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The historic Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) – the last possible thread of diplomacy connecting India and Pakistan, which survived four wars and decades of antagonism and cross-border skirmishes – was cut by India over the dastardly terror attack in Kashmir's Pahalgam on Tuesday, 22 April, which led to the deaths of at least 26 people.
The suspension of the treaty is symbolic, given that this action is a first since the treaty was inked between New Delhi and Islamabad in 1960, and is a clear indication of India's stance that matters have gone too far with the latest terror strike in the heart of Kashmir.
Apart from the symbolism, the suspension of the IWT has wide-ranging practical and detrimental ramifications for Pakistan as it will create a major dent in how river water has been shared between the two nations for decades.
"Some feel that politics should be kept out of water, but water is also a weapon which can be used," says Lt General Kamal Davar (retd), geopolitics expert and Indian Army veteran of the 1965 and 1971 wars.
Further, the water from the Indus is a lifeline for major Pakistani cities such as Lahore, Karachi, and Multan as well as mega hydropower plants located in the country.
Thus, given the sacrosanct nature of the river for Pakistan's agriculture and industrial sector, the denial of water by India is sure to further dampen the economy of the country, which is already plagued with a wide budget deficit and growing debt obligations to foreign lenders.
However, the practical implications of the IWT's suspension may not be immediately felt by Pakistan.
"India will have to build huge catchment areas to hold the excess water," says Lt Davar, adding, "Especially in the monsoon months when there is a lot of water, there could be flooding on the Indian side."
Other experts suggest that following the treaty's suspension, India will have a "free hand" in building the infrastructure to hold excess water – which was forbidden under the provisions of the agreement.
"While there may not be an immediate impact on Pakistan, we can expect the required infrastructure to come up in the next 2-3 years. The excess water can then be supplied to New Delhi, Punjab and other places where there is water scarcity," says Anjal Prakash, research director at the Bharti Institute of Public Policy.
The idea of inking a treaty around the Indus came about because of the manner in which the maps of India and Pakistan were drawn up by Cyril Radcliffe, the chairman of the Boundary Commission.
The bone of contention was that two major irrigation projects, Madhopur and Ferozepur, a lifeline for Pakistan's Punjab province, fell within India's territory. Hence, there was a need to draw up an agreement to ensure the fair utilisation of river water between both sides.
Discussions were held under the auspices of the World Bank and culminated in the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then Pakistani President Ayub Khan.
The provisions of the treaty stated that the water from the eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) would be used by India and the western rivers (Chenab, Indus, and Jhelum) would be allocated to Pakistan.
However, India could make use of the western rivers for limited purposes, such as drinking water, agriculture, and hydroelectric energy, but could not take any steps to divert the rivers or store excess river water.
As the agreement stood, Pakistan would receive around 135 million acre-feet of the total water from the Indus River system, which was 80 percent of the total river water, and India would receive 20 percent.
The reason for the vastly uneven share was that while India has more than 400 rivers flowing across its territory, Pakistan only has 24 – with the Indus being the most prominent, particularly for the country's most populous province: Punjab.
"The part of Punjab which had gone to Pakistan during the Partition in 1947 was among the most fertile stretches of land in India," says Himanshu Roy, professor of international relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University.
First of all, the IWT clearly states that neither India nor Pakistan has the right to abrogate the treaty unilaterally. Any modification in the rules of the treaty require a green signal from both sides.
However, in case of a dispute, Article IX of the treaty delineates a three-step process. In case of a grievance, either side can approach the Permanent Indus Commission, which includes representatives chosen by both India and Pakistan.
If the commission fails to come to a common solution, the countries can approach a neutral expert followed by a group of arbitrators.
Article 62 of the VCLT provides for the possibility of unilaterally ending a particular treaty, subject to a fundamental change in circumstances and its impact on the obligations of the treaty. While it discourages invoking such a change to discontinue a treaty, it states that only under the following conditions can it be done:
1. The change was unforeseen.
2. The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
3. The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
India can also cite the innumerable instances in which other countries, like the US, Israel et al, have unilaterally withdrawn from agreements citing national security concerns.
Singh further states that attributing the actions to "non-state actors" or a "false flag" is insufficient from India's point of view as a tolerated ecosystem within Pakistan.
"Even if non-state actors are involved, the Pakistani state cannot wash its hands off," he says.
While the suspension of the IWT is the most extreme unilateral step taken so far since the signing of the treaty in 1960, several issues have plagued both sides from time to time.
Similarly, after the Pulwama terror attack in 2019, the Indian government had approved eight more hydropower projects in Ladakh, notwithstanding the objections from Pakistan.
Islamabad has also raised objections against New Delhi, particularly over the building of hydroelectric projects by the Indian government along the Chenab River. The Pakistani government had alleged that the building of such projects was in violation of the agreement as it impacts their water supply.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's energy minister Awais Leghari said that India's decision to suspend the IWT is an act of "water warfare" and an "illegal move".
"Every drop is ours by right, and we will defend it with full force—legally, politically, and globally," the minister stated.
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