Beware of a Third Front: Security Challenges for Indo-Bangladesh Borders in 2026

India's efforts to identify and deport illegal immigrants already in India pose a major challenge for the BSF.

There is a perceptible strain in India-Bangladesh relations after the removal of Sheikh Hasina from the political scene in Bangladesh.

(Photo: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

The year 2026 presents several challenges for India—and the Border Security Force (BSF)—in ensuring security of the 4,096.6-km-long borders with Bangladesh in view of the situation in the neighbouring country.

The security environment along these borders has become increasingly complex amid the political situation that has rapidly deteriorated since the August 2024 uprising. There is a perceptible strain in India-Bangladesh relations after the removal of Sheikh Hasina from the political scene in Bangladesh.

The strain has become especially acute with widely reported targeted attacks against minority Hindus in recent times.

Growing India-Bangladesh Geopolitical Hostility

The open hostility towards India is because it is widely perceived to be interfering in the internal affairs of Bangladesh. Internal instability and uncertainty about elections and the type of government these may throw up, economic distress, and cosying up with Pakistan have all led to souring of relations with India.

This shifting away of alignment has an impact on border management, because of threats of increase in illegal migration, transborder crimes, misinformation campaigns, and exploitation by hostile and non-state actors.

The involvement and competing interests of external stakeholders further complicate the landscape, creating strains in what were earlier largely bilateral challenges.

Large numbers of Bangladeshis trying to enter India through the border without papers was a common scene immediately after the regime change in August 2024. However, the people then trying to cross over were mainly the supporters of the Awami League. Since use of force against them was not advisable, the BSF personnel had to employ all their persuasive skills to persuade them to go back.

The call by former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in her first public address after her exile, through an audio message during a media briefing in New Delhi on 23 January, urged the people of Bangladesh to unite and overthrow what she labelled as a “foreign-serving puppet regime” at any cost.

Even though banned from taking part in the elections due on 12 February, Hasina's Awami League continues to enjoy large supporter base which remains “ideologically and historically devoted” to the party despite the allegations levelled against its leadership.

This support base, if mobilised, is likely to create large-scale disturbances during and after the elections. This may cause a large number of Awami League supporters and Hindu minorities to attempt to cross over to India to escape persecution in Bangladesh. Additionally, the situation in the Chittagong hill tracts continues to remain tense—and the likelihood of increase in tribals crossing over from the border along Mizoram cannot be ruled out.

The BSF, therefore, has its task cut out to patrol the border vigorously and prevent such persons from entering India. Since use of force against such persecuted people is not an option, the BSF officers and men will have to use all their soft and negotiating skills to convince them to go back to their homes.

Deportation Drives Hindering Border Security?

The efforts of the government to identify and deport illegal immigrants already in India poses another challenge for the BSF. While the BSF makes all efforts to push them discreetly to Bangladesh, many of them get caught by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), who push them back into India as has happened in some cases where even the Supreme Court has intervened.

This process of deportation may lead to clashes between the two border-guarding forces. While the relations between the BSF and the BGB personnel remain cordial, there has been a hardening of stance in official correspondence and resolution of local issues.

The clashes, if any, are likely to be localised in specific border region where there are disputes due to alignment of fence or construction of any other buildings or structure. The BSF will, therefore, have to remain alert and prepared to take appropriate action for such eventualities.

One very important threat emanates from the fact that Pakistanis have now got a foothold within the establishment in Bangladesh. This is likely to become more prominent if radical elements win the upcoming elections. A radical or unfriendly regime assuming power after the elections, encouraged by Pakistan and China, may start facilitating various insurgent and separatist elements to revive insurgency in the northeastern states.

They may also once again provide them camps, and other logistic support to these separatist elements. The familiarity of the BGB with the terrain of the border area and their border outposts are likely to be used to launch these militants/insurgents across the borders to create trouble in the Northeast.

The likelihood of radical elements coming to power after elections poses the threat of radical elements being pushed into India. The population along the borders being religiously, culturally and linguistically similar, there is a grave threat of radicalisation and consequent spurt in acts of terror.

India Must Watch Out for 'Third Front'

Regular Bangladesh Army initiating or provoking a wider conflict is not visualised. However, India needs to remain alert to counter the threat of a third front being opened along these borders with active support of Pakistan. India especially needs to enhance security of the 'Chicken's Neck' area connecting the Northeast.

Rear area security in the Siliguri Corridor also needs to be rehearsed, and different security forces familiarised with their tasks. In the extremely remote eventuality of there being a clash at a larger scale, the Indian Army may find it difficult to withdraw troops from other areas because of the threat from the West and North.

The BSF, which is a potent force in itself and has performed admirably during the 1971 war, will, therefore, have to take up a larger role and prepare accordingly in conjunction with Army.

Prioritising Borders: The Role of the BSF

It is, therefore, important that the borders are guarded with all available resources at the disposal of the BSF. It is especially important to enhance surveillance of unfenced and riverine border. Keeping surveillance over the 164 villages located across the fence is essential through regular patrolling in order to identify outsiders, besides putting in adequate protocols and providing technological support to the border guards to monitor to and fro movement through the fence gates.

The border guarding is manpower intensive with limited availability of technological interventions. While induction of additional technology will take time, it is essential to ensure that the manpower available is not diverted from their primary task. It has been a practice to withdraw troops from these borders and deploy them for internal security, elections, or some other tasks in the interior of the country. It is informally learnt that as many as 40 to 50 percent troops were withdrawn from the borders with Bangladesh for deployment in election duties in 2024.

While diversion of troops for some crucial internal duties is unavoidable, such withdrawal of troops for long duration seriously compromises border security which has a direct linkage with internal security.

The BSF, at its own level, must ensure that all available manpower remains present to patrol and keep surveillance over the border. It is also recommended that the government should not withdraw manpower from the eastern borders unless absolutely necessary.

The Intelligence branch of the BSF, besides collecting information on day-to- day crimes, must enhance focus on collecting information related to insurgents and radical elements. It must also deploy resources for identifying elements on own side of the border who may be involved in antinational activities or provide shelter and logistic support to insurgents/militants/radicals in carrying out their activities.

They must also enhance efforts to collect information about the likelihood of camps being set up in Bangladesh for the insurgent groups wanting to foment trouble in India, besides collecting information about any new military infrastructure coming up in the vicinity of borders and movement of the defence forces of Bangladesh.

The role of the lead Intelligence agency assigned to the BSF to coordinate intelligence efforts of different Bangladesh borders, thus, attains great importance.

The situation prevailing in Bangladesh has the portends of creating several challenges for the BSF and the Government of India in ensuring proper security of the borders in 2026. The government and the BSF must, therefore, ensure that these porous borders with Bangladesh are prioritised and given adequate resources to ensure constant vigil.

(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)