The bloody violence that transformed large part of Manipur into killing fields since 3 May 2023 completed its second year. Rival parties across the divide made elaborate preparations to commemorate the day. Rallies were held in Manipur, as well as in the national capital, Delhi.
The Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups marked 'Separation Day’, in the Hall of Remembrance in Lamka and other places. Meanwhile, the Federation of Civil Society Organisations (FOCS), Manipur, a Meitei organisation, observed the ‘Day of Remembrance and Reflection’ in Imphal and organised a public meeting under the theme ‘Bridging divide for [a] shared future’.
And yet, no political settlement is in sight.
A quick glance at these two events underscores the divergent ‘demand side’ of their politics that keeps any "solution" speculative and complex.
Separation vs 'Reconciliation'
On the face of it, while FOCS’s theme looks more contemplative and reconciliatory, the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups seem determined to push their demand for a de jure constitutional recognition of the de facto territorial and demographic rupture affected by this violence.
What accounts for these divergent positions and what are the likely political outcomes entailed by these?
Explaining this must consider how the ‘supply side’ of politics, which gives premium to how two of its critical variables, namely, political choices and decisions taken by the political executive/State, interfaces with the ‘demand side’ of politics during this violence.
The divergent positions taken by these rival groups stem from their starkly different take on the cause and nature of this violence. For the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups, the immediate trigger to this violence stems from a calibrated and selective attack on the demonstrators on their return after organising peaceful rallies against the Meiteis’ demand for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status.
But the violence is seen as outrightly ‘genocidal’ in its intent and conceals a larger majoritarian agenda of the State and Meitei Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to dissolve the extant sub-State constitutional asymmetry tribals enjoy under Article 371C, and protective discrimination in matters pertaining to access to education, jobs and ownership of tribal lands.
The Kuki-Zomi-Hmars find the ‘supply side’ of the political system deeply problematic on the contention that it perpetuates structural discrimination and injustice to them.
Some of these ‘supply side’ issues include:
Persistent attempts of the State to extend Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1961 to the hill areas of the state.
Refusal to devolve adequate powers to the six existing district councils in the hill areas, and not making them to work by not holding elections since 2020.
Opposition to the demand to upgrade these councils to that of their counterparts under the Sixth Schedule.
The attempt in September 2021 to dilute membership of the Hill Areas Committee by inducting nine Assembly members from the valley areas.
Lawless law enforcement by invoking ‘protected’ and ‘reserved’ forest acts without following established procedures on the pretext that they are ‘illegal encroachers’.
The refusal to address the under-representation of tribals in state government jobs.
The alleged ‘genocidal’ attacks launched by ethno-nationalist armed groups with the naked complicity of the State against them during this violence and their complete erasure from the valley areas have affected de facto territorial and demographic separation.
The demand for de jure recognition of their ‘separation’ by granting a ‘separate administration’, modelled along the lines of the Union Territory status of Puducherry, is therefore seen by the Kuki-Zomi-Hmar as a logical corollary to this, the only possible way out for their political and cultural survival.
Unlike the case of Kuki-Zomi-Hmar groups, where the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ sides of their politics pull in different directions, the ‘demand side’ of politics pursued by FOCs and other leading Meitei civil society organisations (CSOs) particularly the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (CoCOMI) oftens coalesces, and mutually reinforces with the ‘supply side’ of politics as encapsulated in the political choices and decisions taken by the state’s political executive before the imposition of President’s rule on 13 February 2025.
Under this rubric, the Manipur violence is seen as the outcome of alleged large-scale influx of the ‘Kuki’ illegal immigrants from Myanmar which pose serious demographic threat to the Meitei society who are sequestered within just 10 percent of the total geographical area of the state.
The shifting position taken by the state government on this makes it an incredulous and a highly exaggerated claim. Interestingly, N Biren Singh, the CM, claimed in an India Today Conclave interview in 2018 that no illegal immigrant existed in the state. This position was recanted subsequently.
Incidentally, The state Cabinet sub-committee reported this number to be a little over 2,000 in April 2023. In contrast, responding to a starred question on 2 August 2024 at the Assembly, the CM put the number of detected illegal immigrants for the preceding five years at 10,675.
Trans-National Conspiracy, Narco Terrorism
The violence is also seen as a transnational conspiracy hatched by ‘lungi-clad’ Kuki militant groups and ‘narco-terrorists’ which operate across the Indo-Myanmar border in connivance with homegrown Kuki militant groups which signed a tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the State and Central governments since 2008.
