors and elite business interests in Meitei-dominated urban centres would stand to further marginalise Kuki-Zomi communities, leading to displacement and loss of ancestral lands.

The demand for a Separate Administration is currently at a crossroads. When it comes to the question of what is the way ahead, opinions differ even within the Kuki and Zomi communities. While both groups support the broader demand for Separate Administration, there are internal differences in strategy and engagement with the Centre.

Some factions favour direct negotiations with Delhi, while others see grassroots resistance and local self-governance as the only viable path forward. The government's failure to recognise these nuances further complicates the political landscape and increases the likelihood of prolonged unrest.

A Question of Priorities

For the Kuki-Zomi affected by 22 months of conflict, the need for separate administration is more than just about control of roads. It is about rebuilding their broken lives. But the Centre’s lack of commitment to that end is magnified by its disproportionate financial allocations the name of conflict resolution.

The 2025-26 budget earmarks Rs 157 crore for the relief and rehabilitation of over 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), including both those in the hills and the valley.

However, a closer examination reveals the inadequacy of this allocation. When broken down per capita, each IDP receives a mere Rs 26,167—a sum that barely scratches the surface of what is required for meaningful recovery. Compare this to the Rs 28.99 crore sanctioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for the reintegration of just 800 ex-militants under the United National Liberation Front (UNLF-P) peace process, equating to a staggering Rs 3,61,237 per militant.

This glaring disparity in budget allocation raises profound questions about the government's true intentions in Manipur. While engaging with militant groups is a necessary step in the peace process, the overwhelming skew in resource distribution where certain insurgents are prioritised over civilians suggests that the government's approach is geared more toward conflict containment rather that fostering genuine peace.

If the government were truly invested in the long-term well-being of Manipur's conflict-affected communities, its budgetary focus would reflect that. Instead, IDPs who have lost their homes, livelihoods, and communities are allocated a pitiful Rs 1,167 per person in compensation, an amount so insignificant that it borders on insult. There is no structured, long-term rehabilitation plan in place. Unlike conflict zones such as Jammu and Kashmir, where extensive housing, employment, and education programs have been implemented for displaced populations, Manipur's IDPs are left to fend for themselves with little more than symbolic aid.

Rehabilitate First, Reintegrate Later

The current approach suggests that the government is more invested in maintaining surface-level stability than delivering justice and rehabilitation. Reintegration of ex-militants is undoubtedly essential, but prioritising it over the rehabilitation of civilians who have suffered the brunt of the violence points to a deliberate political calculation rather than a humanitarian commitment.

By disproportionately funding ex-insurgents and neglecting IDPs, the government sends a clear message: peace in Manipur is not about healing its fractured communities but about managing and containing conflict zones.

The directive to reopen roads thus unravels across multiple layers. If the BJP can is successful in restoring free movement across the state, it would send an unmistakable message: New Delhi is more committed to preserving the territorial integrity of Manipur than engaging in serious negotiations over a separate administration.

If New Delhi truly intends to build lasting peace, it must shift its focus from insurgent reintegration to comprehensive civilian rehabilitation. That means increasing compensation, providing structured housing, investing in employment generation, and ensuring displaced communities’ access to education and healthcare.

Until these fundamental issues are addressed, the demand for separation will not fade away. It will only fester, fuelled by the government's failure to acknowledge and act on the real needs of Manipur's people.

(Sangmuan Hangsing is a Public Policy student at the Kautilya School of Public Policy. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)