There’s a strange competition going on in the United States even as I write this. On one hand, the whole lot of Donald Trump, Pete Hegseth, and the likes want the world, or more specifically, the Americans, to believe that the Iranian Civil Nuclear infrastructure has been “obliterated,” while the entire gamut of the American mainstream media is trying to prove otherwise. In this tussle, the split is evident.
There’s no American war that has not gotten the full support of the entire spectrum of the media. This case is unique because it is not their favourite President who started this one.
Outside of this circus, an array of international experts have weighed on the available evidence and have concluded that while a significant part of the civil nuclear infrastructure in Iran has been damaged, it is far from being “obliterated.” In fact, not even close.
Damage Assessment
Let’s look at the facts first. The high-quality post-strike maps of the Fordow Enrichment Plant show several holes through which the “bunker busters” managed to get in. There is a limited subsidence visible on one side. A very small amount of concrete ash is visible, too.
However, these are not enough to conclude that the facility has been destroyed. My conversations with half a dozen Iranian experts—both from the technical as well as the military field—have led me to believe that not only did the strikes not destroy this facility, but the damage it caused was less than they had anticipated. The same was confirmed by at least a section of the US intelligence community in their leaks to the American Press.
The situation at Natanz and Isfahan is a bit different. Everything above and below the ground at Natanz is largely destroyed.
However, this was given considering most of the infrastructure here was overground and hosted mostly first and second-generation centrifuges. Still, the very fact that the US had to use a full load of missiles on a submarine to strike this place tells us that the Israelis couldn’t finish the job on their own here. The strikes at Isfahan are mostly overground and superficial. A large section of infrastructure that was underground—and crucial for what Iran is likely planning next—remained unmolested.
To sum it up, it is now very clear that Iranians had moved the entirety of the 400 kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU enriched to 60 per cent) from the facilities that were struck.
While not even the Western Intelligence is aware of its whereabouts, it is understood that the stock of HEU has been distributed into smaller loads and spread across the country. And while the Iranians had hinted about it even before the strikes, this is now accepted by the intelligence community worldwide. It is also highly likely that a substantial portion of the most advanced centrifuges have survived.
Where Do the Iranians Go from Here?
This brings us to the question of what Iran will do now since—in her own words—the diplomatic table they sat on was blown? It has a range of options, political expediency permitting. To start with, the Iranian parliament—Majlis—has made a unanimous decision to downgrade the relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Rafael Mariano Grossi.
The Agency’s—and more importantly, its head’s—role during the entire episode has been shady at the best and treasonous at the worst. It was the Agency’s politicised wording of the report it presented at the Board Meeting that provided Israel with the excuse to mount an attack on Iran.
After the attack, the IAEA and its head walked back on the language used and said explicitly that Iran is not making a bomb. It could not even bring itself to condemn these attacks and used the mealy-mouthed phrase of “deeply concerned,” which is where the Narendra Modi-led government has also been recently found taking shelter.
Iran’s charges are even more serious. Iranian Intelligence managed to hack a large volume of documents pertaining to the Israeli Nuclear Program, and it insists that the Agency under Grossi was deeply involved in spying for Mossad.
Under the circumstances, the Guardian Council in Iran was quick to sign the bill passed by the Iranian Majlis. This essentially means that the Iranian nuclear program has gone dark.
Here onwards, there are several options. Iran has not yet withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it is a signatory to. That’s the nuclear option Iran has kept in case the Europeans trigger the Snapback Mechanism on Iran vis-à-vis the JCPOA Deal. But limiting cooperation with the IAEA with or without withdrawing from the NPT means that the latter’s eyes and ears have been shut closed.
This essentially means that, Ayatollah Khamenei permitting, Iran can dash towards the bomb.
Iran will need nine Cascades to enrich 400 kg of HEU to bomb-grade. It can install an average of 1.5 cascades per week. This means it will take a month and a half to reach there. A lot of misinformation regarding the assassinations of Iranian Nuclear Scientists is floating on the internet. Yes, Israel did assassinate quite a few of them. But Iran has a pool of 25000 Nuclear scientists and engineers with hundreds added every year. Also, the theoretical works vis-à-vis the bomb are already done.
The only thing stopping Iran is Khamenei’s fatwa. If it is quietly withdrawn—he doesn’t have to announce it—the dash to the bomb shall be quick.
Imitation Diplomacy
But does this option close the door to diplomacy? No, it does not. Iranians can now play-act like the Americans did for the last three months. They can stall the diplomatic process while enriching additional uranium to 60 percent.
Since no IAEA cameras are keeping track anymore, these additional HEU can then be transferred to make the bombs, while he older 400 kg HEU can be brought to the IAEA’s purview once a diplomatic deal is reached. Iran doesn’t need to announce the bomb.
Talking to the experts in Iran, it is evident that the mood in the population has turned for the bomb. Leave alone the ideological types, the push and rancour is now coming mostly from the liberal class, which doesn’t have any love lost for the Islamic Nezam.
If anything, this class sees Khamenei’s Fatwa as a stupid hindrance guided by the religious logic in which they don’t have any belief to start with. Israel and the collective West had put their money on this class to rebel against the Islamic Nezam ruling Tehran.
Much to their chagrin—and horror—this section of Iranians rallied for the flag instead. In a twist of irony, the class Israel and the West bet on to topple the Nezam is the class now most vocally asking for the fatwa to be withdrawn and a bomb to be made. It would be very difficult for the Nezam to ignore this.
As far as the diplomatic question goes, the signal from DC is muddled. In any case, the Iranians are not going to take Trump or any of his representatives at their word.
There are a lot of leaks floating around that talk about a range of options the US is willing to offer Iran to abandon the program. That is not going to work. Iranian resolve vis-à-vis enrichment rights has further hardened.
Trump—who was led by his ears by Benjamin Netanyahu to the war—was told in as many words that till the time he doesn’t come back to his original red line of Iranians not getting a bomb, and not Netanyahu’s red line of no enrichment—there will be no deal. The strategic genius will now realise that even that option is gone. Iranian bomb is now a matter of when and not if.
(Saurabh Kumar Shahi is a journalist specialising in West and South Asian Affairs with a special interest in the inter-religious and intra-Islamic conflict in the region. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)