The Pahalgam attack – in its aftermath – has spawned a number of claims and conspiracy theories, as well as calls for retaliation on social and electronic media. The confusion, claims, and counter-claims on social (and even on some legacy media outlets) call for deeper analysis and introspection of facts—and the chain of events that preceded the attack.
Claim 1: Attackers Were Zealots
The first theory labels the terrorists – reportedly belonging to ‘The Resistance Front’ (TRF), a terrorist affiliate of the proscribed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – as brain-dead religious zealots. However, the reality seems different.
After analysing biographical information and other key details of the 917 LeT militants killed in India, the Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy, West Point (New York), published a study entitled, “The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment, and Death”. Co-authored by Christine Fair, a Pakistan expert at Georgetown University, the report makes startling revelations:
That LeT recruits tens of thousands of well-educated, highly-skilled young men from the same societal segments as the Pakistani military. “These are some of Pakistan’s best and brightest… Pakistani military and Lashkar are competing for guys with the same skill set”.
“100,000 to 300,000 men received some form of training from the LeT between 1990 and 2010". (Note: this trend continues on account of reduced economic opportunities).
The LeT’s so-called “social organisation/charity” wing, the Jamaat ul-Dawa (JuD) runs a network of legitimate mosques, schools, media and publications; these help the LeT sustain its presence inside Pakistan. The CIA’s counterterror officer Charles Faddis separately adds, “They (LeT) operate in Pakistan with a lot more ease than Al-Qaeda…had the ability to make connections with military officers, well-educated people."
Claim 2: India Should Attack Pakistan
The second issue is a growing cacophony for a military attack on Pakistan. Traditionally, terrorism has been a tactic of the weak, i.e., for those who lack the power to impose their political will through ordinary political or military means. And since it’s a tactic used by the weak, terrorism generally focuses on soft, civilian targets, rather than more difficult-to-attack military targets. And every successful major terror attack contains political messaging.
Consider the events that preceded or were ocurring simultaneously. The attack took place when US Vice President JD Vance was in India on a visit (he has since condemned this attack).
It also took place less than a week after Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir’s infamous ‘hard state’ speech which included a reference to Kashmir; two days after floods and landslides hit Ramban-Dharmkund, disrupting the vital Ramban Highway, and diverting some attention towards SAR operations; days after Tahawwur Rana was extradited to India, and Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani “defence expert” spoke to The Tribune (India), openly framing terrorist attacks like ‘26/11’ as ‘tactical manoeuvres’, and refusing to condemn them; and the Bolan Tunnel siege in which many Pakistani soldiers and their families were killed.
As per the US' Congressional Research Service Report, Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and US Policy (13 January 2020), post the Balakot/Pakistani retaliation, it was US President Donald Trump’s repeated offers to mediate in the “J&K dispute” which spurred India to abrogate Article 370, adding that Trump’s attitude towards Pakistan had led to considerable disquiet in India.
Hence, it's well possible that an internationally-abandoned Pakistan, in a political-and-economic freefall, was banking on provoking India into a military strike, which it could leverage with nuclear sabre-rattling (“every war will lead to nuclear escalation”), then “internationalise the Kashmir issue”, and perhaps get some assistance.
The attack could also be aimed at redeeming the rising unpopularity of the Pakistan Army within, and to “avenge” the perceived killing by India of LeT and JeM terrorists in Pakistan.
Hence, rather than pander to that neo-nationalist cacophony seeking an overwhelming, immediate military response, India must carefully choose punitive military punishment, but in a way that it doesn't allow Pakistan to leverage its conventional forces, whose capability yet operates just below the nuclear escalation threshold.
Claim 3: Intelligence Failure Led to 'Hamas-like Attack'
The third theory claims “intelligence failure” as the reason for the arrest. It is evident that TRF, the terrorist entity responsible for the attack, and its sponsors across the border, had sought to replicate the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas in southern Israel. And were provided substantial assistance in planning, communications, surveillance, weaponry, etc by their sponsors – which makes their attack cycle complex.
The first phase of a terror attack cycle entails determining the political message sought to be conveyed through an attack.
This is followed by broad surveillance and selection of the target from multiple options afore settling on one based on its security weakness. Then comes risk evaluation, viz, likely retaliatory options the target nation may exercise against the sponsors in spite of “deniability”. Thereafter, considerable pre-operation surveillance of the target set is conducted, and timings, infiltration-exfiltration routes, weaponry, targeting priorities, etc, are decided.
If undetected, the cycle moves to infiltration-and-attack phase, and ends with the escape-and-exploitation phase. Importantly, the terrorists also exploit “alert fatigue’ – security is usually upscaled in the wake of any terror alert/attack; as the alert continues, fatigue sets in; as alertness ebbs in the absence of a new attack, they strike.
So, was there an intelligence failure at Pahalgam? Yes, and no.
In Israel’s case, there were credible inputs at least one or two months prior, but these weren’t acted upon as the Israelis presumed that Hamas’ plan wasn’t viable.
In Pahalgam’s case, there appear to be no defining prior intelligence inputs. If terrorists maintain communication security, exercise proper tradecraft, and avoid detection in all domains, then intelligence agencies have little to pick.
Further, even if intelligence agencies have an insider in a terror group, merely limiting plans to a small, select circle of terrorists can ensure secrecy. That said, it merits mention that India’s counter-terrorism grid (security and intelligence) is very capable, agile, and considering the various dynamics and constraints, is perhaps the best in the world – and we don’t celebrate the hundreds of attacks thwarted by them. Once again, lessons will be drawn from this terrible tragedy, and the grid will evolve in form, posture, and technology.
Claim 4: Security Failure
The last is about a security failure – and yes, there’s been a monumental one. Its inexplicable why Baisaran, a popular, prominent tourist spot situated adjacent to high peaks and dense forests, and within an area with a history of terror attacks on civilians, didn’t have a security presence/screen.
The Indian Army cannot be everywhere given its numbers in J&K, the rugged terrain, the multiple tasks entrusted including SAR/disaster management, and the shortfall of about a lakh troops (9 percent of the total strength).
In any case, depth areas fall under the police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). Besides, the constant harping on "total normalcy" in the valley for political purposes may have impinged on security considerations, and became an unwitting enabler of an attack.
Depiction of “normalcy”, inter-alia, requires low Special Forces (SF) visibility, which can make it difficult to maintain a pro-active, aggressive, vigilant “no-one-gets-through” posture.
Add to this the imperative to win over populations in a conflict zone and it's perhaps easier to understand how a suitably-supported, determined terrorist can slip through every once-in-a-blue-moon.
While this horrendous attack will definitely act as a shrill wake-up call for both the SF and the intelligence agencies, and we can expect evolved, enhanced security measures and intelligence activity in the days to come, what is far more important is that political bigwigs cognise the broader implications of this attack in terms of delivering inclusive, sagacious governance in J&K.
(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)