The successful maiden flight of the indigenously designed and built Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk1A on 17 October, Friday from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)'s Nashik facility in Maharashtra is to be welcomed.
This flight marks an important punctuation in India’s long and arduous journey to induct a proven, home-made fighter aircraft in the quest for ‘atmanirbharta’ as related to air power. But the road ahead is long, winding, and uphill.
The genesis of the LCA goes back to 1983 when the government, then headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, sanctioned the LCA program under the aegis of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The goal was to develop a lightweight, 4th-generation fighter to replace the Soviet-origin MiG-21s with HAL as the lead integrator. The Aeronautics Development Agency was later formed in 1984 to oversee the project, and the initial budget was estimated to be Rs 560 crore ($56 million).
Designing and building a prototype of a combat-worthy modern fighter aircraft, and then transitioning to series production in a cost-effective manner, is perhaps the most technologically complex endeavour for any nation—and more so for a developing nation.
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China and the J-10 fighter project offer instructive comparison. In 1981, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) proposed a third-generation fighter to Deng Xiaoping, who approved an initial funding of $300 million. Formal design and related development began in 1984 at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
The successful maiden flight was in March 1998, and the J-10A entered operational service with the PLAAF in late 2003. Over the last two decades, the J-10 and its variants have added considerable credibility to China’s composite air power capability and laid the foundation for a vibrant indigenous aerospace design and manufacturing ecosystem.
India is following much the same track, albeit with higher cost and timelines. Despite the setbacks, the Tejas, when fully proven and deemed combat-worthy, will add to India’s much depleted fighter inventory.
The LCA Mk1A program, valued at Rs
These are ambitious targets, and HAL will have to deliver as promised. It will also have to dispel the doubts voiced by Air Chief Marshal AP Singh earlier this year. In June, the Air Chief noted in relation to HAL: “Timeline is a big issue. Not a single project that I can think of has been completed on time."
It is understood that earlier bottlenecks in the supply chain and certain manufacturing defects have been redressed and HAL is committed to deliver as promised.
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When fully proven and inducted into operational service, the LCA will replace the legacy MiG-21s with a 4.5-generation multirole fighter, featuring upgraded avionics, EL/M-2052 AESA radar of Israeli origin, advanced Indian electronic warfare suite and beyond-visual-range missiles.
It enhances network-centric warfare, operational flexibility, and combat readiness in high-threat environments. Future integrations like the BrahMos cruise missile will add long-range strike power.
The strategic relevance of air power was proven in Operation Sindoor, and India will have to invest in this domain to acquire the requisite degree of self-reliance, which in turn, will underpin the abiding Indian prioritisation of strategic autonomy.
In this regard, despite numerous claims that India has acquired robust levels of self-reliance in indigenous defence manufacturing, the truth is more modest.
Lauding the maiden flight of the Tejas, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said this was a shining symbol of India’s growing 'atmanirbharta' in defence and “asserted that the country, which once imported 65-70 percent of critical military hardware, is now manufacturing 65 percent of the equipment on its own soil.” But the 35 percent that is imported masks a challenge.
In the case of the Tejas Mk1A, while it is credible that almost 70 percent of the platform is of indigenous content by value, the fighter aircraft still relies on several key foreign-sourced subsystems. The most critical is the engine, which due to historical development challenges is still imported—in this case, the GE F404-IN20 from the US.
Supply chain complexities and the need for proven high-tech integration remains a work in progress.
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For now, apart from the engine, imported items include active electronically scanned array and multi-mode radar in the initial batches of the LCA ; engine charge amplifier; radome (radar nose cone); and the ejection seat.
Some of these items are being indigenised. Prototype design challenges are many, but HAL and the DRDO remain resolute. It is expected that their efforts will bear fruit and the 'atmanirbharta' journey will remain on course—step by step.
The Kaveri engine is case in point. This program began in the mid 1980s and has seen many hurdles and failures—which is par for the course in designing and developing an aeroengine ab initio. Learning from past experience and with foreign collaboration, it is expected that Kaveri 2.0, which targets 80+ kN, will be proven by the mid-2030s for Tejas Mk1A/Mk2.
Designing and manufacturing a modern combat aircraft calls for multi-domain, wide-spectrum, technological expertise, and there are just six nations in this list—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (USA, Russia, France, UK, and China) and Sweden.
India will hopefully join their ranks soo—but this will need much greater levels of resolve, professional integrity, accountability and sustained commitment among all the stakeholders, especially political decision makers.
This has been elusive in the Indian context and the quest for meaningful ‘atmanirbharta’ must translate from high-visibility political rhetoric to quiet action on the ground.
The Tejas will have to undergo a series of trials after the ordnance and surveillance packages are fully integrated and operationally validated, before it is inducted. That is a long process and will take a few more years.
Till then, while commending HAL for this successful maiden flight of the Tejas, the challenges ahead in attaining true ‘atmanirbharta’ must not be glossed over.
(C Uday Bhaskar is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies. This is an opinion piece. All views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)