Two trains were travelling in opposite directions on the same track. Aboard one, Tarique Rahman, the new Prime Minister belonging to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was hoping to head to India to help stabilise his country’s most important relationship. Travelling in the other direction from her exile in New Delhi, Sheikh Hasina, the former Prime Minister and Awami League leader, was feeling out her way back to Dhaka to rebuild her political future.
But, as is often inevitable in politics, missed signals and cross-purposes have brought the two trains dangerously close to a collision.
It began with the 5 August press conference held by Hasina, where she declared her intention to return to Dhaka as early as December, despite facing a death sentence there following a trial in absentia by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal. Hasina dismissed the charges as politically motivated and demanded that the ban on her Awami League be lifted.
Dhaka was outraged. It saw the New Delhi appearance as an attempt to undermine the tribunal and challenge the legitimacy of the government of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman. It has repeatedly demanded that India extradite the former leader.
On 16 August, Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry said that the two countries had been in touch for several weeks regarding a possible bilateral visit by Rahman to India. But, it added, the process had been “vitiated” by Hasina’s 5 August appearance in New Delhi. Dhaka said that “a propitious environment needs to be created for the visit” and requested India to “expeditiously act” on its extradition request for Hasina, as well as hand over another accused wanted in Bangladesh.
Not Just 'Political Persecution'
India, for its part, has distanced itself from Hasina’s political statements and made clear that it had no role in organising her appearance. It has also acknowledged Bangladesh’s extradition request but has not agreed to hand her over. The proposed Rahman visit is now caught in the middle.
The charges against Hasina are grave and cannot simply be brushed aside as political persecution. A United Nations investigation found that her government, security and intelligence agencies, and violent elements associated with the Awami League systematically committed serious human rights violations during the 2024 uprising.
The UN estimated that as many as 1,400 people may have been killed between 1 July and 15 August, with the vast majority shot by security forces. It said there were reasonable grounds to believe that hundreds of extrajudicial killings and other abuses had been carried out as part of a coordinated strategy of repression.
The uprising began with student protests against the restoration of quotas in public-sector employment, but rapidly developed into a broader revolt against Hasina’s increasingly authoritarian rule. Unable to contain the uprising, she fled to India on 5 August, 2024.
Hasina May Be the Trigger, Not the Real Problem
The problem goes beyond Hasina’s recent press conference. Discussions between India and Bangladesh about Rahman’s visit had been underway for weeks. The visit has reportedly been under consideration for some time, and the two sides had already been wrestling with a difficult bilateral relationship.
To make the 5 August event the principal reason for postponing or conditioning the visit is therefore somewhat overdone, Dhaka is merely using it as an excuse for a pivot it had already decided to make.
More importantly, Rahman himself has signalled that China will be an important component of his foreign policy. His first substantive overseas visit was to China in June, following a stopover in Malaysia. In Beijing, he held talks with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang, and China offered support for Bangladesh’s long-pending Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. The two sides also signed a number of agreements covering economic, political and other areas of cooperation.
China Changes the India-Bangladesh Equation
This matters to India because the Teesta is not merely a development project. It is a politically sensitive transboundary river whose waters are shared by India and Bangladesh.
China’s interest in helping Bangladesh manage the river, including through flood control, irrigation, erosion prevention and other infrastructure, gives Beijing an additional strategic foothold in Bangladesh and that, too, proximate to its sensitive Siliguri Corridor.
There is a legitimate legal and political issue surrounding Sheikh Hasina’s extradition. But at the same time, it cannot ignore the politics of the situation and the fact that in Sheikh Hasina it had a friend who had aligned herself with India’s interests, in contrast to her rival and Tarique’s mother Khaleda Zia.
Given geopolitical compulsions, India cannot simply look at Bangladesh through sentimental prism of Hasina. It needs to work out a new policy that can navigate through the tangle that has been created by the political developments in the country.
Neither Can Afford a Hasina-Centric Policy
But the same is true for Bangladesh. It certainly has legitimate grievances against Hasina, and it is understandable that the new government wants her to face justice. But making her extradition a precondition for normalising relations with India risks giving one individual disproportionate influence over the country’s foreign policy.
Bangladesh is almost surrounded by India and its geography makes a stable relationship with New Delhi unavoidable. India is an important source of food, fuel, electricity, cotton, and yarn, and other inputs vital to Bangladesh’s economy. Bangladesh’s garment industry, for example, depends heavily on Indian supplies of cotton and yarn. India is also a major supplier of electricity and refined petroleum.
China, however, is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner. That makes the relationship a competitive triangle rather than a simple choice between India and China. Beijing has the financial resources and willingness to undertake large infrastructure projects, while India possesses the enormous advantage of geography, connectivity, and economic interdependence.
The Teesta is a good illustration. Bangladesh has long wanted a comprehensive project to manage the river, including dredging, flood control and irrigation. Chinese involvement could bring money and expertise, but it also inevitably raises strategic concerns in New Delhi, particularly because of the river’s location and the proximity of the wider region to the strategically vital Siliguri Corridor. China’s growing role in Bangladeshi infrastructure, ports and connectivity therefore cannot be viewed by India as merely commercial.
India Needs a New Bangladesh Strategy
For India, the answer is not to surrender Hasina automatically. Her extradition involves legal and political considerations that cannot be settled by diplomatic pressure alone. But neither should New Delhi allow her presence in India to become a permanent obstacle to its relations with Bangladesh.
The two countries have too many interests in common and too much at stake. Rahman needs India; India needs a working relationship with Rahman. Hasina’s fate will remain a difficult issue between them. The sensible course is to prevent it from becoming the defining issue. This means a lot of hard diplomatic work to keep the two issues separate.
As India’s new high commissioner in Dhaka Dinesh Trivedi has suggested, dialogue is the only way out of the situation. Perhaps some back-channel effort, too, is needed to keep things on an even keel.
(The author is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint does not endorse or is responsible for them.)