The major fire accident on Monday at one of Asia’s and India’s largest ammunition and weapons depot – the Central Ammunition Depot, Pulgaon, Wardha district in Maharashtra – has once again highlighted the gross inadequacies in the preservation and handling of the scarce, prohibitively expensive assets of our security forces.
The Indian Armed Forces, unfortunately, have been plagued with similar incidents. The state of affairs now calls for brutal introspection and remedial measures by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and, importantly, by the three Services headquarters themselves.
Pulgaon Ammunition Depot Fire
- The Defence Ministry has instituted a special investigation team (SIT) to look into the cause of the incident.
- India needs to have large and well-equipped Armed Forces.
- Proper guarding of installations, such as Pulgaon, along with better infrastructure and systems, becomes imperative.
- Surprise security audits or checks must be duly instituted and carried out.
- One of our major weaknesses is the poor quality of sheds housing such (Pulgaon) installations with virtually no forewarning sensors/alarms.
A Dubious Record
It’s been 70 years since Indian independence. India continues to be the largest importer of defence equipment and weaponry globally, despite a reasonably credible indigenous industrial base and 39 defence ordinance factories in its public sector. It is a dubious record by any standards, especially for an acknowledged emerging power.
That India has serious external and internal security challenges to face as a global player of reckoning would be stating the obvious. In order to achieve the requisite modicum of strategic security, India needs to have large, well-equipped Armed Forces with desired levels of weaponry, arms and equipment – both in qualitative and quantitative terms.
The Indian Armed Forces’ gigantic import list – apart from thousands of diverse pieces of gadgetry and weapons platforms for the three services – comprise state-of-the art weaponry, supporting equipment and importantly, ammunition.
Though it is always hoped that imports of equipment and weapon platforms come with technology transfer, and offsets encouragement of indigenous production, the desired availability normally remains a cause of concern.
Thus, the tools and wherewithal to prosecute wars have to be preserved and maintained while also being judiciously employed for training/research purposes during peacetime.
A Tale of Negligence?
We can hardly afford to lose our scarce tools for waging war to negligence, inadequate security, accidental events, sabotage or whatever ungodly reason.
Beyond governmental and Service Headquarters interventions, all stakeholders responsible for the security at our vital installations, need to put in place and implement at the grassroots level, sound standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Periodic, institutionalised reviews of the efficacy of various security measures must be carried out zealously. Surprise security audits/checks must be duly instituted and carried out with the necessary thoroughness. Defaulters must be suitably punished as required.
One of the major weaknesses in our security preparedness at the various installations – which stack electronically fragile, highly sensitive ammunition like tactical and strategic missile systems, electronic fuses, warheads, etc. – is the poor quality of sheds housing them.
They possess virtually no forewarning alarms, no CCTVs, poor quality of infrastructure, dismal standards of fire-fighting, rain and weather proofing, etc. Most sheds have dry grass growing unabashedly, with scant means to keep this fire hazard under control.
Guarding Defence Arsenals
These vital installations (depots like Pulgaon) often include a large civilian force, which itself poses a security threat. The guarding of these installations has been left to the Defence Security Corps (DSC) , who have proved to be inadequate at this task. The Services HQ may consider deploying some regulars/Territorial Army personnel along with the DSC force.
Some super-sensitive installations need to be guarded by regular, authorised Army personnel imperatively.
In addition, far better fire-fighting, perimeter security, patrolling, watch towers, lighting, surveillance and modern alarm systems have to be put into place.
More importantly, the legal provision – promulgated for decades – of not allowing any civilian construction closer than 1000 metres of such installations, has been overlooked by many state governments and local administrations. Local Army formations must take up this serious security hazard very strictly with the state governments, and ensure that no civilian constructions are allowed within the legally prescribed perimeter.
Lessons to Be Learnt
The major security lapse at CAD Pulgaon has resulted in the death of two brave Army officers and over 20 others. About 22 people have been injured – some, critically. An exorbitant loss to the national exchequer in terms of damage to critical ammunition and missile systems is expected. Lack of proper infrastructure and systems, or a possible enemy threat – whatever be the reason, both our preemptive and response mechanisms are in need of vast improvement.
It is high time that we wake up and face the realities. Competent systems and solid groundwork are required if we want to defend ourselves at any give instance. Let us never underplay what former Pakistan Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf had boasted of in 2002 – that his nation has more than a credible fifth column in India!
(The author was India’s first Chief of the Defence Intelligence Agency and is a renowned security analyst.)
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