National Security Advisor Ajit Doval is right: the government’s Kashmir ceasefire achieved what it set out to do. From 27 April to 16 May, the period before the ceasefire, there were 169 clashes between stone-pelting mobs and the police – often ending in protestors being shot. In the ceasefire period, there were only 49, not one linked to operations by security forces against terrorists. Not a single protestor was killed.
The government believes clashes between protestors and armed forces – which often end in shootings – engender hatred, and fuel terrorist recruitment. That’s a meme the media’s largely bought into, but the numbers tell a more complex story.
Doval didn’t say a couple of things, which help understand the complete story.
Street Clashes Do Not Drive Terrorist Recruitment
First up, the government’s own data gives reason to question the idea that street clashes are driving terrorist recruitment. Though intuitively attractive, it sits ill with the data.
In fact, terrorist recruitment is more or less in line with where it was in the period prior to 2006, a time when there were no clashes. It has since risen and fallen not in line with street violence. Indeed, recruitment actually fell after the massive clashes in 2010.
Instead, there is a strong correlation between terrorist fatalities and recruitment. Years such as 2011-2013, which had low terrorist recruitment, also had low terrorist losses in combat. This suggests recruitment is not spur-of-the-moment. Instead, terrorists tap into a pre-existing base of sympathisers, making up their numbers as needed.
Terrorists Growing Bolder
Secondly, the end to street clashes was brought about by ceding ground to terrorists in the countryside. In the pre-ceasefire weeks, there were 21 terrorist attacks, and during the ceasefire, 48.
Injuries of and killings of security force personnel rose; even exchanges of fire on the Line of Controls shot up, from 16 to 49.
Last year, the number of civilians killed by terrorists in Kashmir surged to 73 from 21 in 2016, the highest level in a decade – and allowing terrorists to operate with some freedom, as the ceasefire did, would drive the numbers even higher.
This is just what happened in 2000, with Prime Minister Vajpayee’s ceasefire. December 2000 to April 2001, the ceasefire period, saw 158 security force personnel killed, along with 278 civilians and 183 terrorists. In the same months of 1999-2000, 129 security force personnel had been killed, along with 241 civilians – but 294 terrorists were shot dead. Earlier, from December 1999 to April 2000, the figures were 83, 244 and 265 – and from December 1998 to April 2001, 52, 187 and 204.
Put simply, the ceasefire saw fewer terrorists killed, and almost inevitably, more civilians and security force personnel murdered.
There are things New Delhi could be doing to address its stated problem: the killings of protestors throwing stones. The Ministry of Home Affairs committee to examine more effective non-lethal police methods has not submitted recommendations after preliminary findings made a year ago; training and equipment remain woeful; infrastructure for prosecuting members of violent mobs is non-existent.
Perhaps New Delhi would be well advised to stick with the hard work of fixing what it can — not chase after a deux-ex-machina, a miraculous solution from the heavens which will make the problem in Kashmir disappear.
(The writer is a senior journalist and author. He can be reached at @praveenswami. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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