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For decades, India has tolerated Pakistan’s double game: talking peace while exporting terror. But the massacre of tourists in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025 wasn’t just another act of terrorism — it seems to have been the final straw. This time, New Delhi’s response was different. Its suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) marks a bold new chapter — one where India stops rewarding betrayal with immense patience, in the hope of a better future.
The IWT, signed on 19 Sept 1960, was often hailed as the world’s most successful water-sharing agreement, surviving wars and diplomatic ruptures. But it was built on a simple premise: good faith between two sovereign states. Pakistan shredded that assumption long ago by nurturing terrorist groups as instruments of state policy.
Legally, India’s move is thought through and defendable. The IWT has not been cancelled but kept in “abeyance”. The Treaty lacks an expiry clause and allows modifications only by mutual consent ( Article XII), but nowhere does it require a nation to bind itself in perpetuity to a partner acting in bad faith. International norms may frown on unilateral withdrawals, but precedence from the United States withdrawing from arms control treaties is clear: national security trumps outdated agreements.
Yet, it conveniently forgets that the Indus Waters Treaty wasn’t an act of charity. It was a compromise, and one that Pakistan has weaponised against India time and again, while India has meekly complied. That era is now over.
The timing is no accident. Inside Pakistan, the Pahalgam attack is viewed as comeuppance for the Balochistan Liberation Army’s hijacking of the Jaffar Express a month earlier on 11 March, an attack some believe was aided by India.
Many casualties resulted in the two day standoff, resulting in civilian and army deaths. Whether or not Delhi had any role, Pakistan’s leaders have to reckon with the strategic consequences of their endless provocations. This includes Army Chief General Asim Munir’s comments on 17 April at an event in Islamabad where he said,”Our stance is very clear, it was our jugular vein, it will be our jugular vein and we shall not forget it. We will not leave our Kashmiri brothers in their heroic struggle”, signalling, in a way, a license to kill. Suspending the Treaty is not an empty gesture.
While India cannot stop river waters overnight, it can begin a systematic campaign of pressure. By regulating and delaying flows—releasing water during floods, withholding it during critical sowing seasons—India can create chaos across Pakistan’s fragile agricultural economy. Rural instability will spread. Political unrest will likely follow. And Pakistan’s elite, long insulated from the costs of their reckless policies, will finally face the bill.
Generation of hydro-power, the source of a third of Pakistan's energy production, would be impacted. Even without the immediate, full-scale engineering changes, India now possesses a potent, non-kinetic weapon.
Quietly, since 2016, India has accelerated construction of hydroelectric projects like Kishanganga, Ratle, Pakal Dul, and Ujh. For the first time in decades, it has prepared the ground for strategic water leverage. With the Treaty suspended, it no longer needs Pakistan’s permission to complete or expand these projects. Importantly, it can initiate new ones on the Western rivers, with the ability to gain a chokehold on Pakistan in a few years.
The global community will undoubtedly express concern in a volatile situation between two overt nuclear nations about water rights, environmental impact, and stability. India must meet these concerns head-on. Pakistan’s use of terror nullified the assumptions underpinning the Treaty.
No nation is obligated to hand over critical resources to an adversary determined to dismantle it through asymmetric warfare.
Two fronts—western and eastern—now define India’s hydrological security. Incidentally, though perhaps less relevant because of limited water flows, the Indus River Basin system encompasses Tibet and Afghanistan too.
Militarily, India must remain cautious. A direct strike risks nuclear escalation under Pakistan’s “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine. Instead, India’s real power lies in covert operations, economic warfare, cyber attacks, and slow, strangling pressure — tactics that Pakistan itself perfected, but now finds the tables turned.
At home, the Indian government must guard against one risk: overpromising by catering to jingoistic fervour, leading to Rambo or war like action. This would be counterproductive, with our neighbour prepared and expecting it.
The western rivers cannot be dammed overnight; droughts will not materialise within weeks. The process will take years — but it needs to be relentless.
At times like these, the nation is like a tinderbox and it takes very little to get inflamed. We’d all do well to remember that, in particular our political leadership. The message from Delhi is now unmistakable: advocates of terror and practitioners have to bear a cost and face consequences.
Treaties are not forever but predicated on mutuality and respect for the other. Cooperation is not unconditional. Pakistan must now live with paying the price of a misadventure; as the rivers that once sustained it become tools of its reckoning.
This is not escalation. This is for the cry for justice for the innocents killed in Baisaran Valley, whose only fault was that they happened to be there on that fateful and tragic day.
(Manoj Mohanka is a businessman who serves on several corporate boards. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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