CAPF Quotas for Ex-Agniveers a Step in the Right Direction, But Not Final Answer

The Agnipath model ensured Armed Forces lost the cumulative institutional knowledge which seasoned veterans brought.

The Agnipath Yojana, introduced in June 2020, marked a fundamental shift from the traditional, decades-old military recruitment model.

(Photo: The Quint)

On 21 July, Nityanand Rai, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, responded in the Lok Sabha to a question from Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MP Janardan Singh Sigriwal regarding the steps taken by the government to secure "second careers" for soldiers exiting the Agnipath scheme, specifically, the recruitment provisions in the paramilitary forces. 

The minister’s written reply, reaffirming its earlier stance for a younger, fitter, and technologically adept military, enunciated the main parts of the new policy.

• Reservation: Fifty percent of all constable (general duty) and rifleman vacancies across the Central Reserve Police Force (CAPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, and Assam Rifles will now be reserved for ex-Agniveers. 

• Age Relaxation: A three-year age relaxation in the upper age limit, with the first batch of ex-Agniveers (released earlier) being granted a five-year relaxation. 

• No Test: Ex-Agniveers are exempted from taking the written exam, the physical standards rest, and the physical efficiency test. 

Why Agnipath Was Introduced

Prior to 2020, under the legacy system, Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR)—comprising soldiers, sailors, and airmen—were enrolled into the Indian Armed Forces for a full, permanent engagement period, typically spanning 15 to 34 years depending on the rank. On culmination of that service, they retired with a lifelong pension, healthcare benefits, and ex-servicemen status. In addition, they had access to some civilian jobs reserved for ex-servicemen. 

The Agnipath Yojana—introduced in June 2020—marked a fundamental shift from that traditional, decades-old military recruitment model. The scheme envisaged short-term recruitment military service model, wherein Indian youth between 17.5 and 21 years, who fulfilled other eligibility criteria, were recruited to serve as Agniveers for four years, including basic training.

The Agniveers were a distinct rank in the Indian Armed Forces—different from any other existing ranks. During those four-year service period, Agniveers are provided non-contributory life insurance cover of Rs 48 lakh. Upon completion of those four years’ service, up to 25 percent were to be retained in the regular cadre, with 75 percent being discharged with a tax-free financial severance package ('Seva Nidhi' of approximately Rs 11.71 lakh), but no lifelong pension or gratuity benefits. 

In addition were job reservations for the Agniveers—the Ministry of Defence had reserved 10 percent of jobs in the Indian Coast Guard, in defence civilian posts, and all defence public sector units; the Ministry of Home Affairs had reserved 10 percent in the CAPF and Assam Rifles; and the Ministry of Ports, Shipping & Waterways offered smooth transition avenues into merchant shipping.

The stated advantages of this scheme were: a transformative reform aimed at attracting youth who are more in tune with contemporary technological trends; reduce the average age of the Armed Forces (from ~32 years to ~26 years); provide the youth a unique opportunity to train in the best institutions, serve the country and contribute to nation-building; and availability of disciplined and skilled youth with military ethos in civil society.

Why Agnipath Drew Criticism

A major objective was to reduce the burgeoning financial burden of pensions. The legacy model recruited PBOR served between 15 and 34 years, and then was paid full pension till he passed away, after which his spouse drew a family pension. On account of longevity, the salaries, pensions, and associated benefits began consuming a massive portion of the Indian defence budget, leaving sparse funds available for military modernisation and capital acquisitions.

By drastically reducing the number of personnel eligible for permanent service and pensions, the government sought to realise funds for advanced weapon systems, technology, and training. 

It merits recall that the Kargil Review Committee and the associated Group of Ministers Report to Review the National Security System had recommended:

• Maintaining a younger military by reducing the colour-service period from 17 to 7-10 years 

• An integrated manpower policy for the Indian Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, and the CAPF 

• Enhancing training and equipment of the CAPF to meet emergent threats

• And importantly, a lateral entry into the CAPF for soldiers being demobilised from the forces

The Agnipath Yojana, however, came under massive criticism from defence veterans, Opposition parties, and the youth:

• Loss of Experience: Contemporary warfare, which is evolving fast and emphasises small-team operations, requires not just physical resilience, but also leadership, good tactical knowledge, technical proficiency, deep adaptability, and emotional intelligence to navigate the unpredictable, digitised battlefields.

It takes about a year to impart basic training to a soldier, with higher levels of skills being acquired after four years of service. The Agnipath model thus ensured that Armed Forces lost the cumulative institutional knowledge which well-trained, seasoned veterans brought. 

• Loss of Motivation and Effect on Unit Cohesion: In traditional militaries, a soldier's loyalty and willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice is deeply embedded in the bonds forged over extended service with other soldiers, and importantly, with his unit and flag. The promise of a pension to him or his family was a massive incentive to endure the rigours and risks of military service. The prospect among a large segment of being discharged at the end of four years without a pension impinges on that trust and bonding.

• Risk of Militarisation of Civilian Society: Releasing large number of young, militarily-trained individuals into civilian life without socioeconomic rehabilitation or long-term employment risked not only militarisation of civil society, but also held potential of them being exploited by anti-social elements.

The New CAPF Policy

The new policy outlined on 21 July effectively takes care of the third construct, and partly of the second problem. Unconfirmed reports suggest that to address the first issue, the Indian Armed Forces have proposed extending the Agniveer service tenure to seven years, and increasing the permanent retention quota from 25 percent to 50-75 percent.

A formal quota written into the recruitment rules provides employment assurance to the ex-Agniveers, even as their induction into the CAPF reduces the latter’s training requirements while improving operational capabilities.

However, the issue in India is not policy formulation, but implementation of that policy given the turf wars and vested interests operating in each organisation. The establishment of a dedicated Ex-Agniveer Wing in the Ministry of Home Affairs is expected to plug that gap.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)