The ongoing Maha Kumbh in Prayagraj, which began on 13 January and will continue till 26 February, has so far witnessed at least two fires and a major stampede.
As per official estimates, around 30 people were killed and at least 60 injured in the stampede that took place after a sea of humanity amassed at the Triveni Sangam’s ‘nose’ on the intervening night of 29-30 January, following the mahurat for Mauni Amavasya.
A day later, Vishal Tiwari, an advocate from Rajasthan's Bharatpur, filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court of India, accusing the Uttar Pradesh government of “lapses, negligence, and utter failure of administration” in the ongoing Maha Kumbh in Prayagraj. He further claimed that "from the 1954 Kumbh Mela stampede to the Maha Kumbh 2025 stampede in Uttar Pradesh... it’s clear and visible (that) nothing in the administration activity of our country has changed”.
Notably, in 2014, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) had published a comprehensive guide entitled “Managing Crowds at Events & Venues of Mass Gatherings” for state governments, local authorities, administrators, and organisers.
The NDMA has also been conducting training for state governments prior to every major religious gathering. Yet, such stampedes recur with alarming frequency in India.
It would be recalled that after 121 people were killed and 150 injured in a stampede after a ‘satsang’ by Bhole Baba in Hathras on 2 July 2024, UP Minister Asim Arun had stated that the state government has commenced work on SOPs to prevent such incidents in future.
That said, it merits mention that although the UP government had done a commendable amount of groundwork and preparations for Maha Kumbh 2025, the causes for this tragedy and other deficiencies stretch beyond standard crowd management procedures and techniques.
Politicisation of Maha Kumbh
The Maha Kumbh 2025 is undoubtedly a major religiously divine occasion — and many Indians across various faiths have been eager to spiritually partake in it.
While the Kumbhs have always been the world’s largest gatherings, what particularly complicated the Maha Kumbh’s management this time are the endeavours of various political leaders and parties to profit politically from this auspicious event through repeated calls for participation, extensive publicity to visits of apex leaders, among others.
In sum, they encouraged multitudes to attend, but failed to take into cognisance some crucial aspects. As per media reports, from 16-30 January, around 28 crore people visited Maha Kumbh, with over 7.6 crore people taking a dip in the immediate aftermath of the stampede.
When a religious event has, in a single day, an attendance far exceeding the populations of Delhi NCR and Mumbai put together, and that too in a finite space, what you get is a logistical nightmare. Now add to this mix a huge mass of humanity desirous of realising their religious faith on a particular date and time.
No amount of transportation infrastructure, eateries, water supply, sanitation, police, and volunteers can effectively handle or manage even a smaller set of such an attendance.
The administration should have envisioned the implications of such a massive presence.
Finite Space and Restrictions
While the Triveni Sangam – the area where the rivers Ganges, Yamuna, and Saraswati meet – is quite large (about 4,000 acres available for Maha Kumbh), numerous visuals of the event point at congestion near the zones designated for ‘snans’ (bathing) by common people.
This because a very large number of people had arrived, and given their diverse ages, nearly everyone wanted to be as close to the sites as possible at the indicated times of ‘snans’.
Moreover, many devotees had no place to stay and were, therefore, inclined to remain on or around the ghats.
More importantly, the allocation of certain ghats solely for ’important‘ persons or VIPs reduced the spaces available for the common public, even as access to many pontoon bridges was restricted.
Out of the 30 pontoon bridges, only nine were reportedly open to the public on 29 January. In turn, such restrictions, with no credible movement plan in place, not only led to severe overcrowding at the designated ghats, but also impeded to-and-fro movement, leading to long detours for the public and difficulties in returning.
VIP Culture
The event saw political leaders of all stripes and bureaucrats thronging to the venue, none of whom were keen to be a common devotee, but instead wanted ‘moksha’ while insisting on their ‘security’ and cavalcade(s).
Add to it the relatives of various people who managed to get a pass ‘because-I-know-someone important’. Meanwhile, the so-called aam aadmi had to walk all the way and made to wait endlessly as the vehicles of this entitled class were allowed through.
This waiting was not restricted only to the Sangam area, but also to roads leading to the venue. Such protracted waiting, coupled with the lack of drinking water and sanitation in the pathways, and the overwhelming desire to partake of the ‘snan’ at the indicated time(s), ostensibly aggravated the massed crowd and made them restless. This, in turn, was a recipe for a stampede.
The NDMA’s 2014 guide had clearly outlined that prolonged waiting at places of worship can impel devotees to jump across fences which may lead to other areas getting overcrowded.
Post-disaster, the UP government issued a press release limiting special privileges to VIPs visiting Prayagraj during Vasant Panchami, Magh Purnima, and Maha Shivratri.
Forecasting and Prophylactic Measures
The four critical prerequisites of crowd management in such a massive religious gathering are:
The establishment of an Emergency Command & Operations Centre
The ability to maintain situation awareness by gathering information in real-time
The capability to synthesise that information
To take timely, prophylactic actions on the synthesised information.
While the UP government had done an admirable job on the first two, it’s unclear why, despite the large number of CCTV cameras, drones, and security forces deployed, the Maha Kumbh administration couldn’t understand the congestion and associated potential for a stampede, and then undertook immediate measures like opening of barricades, pontoon bridges, and VIP ghats.
Inadequacy of Transportation Infrastructure
Although the roads to Prayagraj have improved and the Indian Railways reportedly scheduled over 13,000 trains between Prayagraj and nearby cities, it’s evident that even the boosted transportation capacities cannot cope with such numbers.
Post-stampede, in order to control the inflow of devotees to Maha Kumbh, the government sealed the borders of Prayagraj district from neighbouring districts – which then led to several thousand vehicles and people remain stranded for hours on different highways.
The politicisation of religious events has also led to a need to ‘conceal & deny’ tragedies, lest unfortunate occurrences cast a shadow on the touted ‘success’ of the event.
This means that fewer lessons are learnt and accountability is dodged.
The Nashik Kumbh 2027, to be held during the monsoon season on a far smaller area (about 300 acres), is the next big religious gathering on the cards. It remains to be seen how many lessons the Maharashtra government learns from the Maha Kumbh 2025 and how it implements corrective measures.
(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)