'Operation Sindoor' May Halt the War Frenzy But Not For Long

In a direct response to the Pahalgam terror attack, the Indian Armed Forces launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of Wednesday, 7 May, targeting nine terror-linked sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

(Photo: PTI/Altered by Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

After a fortnight of political war posturing and tactical strategising, India launched 'Operation Sindoor' in the dead of the night, striking alleged terror bases in Pakistan. The kinetic response after the heinous Pahalgam killing of 26 innocent tourists is perhaps a perfect example of the maxim— "Revenge is best served cold".

It may now be hoped that the media hype and war frenzy calling for a punitive response to Pakistan will be satiated to some extent.

The press release, issued by the Government of India after the operation was carried out late in the night intervening 6-7 May 2025, states that India launched missile attacks on nine targets in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and also in Pakistani Punjab. It also emphasised that India's response has been measured and ‘non-escalatory’ in nature, as no military establishment has been targeted.

Most of the nine targets are in close vicinity of the border, except the ones at Bahawalpur which is about 100 km inside Pakistan.

The 9 Terror Bases

On the day following the attack, GoI has done a detailed briefing outlining the reasons for targeting specific points. The targets selected were centers for training, indoctrination, and launch pads of militants for attacks inside India, as per the government.

The Bahawalpur camp was the headquarters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and was a major terror hub. Other Jaish camps were targeted at Bilal, Kotli and Gulpur opposite Rajouri.

These camps were used to allegedly launch terrorists for attacks in Rajouri Poonch area and killing of innocent pilgrims travelling in a bus to Reasi. The Sarjal camp, opposite Samba area, was the launch pad for terrorists who carried out attacks in Kathua and Pathankot.

Muridke was selected as a target as it is the HQ of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), led by Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Ther Sawai Camp opposite Tangdhar was chosen because it was used to launch terrorists who attacked Sonmarg and Gulmarg on 24 Oct, apart from the latest Pahalgam attack on 22 April.

The other two camps - Barnala and Mehmoona - are closer to the LoC and also alleged terror launch pads.

The targets were well selected because these are known to have been training areas for militants and extremists of various hues harboured by Pakistan. The element of surprise, retained till the last moment, went a long way in the success of the strikes.

Echoes of Balakot in Pahalgam Response

The punitive action was anticipated by the flurry of activity and consultations that were going on over the last week. That something was in the offing soon was confirmed by the civil defence preparations ordered by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for Wednesday, 7 May, in anticipation of Pakistani retaliation.

Pakistan has confirmed the deaths of eight Pakistani nationals in the attacks and injury to 35 others.

The only difference in India's response to the Pahalgam attack vis-à-vis Pulwama, though, is that in 2019, India had carried out air raids well inside Pakistan. This time, however, we have carried out missile attacks from the Indian airspace. This perhaps was necessitated because Pakistan was prepared with its air defence systems this time.

The signals emanating from the press releases by the Government of India are similar to those discernible after the Balakot air attack in 2019. We are indicating to Pakistan that we do not want escalation.

This can also be inferred from the fact that there has been no mobilisation so far, although the three services must have been placed on high alert.

What are Pakistan's Options?

The questions that now come to mind are complex.

The strikes may help the government — to some discernible extent — restore the ruptured pride and honour of India post-Pahalgam. In turn, what are the actions that Pakistan is likely to take to ‘restore its honour’ and image of its military in the eyes of its own citizens? Pakistan has already avowed retaliation at a place and time of its choosing—something it did after Balakot airstrike too in 2019.

The second question that needs to be asked is, has military option become the standard response for any such militant attack in future?

As threatened by the Pakistani authorities, the country will certainly take retaliatory action. We cannot predict when and where and, therefore, we may have to remain on guard for a long period.

Going by the experience of 2019, it can be visualised that Pakistan will deploy a similar type of kinetic action as used by India. Therefore, it may not use the Pakistani Air Force to attack targets in India because that might lead to escalation.

It is possible that Pakistan will use its missiles to attack targets in India, similar to what India has done.

Pakistan has a range of missile systems in its armoury, like the Abdali system with a range of 450 kms, and Shaheen III, which has a range of 2,750 km. Since India has focused on hitting targets close to the border aka Line of Control (LoC), it may similarly restrict its actions to targets in close vicinity with lower-range missiles deployed suitably away from the range of Indian Artillery and Missile systems.

Target Selection & Lasting Deterrence

Another grave question to ponder over pertains to how Pakistan will choose the targets to hit. One can perhaps assess that it may not target military establishments, except along the LoC, which has already witnessed heavy exchange of fire, including that of high trajectory weapons like Mortors.

This exchange at the LoC is now going to be a long-drawn affair, at least till the summers last. India needs to be on extra alert to ensure that LoC or the International Border is not exploited by Pakistan to send across militants under cover of fire.

The Border Security Force (BSF) deployed along the International Border in Jammu sector and Punjab, needs to be especially vigilant against the threat of tunnels and drones being used by Pakistan to send across militants and logistics.

An attack on targets south of the LoC in India is fraught with the danger of escalation, and therefore, not anticipated. However, we must remain vigilant.

Pakistan may also resort to targeting infrastructure along the Western and Eastern rivers, part of the Indus Waters Treaty, because of the adverse impact of India's holding it in. The strategic community needs to factor this in and deploy adequate resources to defend these points of potential vulnerability.

This brings me back to my earlier question.

While the complicity of Pakistan in the Pahalgam attack is beyond doubt, can military response alone deter it?

The frenzied backstage parlays and intervention of the international community had been key to enabling rapid de-escalation after the Pulwama-Balakot episode in 2019. The situation could similarly be diffused even now.

But such ad hoc strategy every time things escalate beyond control between the two nuclear neighbours is no failsafe—and doesn't ensure deterrance for long. There is no guarantee that an attack will not happen again. The only way out of this for us is to perhaps go inward. We need to look within and address the causes of the long-festering militancy in the Kashmir region, which collectively remains the biggest casualty of this conflict.

(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)