The Government of India is reportedly considering a proposal to establish a Single Border Guarding Force, following a recommendation by Rajya Sabha MP Ajit Madhavrao Gochade to the Home Ministry. The recommendation suggests that an integrated agency—similar to South Africa's Border Management Authority (BMA)—should be entrusted with handling all matters related to border control.
The MP feels that, at present, there is “absence of a unified command and tech-driven surveillance in the border areas.”
Before evaluating the merits of the proposal, it's pertinent to note that the Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security set up after the Kargil War in 2001 had made two important recommendations.
The first one was related to the creation of a Department of Border Management to coordinate activities of various agencies, including that of the Border Guard Forces (BGF) involved in border management. Thus, we already have an entity similar to South Africa's BMA.
The second recommendation was to entrust the responsibility of India's borders with its different neighbours to different BGF—aka ‘One Border One Force’.
Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) was raised to guard India-Nepal and India-Bhutan borders
Assam Rifles was entrusted with the additional responsibility of guarding the India-Myanmar Border
The Border Security Force (BSF) continued to guard the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh border
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was entrusted with the India-Tibet border
The South African Model
South Africa's operational environment, terrain configuration, and demography of the border areas differ widely from that of India's. Additionally, the BMA system was introduced only in 2023, and so, it may not have been fully tested for its efficacy in the short period of its existence.
South Africa has less than one third of the land border (4,862 km) as compared to India's land borders measuring 15,106.7 km. Further, the coastal border of South Africa at 2,798 km is only a little more than one third of the coastal border of India (7,516.6 km).
A single BGF for South Africa is feasible because of the limited extent of borders and the similarity of terrain. There's also almost a total absence of trans-border crime, with migration from other countries being the only challenge.
Apart from these, thin population density along the border, is another factor that facilitates deployment of a single BGF. These factors, besides remoteness of border areas from major population centres, and therefore, absence of regular law-enforcing authorities in border areas, necessitate delegation of powers related to other border control functions to the BGF.
The Need For Multiple BGF
In India, varied operational challenges, terrain conditions, as well as some inimical neighbours, necessitate deployment of multiple BGF trained and equipped to guard different borders.
Both Pakistan and China are inimical to India, and hence, the border infrastructure and methodology of guarding these borders are militaristic in nature.
Open support by Pakistan in fomenting trouble in border states requires not only militaristic infrastructure, methodology, and training, but also an obstacle system to prevent infiltration by militants and logistics to them.
The BSF along the western borders, therefore, does not have any resources to spare for any additional responsibilities other than securing the borders to prevent infiltration and breach of border. The Line of Control along Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, and the 200 km of International Border in Jammu Sector, witness frequent ceasefire violations.
The border management in these areas is akin to border defence. The disputed border with China is also managed by the Indian Army and the ITBP in a militaristic manner.
India-China Border
The operational and crime situation along the Bangladesh border necessitates aggressive guarding. Heavy population density along the 4,096.7 km border, similarity of language, cultural, and century-old family ties transcending the border, and intertwined economies pose heavy border management challenges. This requires troops to be skilled in handling aggressive trans-border criminals even as they need to avoid any human rights violations.
The open India-Nepal and India-Bhutan border allows free to and fro movement of citizens. These borders, even though peaceful, are prone to exploitation by forces inimical to India for infiltration of militants and smuggling of drugs and weapons. The SSB guards these borders by establishing border outposts as bases, yet the methodology is not militaristic. The border guarding is centered more on intelligence-based operations.
Possible Logistical Challenges
Each of these BGF has been delegated powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CRPC), Customs Act, Passport Act, Emigration Act, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act to empower them to perform essential functions related to border crimes. Difficult terrain along the Myanmar border precludes forward posture, compelling Assam Rifles to undertake information-based patrolling along the border.
Extending the charter of the BGF to include additional border control tasks like customs, immigration, and investigation of crimes will dilute their efficiency in their core function. BGF personnel will also require training for performing these tasks. Delegation of investigative powers to the BGF may also lead to conflict between the states and the Centre because police is a state subject.
The coordination among the BGF and other stakeholders along each border, including at integrated checkposts established along borders for better management of trade and movement of people, is of high standard.
Creating a single large monolithic BGF is, therefore, not suitable for Indian conditions. A single BGF will pose several administrative, personnel management, and logistic challenges as the requirement of training and equipment for different areas will vary drastically.
The border management systems in India are robust having been strengthened progressively since the Independence. Bringing about drastic changes will be counterproductive, especially when the operational circumstances have not changed. The guiding principle of "a thing should be repaired only when required" should be followed.
That should, however, not prevent us from identifying and incorporating good points of the systems adopted in South Africa in our systems. Policymakers should focus on modernisation of the BGF instead.
(Sanjiv Krishan Sood (Retd) has served as the Additional Director General of the BSF and was also with the SPG. He tweets @sood_2. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)