On 29 April, Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave the Defence Chiefs “complete operational freedom to decide on the modes, target and timing” to deliver a “crushing blow to terrorism”. Following that directive, it can be presumed, that they are actively working on options that they will present to Modi, and perhaps the Cabinet Committee on Security, to achieve the objective given to them.
Naturally, operational freedom means that no restrictions have been placed in their way, as was the case during India’s response to Pakistan’s occupation of the Kargil Heights in 1999.
It does not, however, connote that a political decision will not be needed for the general approach that the defence forces will adopt. But professional decisions will only be for the Defence Chiefs to make.
Modi Govt's Kinetic Response to Pak
Over the past few days, reports have appeared in the media of Modi meeting the Naval and Air Chiefs. The briefings they would have given him and the instructions he would have conveyed would be kept, as they should be, confidential.
However, these public reports indicate that a kinetic response to the Baisaran attack is very much on the table. This is despite the exhortations of the major powers that both India and Pakistan should exercise restraint.
This is also despite the two rounds of measures that have been taken against Pakistan. The most important of these is keeping the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance.
If Modi goes in for a kinetic response to the Baisaran attack, can it be said that he has established a 'Modi Doctrine' on how India will deal with an “unacceptable” terrorist attack from Pakistan? The answer to this question has to be in the affirmative for it would be the third time that he would have ordered kinetic action across the Line of Control (Loc) or the International Border with Pakistan.
The first was in 2016, in response to the Uri terrorist attack, when the Indian Army went across the LoC to carry out the 'surgical strikes'.
The second occasion was in 2019, when, after the Pulwama terrorist attack, India undertook the Balakot aerial strikes.
Significantly, in both instances, India emphasised that it had not targeted Pakistan’s state assets but had confined itself to going after terrorist targets. This time, too, Modi has asked that a crushing blow be given to terrorism. Three kinetic attacks would justify Modi’s decisions to fall within the rubric of a doctrine.
The question is if the Defence Chiefs will limit themselves to exclusively terrorist targets as in the previous two instances.
The advantage of doing so would be to justify the action as against terrorism, and not the Pakistan state. It is a different matter that the Pakistan state sponsors terrorism against India but the distinction is diplomatically important.
As after Balakot, so in the case of kinetic action even restricted to a terrorist target, the Pakistanis would respond. The Pakistani army has said so. The major powers are concerned with the risk of escalation but they should understand that the targeting of civilians on the basis of religion gave a completely different dimension to the Baisaran terrorist attack. Hence, they should fully lean on Pakistan to avoid escalation.
'Modi Doctrine': How is it Different?
The 'Modi Doctrine' is in contrast to the earlier Indian responses, which spanned over two and a half decades of Pakistani terrorism. In this period, India adopted only diplomatic means to seek to expose Pakistan.
This was even after the horror of 26/11. It avoided kinetic action.
The major powers also always assured India that they would take steps to change Pakistani behaviour. However, once public anger had cooled in India after a terrorist attack and a process of engagement had resumed, the major powers had no incentive to put pressure on Pakistan.
Besides, once the US got involved in Afghanistan after 9/11, it needed Pakistan as a supply route and also to engage the Taliban. It is a different matter that the Pakistanis played a double game with the US.
For India, the consequence of the US' need of Pakistan for Afghanistan was that it showed a degree of leniency towards Pakistan on terrorism against India. Naturally, it would always deny this but it is true nevertheless. The surgical strikes and the Balakot aerial attack showed to the US that Modi was unwilling to play by the established pattern.
It will be recalled that the Balochistan Liberation Army had carried out the Jaffar Express attack on 11 March 2025.
Pakistan has blamed India for it. At that stage, it would have been appropriate for India to not only refute these allegations but also warn the major powers: If Pakistan retaliated for an action that India was not even remotely concerned with the responsibility of, the development of a dangerous situation would rest entirely on Pakistan.
That would perhaps have alerted the powers to try to restrain Pakistan from carrying out an attack like the Baisaran one.
A last word: The only other Prime Minister to be associated with a doctrine named after him was Inder Kumar Gujral. The 'Gujral Doctrine' prescribed that India would be generous with its neighbours but it would be so if they did not harm its security interests. Naturally, the 'Gujral Doctrine' did not extend to Pakistan.
(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs. He can be reached @VivekKatju. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)