More than his predecessors, Prime Minister Narendra Modi desires to create personal bonds with his international interlocutors and peers. Pursuing this track, he goes far beyond the requirements of protocol. He meets some of them outside Delhi, engages them over tea (chai pe charcha), and carefully selects gifts for them. The visit to Lahore last December to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was part of this hallmark personalised diplomatic style.
Will this attempt at establishing personal chemistry with Nawaz Sharif help Modi “to try and turn the course of history” in Indo-Pak ties? Certainly it will have little impact on the Pakistan army which decides the country’s India policy. The hard generals dismiss such endeavours as sheer drama.
Indian Diplomacy
Indian foreign policy objectives on Pakistan have been consistent since its breakup in 1971. So has Indian diplomacy in large measure, though, there have been variations reflecting the persona and assessments of some Indian Prime Ministers. Narasimha Rao’s cool detachment, Rajiv Gandhi’s youthful vigour, Gujral’s Punjabi exuberance which hid a steely commitment to Indian strategic interests, Vajpayee’s calm and consensus building charm and Manmohan Singh’s diffidence impacted on India’s Pakistan diplomacy. Nothing has moved the generals though.
There is a distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy though often the words are used synonymously. The former establishes aims and may outline broad strategies for external interaction; these are the domains of the political leadership. The latter is meant for the execution of policy and involves the minutiae of tactics; these are largely the field of professional diplomats. However, political bosses sometimes find it difficult to resist sallying forth into its quagmire sometimes with sub-optimal results. This has been true in India as well, including in India-Pakistan interactions such as during the Agra summit.
All Indian governments have wanted a stable Pakistan. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee eloquently expressed this foundational principle at the Minar-e-Pakistan during his visit to Lahore in February 1999. It is a different matter that most Pakistanis and certainly the country’s army disbelieve it altogether.
All Indian governments have also wanted to develop full cooperative relations with Pakistan.
The continuing features of Indian diplomacy after the Simla Agreement of 1972 are:
1. a firm commitment to bilateralism and a complete refusal to permit any third party involvement in India-Pakistan negotiations.
2. a focus on developing cooperation as a good in itself but also in the belief that once the two countries begin to cooperate, it would be easier to address outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir.
3. a preference to engage the civilian leadership unless the military has assumed a direct political role.
Significantly, Pakistan holds diametrically opposite views on the first two points and its army refuses to engage with India directly whenever there is an elected government in Islamabad.
Terrorist Challenge
The Pakistan-fuelled Kashmir terrorist insurgency has confronted Prime Ministers with a most serious strategic and diplomatic challenge. India used its military forces to combat the terrorist challenge and still does. However, over the years, the Indian political and strategic classes became convinced despite continuing incidents that Pakistan’s cross border terrorism was only a political management issue. The response, therefore, became limited to diplomacy. Modi’s response to the Pathankot terrorist attack demonstrates that he too is following the path of his predecessors.
As Pakistani cross border terrorism is now considered only a political management matter, Modi, like his predecessors, will have to decide if terror and talks can go together. Indian diplomacy tried in the past to put them in separate diplomatic baskets but the public outrage that follows a major terrorist incident forces a diplomatic rupture. By elevating talks on terrorism to the NSA-level Modi is attempting to prevent such a rupture. It is doubtful if he will succeed if another attack takes place or if Pakistan does not take any real action against the Jaish leadership.
Modi’s Agenda
Indian Prime Ministers have generally favoured conventional diplomacy and hard negotiations to safeguard national interest. However, in a couple of cases, back-channel contacts in secrecy have been pursued. This was done briefly during Kargil and by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Kashmir. Both Singh and former Pakistan Foreign Minister Kasuri have claimed that these talks held over three years almost succeeded. It is difficult to assess these claims.
Back channel diplomacy is within the scope of conventional diplomacy. It insulates the process from the public glare but its success rate is not higher than the open process. The latter has to be in confidence too while it is on. There are well established ways of doing so. India and Pakistan have undertaken these exercises successfully in the past through sustained effort. In these cases, the Pakistani army was willing to go along.
As Modi seeks to advance his ambitious Pakistan agenda, Indian diplomacy will be on test as never before.
(The writer is a former Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs.)
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