How does a war between an Iran and an Israel—two nations that are least 1,000-1,100 kms at the shortest point-to-point distance—actually happen?
It basically entails attacks from the skies, rather than land or sea. Drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, guided munitions, and, in Israel’s case (with US support), fighter and bomber aircraft have defined the nature of this conflict. It also entails supporting sabotage operations in each other’s territory, as also air defence dhields, eg, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow System etc.
The so-called “12-Day War” between Iran and Israel has now been given to a timely ceasefire mediated by Donald Trump and the maverick Arab nation of Qatar.
All public posturing of intransigence and annihilation of the “other” in Tehran or Tel Aviv aside – both Iran and Israel seem to have readily honoured the ceasefire conditionality's and have been unexpectedly compliant, so far.
So, what does the cessation of attacks from both sides, without really achieving their stated objectives, suggest?
What Does This Ceasefire Actually Suggest?
Tehran did not manage the “liberation of Palestine” or “elimination of the State of Israel”, nor did Tel Aviv manage to “topple the Iranian regime”, “degrade Iranian military wherewithal completely”, or “end Iranian nuclear capability permanently”.
If anything, both sides got exposed in terms of their abilities to “hit” the other conclusively, as indeed, failed to defend themselves against the attacks from the other side.
Basically, the “12-Day War” bled both sides militarily, psychologically, and economically, to deplete their respective coffers, patience, and arsenals to unsustainable levels.
With no conclusive victory possible on either side and the citizenry on the razor’s edge with acute concerns of their safety, and increasing distrust in leadership growing in both the countries, the grounds for ceasefire were ripe. Tell-tale signs of failure and fatigue were obvious as the goalposts shifted tellingly from “destruction” to the language of “deterrence”.
Qatar’s Role: The Quiet Diplomatic Fixer
The only hitch was that the US by itself could not mediate as it had no leverage with Tehran and it needed a trusted interlocutor. This is where the hotlines got activated in Doha, Qatar, as it shares a counterintuitively warm relation with Iran, despite being a Sunni-Arab nation (a sectarian concern of a Shia Iran).
But Qatar has always fancied an outsized role for itself in the Middle East, that has often put it in crosshairs with traditional Arab-Sunni powerhouse ie, Saudi Arabia. To “up” its own relevance, Qatar has had no qualms in cozying-up to Iran and Turkey to stitch a new ‘Bloc’ within the Ummah.
Expectedly, Qatar, which had also mediated the US-Taliban talks earlier, knew the tricks of the trade and got Iran to warm up to the idea of ceasefire. The stage was set and after the US announced its own debut in the war through “Operation Midnight Hammer” targeting Iran’s key underground facilities at Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow, it quickly pivoted to diplomacy and calls for restrain.
A timely “now is the time for peace” underscored the willingness of all parties to call for truce, after making their own rhetoric of “victories” – even as all sides knew that the essential truth was far more nuanced and complex.
Even Iran, that had earlier been in throes of internal dissonance with its own politics, witnessed a rare and complete unity in its animosity against Israel and the US. All murmurs of local upheaval and revolt leading to “regime change” turned out to be pipedreams fuelled by Iranian diaspora in the US, as the ground situation was really about an ancient civilisation licking its wounds at the imagined sleight propounded by the Western media.
Why Iran’s Distrust Runs Deep
While the memories of the US wounds date back to the Ayatollah Khomeini-led Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent American Embassy hostage drama, the Iranian memories hark back even further and deeper to the ouster of the popular and nationalistic Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, who was deposed in a CIA-led coup d’état, in 1953.
The Western media never bothered to go beyond 1979 to understand the lingering sense of inequity, unfairness, and diminishment by the West. Even in the Iran-Iraq War (through 1980s), the Western media hardly recalls that the US had been on the side of Saddam Hussein (it is another matter that he too, was subsequently neutralised by the US).
Iranian despair was worsened when a couple of years after the “9/11” attacks—which entailed 15 Saudis, 2 Emiratis, 1 Egyptian, and 1 Lebanese—Iran was unfairly conflated into the “Axis of Evil”. That the likes of Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaida, or the subsequent phenomenon of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), were vehemently opposed to Iran, made little difference to the Western folks as they were inundated with anti-Iranian complicity storyline.
It had taken the heroics of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani to take the ISIS/Daesh head-on and retrieve lost ground. Yet, after willy-nilly doing the world a favour by destroying ISIS/Daesh, General Qasem Soleimani was “taken out” by the Americans.
Deepened Suspicions
Later, even as the international nuclear watchdog agency, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would confirm that Iran had met all conditions and provisions of the Iran Nuclear Deal, Trump unilaterally tore the deal and humiliated Iran as all other P5+1 signatories watched in silence, helplessly.
Recently, Trump’s chosen Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, confirmed explicitly, “The IC continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamanei has not authorised the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003”.
Yet, the US attacked Iranian sites, whereas Tulsi Gabbard subsequently and sheepishly said that her statement was taken out on context.
Therefore, irrespective of the opinion of the Iranians towards its Ayatollahs, they do not imagine the US-Israel duo as the “saviors”. The “12 Day War” has only deepened suspicions of the US-Israel intent on the Iranian street and now, a semi-destroyed Iran is infinitely more dangerous than what it was before the war.
A Ceasefire of Face-Saving and Symbolism
Sensing the futility of any further grandstanding or attacking of the other side, the ceasefire has offered all the sides an honourable exit option.
Trump will further gloat about “stopping” the war while not owning the failure of the Iranian “regime change”, Netanyahu will falsely claim “destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities” without talking about the failure of his own defence shields in the face of Iranian drones, and the Iranians will claim “moral victory” in surviving the attack but will not talk about the human-economic-material loss to Iran.
Trump will further gloat about “stopping” the war while not owning the failure of the Iranian “regime change”, Netanyahu will falsely claim “destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities” without talking about the failure of his own defence shields in the face of Iranian drones, and the Iranians will claim “moral victory” in surviving the attack but will not talk about the human-economic-material loss to Iran.
Logic Behind 12 Hours
A gradual “12 hours plus 12 hours” ceasefire formula, that afforded crucial face saving to both the Iranian and Israeli regime, was postulated.
Iran was to initiate the first “pause” for the initial 12 hours to assure Israel of its intent, thereby triggering a reciprocal 12 hours cessation by Israel. The completion of the resultant 24 hours of ceasefire would signify the end of the war, officially.
Such a gradual approach to ceasefire would have allowed for both sides to complete their “final missions” and posture their “success” internally before acceding to the overall ceasefire terms.
Besides predicating the ceasefire on trust, it also subtly showed that the Israeli side had the major backing of the mediators—US and Qatar—as the onus of proving their sincerity was on Iran first, and then by Israel. In conflict resolutions such “who goes first” has symbolism that can tilt the storyline of “success” in favour of one side versus the other.
Nonetheless, with little to showcase for “victory” by either side, the downside of the “12 Day War” can be summed up with the hardening of emotions and animosities that will far outlive this “12 Day War”, its accompanying ceasefire, or even the Western memory.
(The author is a Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)