Is Kunduz the Beginning of the Endgame in Afghanistan?

The Taliban taking over the city of Kunduz in Afghanistan comes as a serious blow for the Ashraf Ghani government.

The fall of Kunduz to the Taliban on Monday seems to be the beginning of the endgame for the current US-supported dispensation in Kabul. How long it will survive depends entirely on the US’ stamina.

Kunduz has a similar significance as Jalalabad had in 1992 – it fell to the Mujahideen when they were on their way to capture Kabul. The Taliban conquered it in September 1996, making it part of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The fall of Kunduz to the Taliban could very well be the critical milestone that the fall of Jalalabad was to the advance of the Pashtu-led insurgent forces over two decades ago.

What will happen in Afghanistan after the Americans completely withdraw? That the USA will leave Afghanistan is certain. That it will do so within the next couple of years is also certain. The only question that remains is how long will it remain engaged with Afghanistan and the war on terror, which is now mostly confined to the rugged Pathan homelands?

A Brief History

The Russians officially withdrew from Afghanistan when they signed a peace accord on April 14, 1988 in Geneva with the Afghan government, Pakistan and the United States of America. The agreement included “non-interference” articles supposedly protecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and the right to self-determination.

Till the attempted coup d’état in August 1991 leading to the final collapse of the USSR towards the end of the year, the Russians continued to pour in money and material amounting to almost $300 million a month. Najibullah’s government kept fighting back against the onslaught on Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar.

After Mikhail Gorbachev resigned on Christmas day in 1991, Russian funding ceased almost immediately. Consequently, in February 1992, Abdul Rashid Dostum turned against Najibullah and allied with Ahmed Shah Massoud. The end was at hand for Najibullah. On 15 April 1992, he was stopped at Kabul airport as he tried to flee the country. The point is that as long as money kept flowing in, and $300 million a month is an amazing burn rate even by today’s standards, Najibullah was able to retain control over the government in Kabul.

Taliban Takes Over

• Taliban taking over Kunduz raises some fundamental questions
• How long Afghanistan will survive depends entirely on the US’ stamina
• A couple of billion dollars a month as financial aid is something even America cannot afford these days
• Even the Pakistani military doesn’t want a talibanised Pakistan
• Like the ISIS is kept going by its few oil wells, the Taliban state can be sustained by the opium poppy

Thriving on Financial Aid

Likewise how long President Ashraf Ghani keeps going after the US withdrawal really depends on how long the purse strings will be open. Estimates on how much it will cost, even the most conservative, would veer towards a burn rate of $2 billion a month. A couple of billion dollars a month is something even America cannot afford these days.

The Americans shift priorities with great alacrity. In the mid-1960s, Vietnam to most Americans seemed to be of vital national interest; a couple of decades later few thought it had ever been so. The victorious Communists in Vietnam now seek to enter the capitalistic world market economy.

George Washington was off Da Nang in August 2010 on a friendly mission, while the guided missile destroyer John S McCain made a port call to the city. One can be fairly sure that, in time, Afghanistan will recede into the farthest corner of the USA’s collective memory as well. There will be other battles and each generation will be suitably bloodied in them.

With the USA tightening its purse strings, the country will be once again racked by a full-scale civil war and a great struggle to control Kabul. The bets will have to be on the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. The Taliban effectively controls large swathes of territory in the traditional Pashtun homelands west of the Durand Line.

Dealing with the Taliban

In 2010, Robert Blackwill, a Washington Vulcan, prophesied, “the Obama administration’s counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan seems headed for failure.” He also added, “given the alternatives, de facto partition of Afghanistan, while not the best outcome, is the best policy option available to the United States and its allies.” Above all, this “best outcome” would be consistent with vital national interests and US domestic politics”.

As far as one can see now, it seems inevitable that once again the Taliban will rule an Afghanistan that is mostly the Pashtun territory west of the Durand Line with its capital in Kabul. Then what?

There is a Pashtun Taliban in NWFP and FATA that is even now waging a jihad against Pakistan. Whatever else the Pakistani military may want, it doesn’t want a talibanised Pakistan. Once one Taliban has a state, how long will it be before it coalesces with the other? Like the ISIS is kept going by its few oil wells, the Taliban state can be sustained by the opium poppy.

History, however much we may try to deny or distort it, has a way of repeating itself. One lesson of recent history is the assertion of nationality as a unifying theme. Religion is apparently not enough of a glue to hold diverse nations together. Pakistan should know. Religion did not prevent it from splitting once before. Communism, that great dogma of the modern era, could not hold countries together either.

The USSR and Yugoslavia do not exist any more. What holds countries together are shared aspirations, a common perception of history and the liberal freedoms of a modern democracy. India’s founding fathers chose well. They did not deny the past, nor did they seek to deny anyone of their rightful place under the sun.

That is not possible under the scheme of Pakistan.

(The author is chairman and founder of Centre for Policy Alternatives)