Around twenty years ago, the foreign minister of a prominent gulf country bluntly told his Indian counterpart that the Arabs could contemplate joining hands with Israel against Iran. Taken aback, the Indian minister realised that diplomatic navigation between Iran and the Arab Peninsular states – while always difficult – would become increasingly problematic. However, sanctions severely curtailed Iran’s role in the region. Now, an assertive Iran post-nuclear deal seeks to expand its influence; Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to Islamabad on March 25-26 is a part of the outreach to recalibrate relations.
South Asian countries, especially Pakistan, face a major challenge to balance relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. How has Pakistan managed the Saudi Arabia-Iran contradiction so far?
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Balancing Ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran
For over four decades, Pakistan has obsequiously courted Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. It has virtually given the Saudis the authority to mediate in their country’s domestic political quarrels. More insidious for Pakistan’s social fabric has been the penetration of the rigid and obscurantist forms of Saudi Islam among Pakistani Sunnis.
Saudi financial assistance has bailed Pakistan out at critical times, and the millions of Pakistanis working in the Kingdom send home much-needed remittance. All this has contributed to the Saudis and other Gulf states thinking that Pakistan – the only Islamic country with nuclear weapons and with the largest army – is at their beck and call.
Despite pious expressions of Islamic solidarity and a long common border, Iran and Pakistan have treated each other warily. Political bonhomie is deprived of usual warmth, trade ties are on a decline, and the veneer of traditional Persianate culture is disappearing in Pakistan. However, as Iran has consolidated its influence over Pakistani Shias, it has developed the capacity to add to the sectarian conflict which has ravaged the country.
Impact of Rouhani’s Visit
- South Asian
countries, especially Pakistan, face a major challenge to balance relations
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- The Sunni-dominated
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have enjoyed close ties with Pakistan.
- On the other
hand, it has been a tightrope walk as Pakistan has tried balancing relations
with Shiite-dominated Iran.
- India must take
note of the Rouhani-Nawaz Sharif decision for cooperation between the Gwadar
and the Chabahar ports.
- India will also
have to closely watch the Rouhani and Sharif exchanges on Afghanistan.
When Saudi Arabia Sought Help from Islamabad
Saudi Arabia has watched Iran’s greater role in the region with alarm. The two countries are on opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria and Yemen. While Iran, through the Iraqi Shia militias, is actively taking on ISIS, the Saudis’ primary attention is on Iran, though ISIS constitutes a danger to the monarchy. In 2015, Saudi Arabia called on Pakistan to send troops for the Yemen operations, but it refused to oblige. However, Pakistan pledged to defend Saudi Arabia if it was attacked. The Saudis and other Gulf countries such as the UAE were furious at the Pakistani “betrayal”.
Saudi-Iranian tensions escalated with the former breaking diplomatic relations with the latter, following a mob attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, backed by the Army, embarked on a peace-making mission in Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudis snubbed him, though the Iranians played along. The Saudi message hit home. Pakistan is now part of a 34- country Saudi-centred group against terrorism!
Ensuring Its Interests
It is in this context that Rouhani is visiting Islamabad. His focus is beyond the usual commitments that are made during such visits – to strengthen trade relations and deepen economic cooperation. In the typical sugar-coated and elliptical Iranian manner, Rouhani has conveyed to Pakistan not to overlook its interests while continuing its Saudi-centred relations.
While Iran and Pakistan have decided to expand energy cooperation, there has been no media mention, as yet, of the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. This is partly because there are differences that both sides need to iron out, but also because the real prize for Iran is its extension to India. The dynamics of the project will change if India joins it.
Implications for India
India must take note of the Rouhani-Nawaz Sharif decision for cooperation between the Gwadar and the Chabahar ports. As the latter port is critical for India’s strategy of access to Afghanistan and thence to Central Asia, this decision may have a direct bearing on Indian interests. It is necessary for India to ensure that the proposed Gwadar-Chabahar cooperation does not further impede the already delayed port development.
India will also have to closely watch the Rouhani and Sharif exchanges on Afghanistan. Will there be an attempt at reconciling their competing interests? Iran is always concerned about the welfare of the Afghan Shias which face Taliban hostility.
Underlining the importance of security, the Army Chief in Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif, called on Rouhani. He complained to the Iranian President about alleged Indian attempts to intervene in Baluchistan. In this connection, he raised the issue of the alleged R&AW spy who Pakistan claims had a valid Iranian visa and was based in Chabahar.
It is unlikely that Rouhani would have given the General any comfort.
(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs.)
Also read:
Afghan Peace Talks: Will India Consider Opening Up With Taliban?
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