When someone is arrested in India, their family is often left in the dark. They may know their loved one has been taken away, but not why. They cannot brief a lawyer, prepare a bail application, or even reassure themselves that the arrest is lawful. This uncertainty is not just cruel—it undermines the very foundation of liberty our Constitution promises.
Article 22 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be arrested without being informed of the grounds of arrest. However, for decades, this safeguard has been reduced to a hollow ritual. Police officers often read out a formulaic statement, sometimes in a language not even understood by the accused, and claim compliance.
In a judgment on 6 November, the Supreme Court has decisively changed this landscape, directing that the grounds of arrest must be provided in writing, not merely conveyed orally.
The Court has gone even further. In recent judgments, justices have stressed that written grounds should be provided not only to the accused but also to their relatives or friends, as mandated by Section 50A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This development, though seemingly procedural, could shift the balance of power between the state and the citizen at the moment of arrest.
Introducing a simple, standardised arrest-compliance form, detailing the grounds of arrest, acknowledgments from the accused and the nominated relative, and the station-book entry, would eliminate ambiguity and greatly strengthen constitutional compliance. A uniform form would turn a fragmented set of duties into a single, verifiable document and ensure there is no confusion at the remand stage.
Historical Context
The story begins in the early 1960s. In Harikisan vs State of Maharashtra, the Court held that simply handing an English note to a Hindi-speaking accused did not amount to effective communication. The right to be informed, the Court said, meant that the accused must truly understand the reasons for their arrest.
Two decades later, in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel vs Union of India, the Court reinforced this, emphasising that communication of grounds is not a formality but a substantive safeguard.
The Supreme Court, in its latest decision in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025 (pronounced on 06.11.2025), a bench led by Chief Justice BR Gavai and Justice Masih, has gone further.
In Mihir Rajesh Shah, the Court draws a direct parallel between Article 22(1) and Article 22(5), holding that both require “effective knowledge” of the grounds, which is only possible if the grounds are supplied in writing, in a language understood by the accused. The Court explicitly cites Harikisan and Lallubhai to hold that oral explanations or police-officer translations do not satisfy the constitutional requirement. This constitutional interpretation now applies to all arrests, irrespective of the statute invoked.
This line of reasoning culminated in 2023 with Pankaj Bansal vs Union of India. There, the Court addressed a recurrent dispute—police claimed they had informed the accused of the reasons for his arrest, but the accused denied this. To resolve this confusion, the Court suggested a simple remedy: provide the grounds of arrest in writing and obtain an acknowledgment. This approach ensures compliance is documented, not just asserted.
In Prabir Purkayastha vs State (NCT of Delhi), the following year, the Court went even further by invalidating the arrest altogether due to the absence of written grounds. What was once regarded as a procedural nicety had now become a constitutional requirement.
The pivotal decision was in Vihaan Kumar vs State of Haryana in 2025. Justice Abhay S Oka, writing for the Court, reaffirmed that written grounds must be provided to the accused. However, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, in a compelling concurring opinion, went further. He contended that Article 22 and Section 50A of the CrPC should be read together to require that relatives or friends are also given written grounds of arrest. Without this, he cautioned, the purpose of notifying them would be reduced to a mere formality.
Most importantly, in Mihir Rajesh Shah, the Supreme Court held that Article 22(1) does not create any exceptions based on the nature of the offence. Therefore, the requirement to furnish written grounds applies equally to arrests under the BNS (formerly IPC), and not merely to arrests under special statutes like PMLA or UAPA.
The Court characterises the Article 22(1) obligation as a “mandatory, unexceptional duty” imposed on the State in every arrest scenario. What began as a concurring opinion is now crystallising into a principle of consensus.
Why Families Matter
The reason for this extension is straightforward but significant. An accused person in custody is often under stress, feels intimidated, or may even struggle to remember what is read to them. In such cases, providing the written grounds to a nominated relative or friend ensures that someone outside the custody environment can take meaningful actions: consult lawyers, prepare bail applications, and, if needed, challenge the arrest itself.
Without written grounds, families are left powerless. They may know that their loved one has been arrested, but they do not know whether the arrest is lawful, what the charges are, or what remedies are available. Providing written grounds to relatives transforms Section 50A from a simple notification requirement into a meaningful safeguard.
The Supreme Court has now endorsed this approach in Mihir Rajesh Shah. The judgment advances further by reinforcing the documentary protections surrounding arrest. The Court observes that Section 50A CrPC (now Section 48 BNSS) does not merely require that a friend or relative be informed — it also mandates that the police officer “shall make an entry of the fact as to who has been informed of such an arrest in a book to be kept in the police station.”
