Students who understand a bit of statistics and history know that correlation is not evidence of causation. Yet, for the authors, the second conviction of Congress politician Sajjan Kumar on murder charges allegedly committed during the near-genocide of Sikhs in Delhi in 1984, carries a certain irony.
The political trajectory of the past 40 years, since the anti-Sikh Delhi riots of 1984, has been symbolised by this conviction.
It reflects the slow and painful decline of the Congress as a dominant political force and the near-simultaneous, relentless rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the dominant political force in India.
Less than a week before the second conviction of Sajjan Kumar, results of the Delhi Assembly elections were announced. The big news, of course, was the BJP winning after 27 years along with much speculation and commentary over the future of Arvind Kejriwal and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). But the elephant in the room was the Congress's dismal performance. It registered a double hat-trick of zero seats. In three successive Lok Sabha and Assembly elections since 2014, the Congress tally has been a big fat zero.
The correlation is there. But no sane person would suggest that the pathetic condition of the Congress now is because, as the court verdicts say, Sajjan Kumar's murder of innocent Sikhs in the 1984 riots.
However, the tumultuous events of late 1984 are reflective of the pendulum of the political arc beginning to swing. Less than two months after the massacre of about 4,000 Sikhs on the streets of Delhi, Rajiv Gandhi led the Congress to its biggest-ever Lok Sabha victory. One could safely say that the elections marked the zenith for the Congress; the only way forward was downward. For the BJP, which won only two out of 543 Lok Sabha seats, the elections were a political nadir; the only way forward was upwards.
And that is exactly how political discourse, narrative, and voter behaviour has changed systematically over the past 40 years in India.
Shadow of 1984: The Price Punjab Paid
But first, let's look at the verdict. Two life sentences may appear to be a case of justice being served.
Yet, the sheer scale and barbarity of the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 remain such a blot on India that even this verdict pales in comparison.
For those who have forgotten, Punjab came close to slipping out India's grasp in the 1980s. The emergence of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, the extremist Sikh preacher, and the surge in terrorism across the state led to unimaginable violence.
There was misery on all sides. Senior Sikh police officials visiting the Golden Temple were shot dead by terrorists. On the other hand, Khalistani terrorists too pulled out Hindus from buses and shot them dead in cold blood.
Eventually, this led to then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to authorise Operation Blue Star in June 1984, when the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple and killed Bhindranwale, along with thousands of terrorists and pilgrims.
A dark legacy of violence followed. While Punjab has outwardly recovered from those traumatic years, the impact has been so brutal that the economy of the state has never really recovered. Once ranked first in per capita income in the 1980s, Punjab has now slipped to somewhere tenth and thirteenth place. This is the price that India has paid for terrorism.
Shades of that fearsome history came back to haunt India in recent years, as sections of the diaspora that support the Khalistan movement called for a referendum on an independent Khalistani state in countries such as Canada and Australia. Though this involved only a tiny fraction of the Sikh diaspora, the publicity and propaganda it generated far outweighed its actual significance.
Mandal, Mandir and Congress’ Missteps
Politically, post-1984 India has been shaped by the competing influences of the Mandal and the Mandir factors. Both have decisively shaped voter behaviour, the emergence of new social coalitions, and electoral outcomes.
For a party that was once an umbrella for a diverse nature of views and acted as a ‘banyan tree’, the Congress failed miserably in navigating either of these movements effectively.
It simply withered away in crucial Hindi heartland states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, ceding political space to regional parties.
Even before the Mandal 'revolution' in the north, the Congress had already lost ground in the South to Dravidian parties that had aced the pre-Mandal caste card.
When it came to Mandir, the failure to navigate has been even more fatal. For decades, the grand old party always managed to win large swathes of Hindu votes. It was these votes, not the minority votes alone, that enabled the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) to rule India for two terms between 2004 and 2014.
But a series of the party's missteps alienated many Hindus, including some liberal voters who were never fans of the BJP's brand of Hindutva.
It was a series of actions, such as PM Manmohan Singh publicly stating that minorities had the first rights on national resources, filing an affidavit in the Supreme Court suggesting that the Hindu deity Rama was imaginary and mythological, and repeated bomb blasts in urban India that shattered morale. Additionally, the controversial Communal Violence Bill in 2011, drafted by the National Advisory Council (NAC) under Sonia Gandhi, that seemed to stipulate that Hindus were by default the guilty party in any riot.
The accumulation of such 'sins' or political blunders, since 1984 finally exploded into a decisive rejection of the Congress by voters in 2014. Its national vote share dropped below 20 percent and the party was reduced to just 44 seats.
The 2024 verdict provided an illusion that a Congress revival was inevitable. And illusion it remains.
A Crumbling Fortress
It is clear as the blue sky for anyone to see that the Congress remains a crumbling fortress with no visible or viable strategy for future revival.
More than a decade ago, the AK Antony committee submitted a report on the Congress' 2014 Lok Sabha debacle. One of its key findings was a revelation that an increasing number of voters in India perceived the Congress to be anti-Hindu. The behaviour of its leaders during the opening of the Ram Temple or even some dismissive comments on Kumbh Mela devotees suggest that no lessons have been learned.
The party has made some clumsy efforts to project its 'Hindutva' credentials in some elections. But that is foolish as it risks becoming perceived as the 'B Team' of the BJP. The Congress' strength traditionally had been its appeal to all sections of society. To get that support back will require dedicated effort and a clear statergy; mere gimmicks and rhetoric will not be enough.
There is another political reality that underscores the complexity of politics in India. While many are arguing that the Sajjan Kumar verdict is too little and too late, it is apparent that Punjab's voters have long forgiven the Congress for the 1984 riots. But the BJP, which has consistently championed the cause of the riot victims, struggles to gain support in Punjab.
No wonder even seasoned pundits fail to understand politics in India.
(Yashwant Deshmukh and Sutanu Guru work with the CVoter Foundation. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the authors' own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)