“Even after the last terrorist is neutralised and the last gun is seized, an attack on Yatra can’t be ruled out. But we take precautions and ensure security arrangements as per the threat perception at a particular point of time and history since the last 10-15 years”, said a senior official of the Jammu and Kashmir Police in the context of criticism over the authorities’ failure to pre-empt the 10 July ambush that left seven Amarnath pilgrims dead and 19 more injured in Anantnag.
The attack, in which unidentified sharp-shooter assailants emptied five AK-47 magazines at the yatris’ bus in just 10-15 seconds, indicates prima facie that at least five persons carried out the operation.
The J&K Police have now ceased to insist that it was actually an attack on the naka of Special Operations Group (SOG) and the “unregistered bus carrying tourists got caught in the crossfire”.
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‘Yatris Are Registered, NOT Vehicles’
Saleem Sheikh, the incredibly daring driver of the ill-fated Gujarat-based bus, has made it clear that all of his passengers were in fact “registered Yatris” who had properly visited the holy cave and returned after their darshan two days before the incident.
The officials claim that over 30,000 police, military and paramilitary personnel had been deployed to foil the possible terror attacks on the Yatris as there was “increased threat perception” this year.
SSP Anantnag Altaf Khan and IGP Kashmir Munir Khan had received intelligence inputs indicating a “major terror strike” on the pilgrimage a week before it started on 29 June.
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Panel on Amarnath Yatra Attack
So, what was amiss that helped the terrorists – other than their training, experience and audacity – as they hit their target with meticulous precision?
Police are, among other things, investigating why none of the six-odd checkpoints on the hypersensitive ‘Jhelum Corridor’, on the highway from Pampore to Anantnag, stopped the bus and arranged for an armed escort. They are also probing if anybody from Awantipora, where the bus halted for one hour, tipped off the assailants about the soft target.
When as many as 243 pilgrims died due to inclement weather on the Yatra track, close to the holy cave on 22 August 1996, the Ministry of Home Affairs had constituted the Nitish Sengupta committee to devise the means to prevent all possible threats to the Yatra. After some sporadic attacks and attempts, the worst ever terrorist attack occurred at the Yatra base camp of Pahalgam on 1 August 2000, when 34 people, including 17 pilgrims, were killed.
With the then General Officer Commanding Srinagar-based 15 Corps and Security Advisor to the state government, Lt Gen JR Mukherjee as its Chairman, and Principal Secretary (Home), C Phonsog, and Deputy Commissioner of Anantnag, GA Peer as its members, Farooq Abdullah’s government constituted a committee to find how terrorists had planned and executed such a deadly strike in a high security zone.
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Mukherjee Committee Report
The findings of the enquiry, according to Praveen Swami’s report in Frontline , held Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) responsible not only for a host of security lapses but also killing a number of the pilgrims in confusion well after the two militants of Lashkar-e-Taiba had been shot dead. Swami dismissed the report as unprofessional and prejudiced against the CRPF.
Significantly, the Mukherjee Committee did not put any questions before the then DIG of South Kashmir, Javed Makhdoomi, or SSP of Anantnag, Munir Khan, even as it held incharge SP at Pahalgam Tilak Raj and the CRPF camp commander Hari Singh responsible for several lapses.
The committee also ignored a letter of the then IB Assistant Director in Srinagar Mr Rasgotra, who is currently JD of IB in Kashmir. The Mukherjee Report had also overlooked intelligence inputs provided by R&AW to Lt Colonel Gurvinder Singh of 15 Corps, which claimed that the militants had been given the task of attacking the pilgrims. Both the inputs were reportedly based on radio intercepts.
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Report Not Made Public
Mr GA Peer, now a retired IAS officer, said that he was not aware about any action taken against any official.
Mr Mukherjee submitted the report to then Governor Girish Chander Saxena who, in turn, forwarded it to the Home Department. It was kept confidential and never made public.GA Peer, Former Deputy Commissioner, Anantnag
Years later, in 2012, the Supreme Court of India took suo motu cognisance of the lapses and irregularities concerning the Amarnath Yatra operation even as no tragedies occurred for over a decade and the number of pilgrims reached an all-time high of 6,29,428 in 2011 and 6,37,071 in 2012 as against 2,96,000 in 2007.
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SOP for the Yatra
Consequent upon the apex court directions in the writ petition No: 284 (Civil) of 2012, J&K government’s Home Department formulated and circulated Standard Operating Procedures for the Yatra vide Order No: 226-Home of 2013 dated 10 June 2013.
In an annexure to the Government Order, the paragraph on ‘Vulnerability analysis’ reads: “Considering the security scenario, topography of the Yatra area, high potential of terrorist attacks on the Yatris to create law and order situation throughout the State and the country, sensitive nature of the Yatra, and the high publicity the Yatra generates, the entire Yatra area is highly prone to terrorist attacks”.
The army, police and other security forces shall take action as per their departments’ SOPs in the matter. Direction/inputs received in this regard from intelligence agencies and Unified HQ shall be promptly shared with other Security Forces/ intelligence agencies and necessary action shall be initiated to prevent any mishap.Para 6.6.1 of the ‘Standard Operating Procedures’
It also stresses on the deployment of ‘spotters’ to keep an eye on suspicious movements and activities particularly at the base camps and the holy cave.
As of now, nonchalance and gaps in communication and coordination between the police, security and intelligence organisations, and the shrine board authorities abound, and the whole gamut of so-called SOPs needs a radical overhaul in consideration of the fast changing threat perception to different pilgrimages and religious ceremonies in the Valley.
(The writer is a Srinagar-based journalist. He can be reached @ahmedalifayyaz.)
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