This written record is compulsory. Significantly, the Court emphasises that a corresponding duty is placed on the Magistrate: when the arrestee is produced for remand, the Magistrate must ensure that this requirement has been satisfied. In essence, the notification to relatives, the written entry in the station register, and the Magistrate’s verification together constitute a mandatory constitutional chain. The failure of any link — whether the absence of written grounds, proof of communication to relatives, or the station entry — invalidates the arrest itself.
For the first time, the Court has closed the compliance gap. It is no longer enough for the police to claim orally that a relative was “informed”. The law now requires the arresting officer to make a written entry in the station register stating who was informed, when, and how. More importantly, the Magistrate has a constitutional duty to check this record when deciding remand. If the entry is missing, the remand cannot be granted. This transforms what was once a hollow ritual into a verifiable safeguard.
The Magistrate’s Role
If written grounds are provided to both the accused and their relatives, and acknowledgment is obtained, magistrates can require these acknowledgments to be presented at the remand stage. If they are not available, remand can be denied. This alters the situation completely. Instead of vague police assertions, magistrates will have documentary evidence. Compliance will be verifiable, not speculative.
This represents the logical next phase in the development of personal liberty protections. Magistrates are intended to serve as guardians of liberty. They should uphold this principle as a standard practice.
The Supreme Court has now clarified that this requirement is mandatory. In Mihir Rajesh Shah, the Court states that failing to provide written grounds “as soon as may be” makes the arrest unconstitutional and nullifies all subsequent custody, including police remand and judicial remand. Importantly, the Court explains that neither filing a chargesheet nor magistrate's cognisance can remedy the inherent unconstitutionality of the arrest. This is the most authoritative reaffirmation of the Article 22(1) safeguard to date.
A Global Standard
India is not alone in this development. The UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, mandates that written notice of the reasons for arrest must be provided. The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that detainees must receive “prompt and precise” written reasons for their detention under Article 5 of the European Convention.
Far from being radical, the Supreme Court’s stance aligns India with global best practices. The Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah also offers a rare sociological insight: arrest is not merely a procedural step but a life-altering rupture. The Court highlights the stigma, psychological trauma, disruption of family life, and erosion of dignity that come with arrest. Building on Arnesh Kumar and Joginder Kumar, the judgment warns that arrest must not become a routine police reflex.
This contextual, humane perspective strongly reinforces the necessity of written grounds — they are not mere paperwork; they are the first defence against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The gap between principle and practice can be bridged with a simple, standardised form. This ensures uniformity, accountability, and ease of judicial verification.
This form may appear bureaucratic, but it is precisely this bureaucracy that protects liberty from arbitrariness. With one stroke, it transforms an oral ritual into a verifiable safeguard. Although the Supreme Court stops short of prescribing a specific form or template for communicating grounds of arrest, the logic of the judgment clearly indicates a move towards such standardisation.
Currently, the Court relies on statutory duties — written communication to the accused, written notification to relatives, an entry in the station register, and the Magistrate’s verification — but the lack of a uniform form allows significant room for inconsistency and dispute.
Time to Move from Promise to Practice
Despite these judicial pronouncements, practice in most States remains inadequate. Police continue to depend on oral intimations and standard memos. Families are seldom provided with written reasons. Magistrates frequently overlook the lack of acknowledgments. The consequence: a constitutional safeguard stays a mere paper promise.
The jurisprudence from Harikisan to Kaisar Reddy illustrates the path forward. Written grounds of arrest must be provided not only to the accused but also to their families, with acknowledgments becoming part of the judicial record.
This is no longer merely a courtesy; it has become a constitutional obligation. If Article 22 is to hold meaning beyond ink on paper, if liberty is to be more than just a slogan, the police, magistrates, and the justice system must adopt this practice.
Only then will families of the arrested be able to act, lawyers be able to defend, and citizens be assured that the state’s power to arrest is exercised within legal bounds. With Mihir Rajesh Shah, jurisprudence has reached a definitive point: written grounds of arrest, provided both to the accused and their designated relatives, are now a constitutional requirement applicable to all offences. What started as a procedural suggestion in Pankaj Bansal has evolved into a universal rule.
The Supreme Court has spoken with unprecedented clarity. After the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah, it is no longer possible to treat Article 22(1) as a hollow incantation. Written grounds of arrest are now the constitutional minimum—anything less is unlawful. It is now for the system to listen.
(Krishnan Agarwal is an advocate practicing in constitutional and criminal law. He has worked extensively on issues relating to personal liberty and procedural safeguard. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author's. The Quint is neither responsible nor endorses them.)