Based on this understanding, these CSOs made a series of demands, namely, the abrogation of SoO with Kuki militants, withdrawal of Free Movement Regime (FMR), construction of border-fencing along the Indo-Myanmar border, implementation of National Register of Citizens (NRC) like Assam—using 1951 as the base year, and blanket deportation of all ‘Kuki’ illegal immigrants.
Couched in a language of national security, best understood by policy mandarins in New Delhi, the position taken by these CSOs and the political executive of the State on the above has singularly blamed the Kuki militants for this violence, and contend that they pose a grave national security threat.
To amplify this, the then Chief Minister’s (CM) office came up with an ‘intelligence input’ in mid-September last year to forewarn the imminent crossover of over ‘900 Kuki militants’ from their camp in Myanmar, who are trained in sophisticated arms including the capability to launch rocket launchers, to attack proximate Meitei villages along the ‘buffer zone’.
This zone, ideated and enforced by the Indian paramilitary forces after Union Home Minister Amit Shah visited the state towards the end of May, 2023 marks the line of territorial and demographic separation between the Kuki-Zomi-Hmars and the Meitei along the foothills in the State. Although this security bluster was soon disowned for lack of substantive evidence, it acts as a half-clever ploy of the majoritarian government to whip up a pervasive sense of insecurity in the valley areas and use it as a convenient pretext to launch a series of combing operations against Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages beyond the buffer zone.
While singularly casting the blame of this violence on Kuki militants, the majoritarian-minded CSOs and State government under Biren Singh have maintained conspicuous silence on the more serious national security threat posed by valley-based insurgent groups (VBIGs)—eight of them have been declared as ‘unlawful’ by the central government because of their secessionist agenda.
The mobilisation of these groups to fight the majoritarian turf war during this violence has effectively neutralised the security gains obtained by the Indian state since 2004 when it launched Operation All Clear to flush out VBIGs from the valley areas.
Desperate Need for New Security Framework
The unusual zeal with which the Centre revoked FMR and sanctioned over thirty-thousand crore rupees to construct border fencing across the 1643 kilometre-stretch Indo-Myanmar border, including 398 kilometre-stretch Manipur-Myanmar border suggests that the ‘supply side’ of the political system complements with and reinforces the ‘demand side’ of the politics of majoritarian minded FCOS, CoCOMI and other groups.
This, however, implies that substantive national security concerns like upskilling, modernisation and professionalisation of the Indian Army and police, improving intelligence gathering capacity and security infrastructure of the Indian State are kept at bay, and will be sacrificed at the altar of an obsolete national security framework.
In the meantime, arcane policy framework such as revoking FMR and border-fencing may eminently serve the purpose of promissory collateral benefits to intermediate brokers and contractors, yet it is bound to push back India’s longstanding neighbourhood first policy via Look East (now Act East). It will also unnecessarily antagonise transborder people who are the primary stakeholders in India’s Act East policy. The staunch opposition registered by the Naga and Mizo, among others, is a clear pointer that India’s national security policy is increasingly distant from ‘winning hearts and minds’—a time-tested strategy of securing national security.
If FOCS and other majoritarian-minded CSOs in Imphal are serious in contemplating ‘bridging the divide’ within and without Meitei society across Manipur, they must seriously rethink the false premise of their majoritarian and integrationist project which seeks to superimpose ethnocracy.
This does not seem to have worked in a deeply divided place like Manipur and beyond. ‘Bridging divide’ in deeply divided places is best done not by a homogenous and uniform applicability of the laws and institutions, but by upholding pluralism—by the recognition and accommodation of deep differences.
If historical institutionalism is any guide, historical institutions which accommodate differences are sticky to change as they underpin complex power distributions—social, cultural, economic, political, and symbolic.
This explains why despite all their internal differences, disparate tribes in Manipur—Kuki, Zomi, Hmar, and Naga—strongly rally behind themselves to zealously guard against any attempt by the State government to dilute/dissolve existing institutions which have important bearings on their autonomy, land, and identities.
For the Kuki-Zomi-Hmars, their demand for de jure recognition of ‘separation’ has to navigate the difficult terrain of oppositional politics from the majority community of the State and that of the BJP-led government at the centre, which does not seem to be favourably disposed towards their ‘demand side’ of politics.
The jury is out to track how these rival groups harness the two-commemorative events to position their ‘demand side’ of politics to harness the ‘supply side’ of the political system in ways that push their divergent agenda for favourable political outcomes.
(Kham Khan Suan Hausing is a Professor and former Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow, Centre for Multilevel Federalism, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi. Views are personal. This is an opinion piece. All views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)