Fissures within Hindu society on caste lines have been incessant bugbears for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), its affiliates including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and other organisations or individuals who are part of the ecosystem of Hindu nationalistic thought.
Although the RSS, especially in its centenary year, now monopolises the idea of Hindutva, the word and its central thesis—that Hindus are a ‘nation’—preexisted the formation of the RSS. Even then, the same challenge had these individuals and organisations in its bind.
Well before the RSS was born in Nagpur in 1925—and decades before Vinayak Damodar Savarkar wrote the ideological treatise, Essentials of Hindutva in 1923—Bal Gangadhar Tilak, nationalist and Hindu revivalist leader, conceived the Ganesh festival in the 1890s to forge the pan-Hindu identity.
This was aimed at countering divergences between different sects and philosophical schools within Hinduism, more importantly, among various castes.
Diverging Takes on Caste: From Savarkar to Sangh Today
Savarkar, too, wrote about unity across castes in a pamphlet titled 'Oh, Martyrs' that he distributed in May 1908 at an event in London.
The next year, he published an elaboration of this work; the book was titled The Indian War of Independence of 1857. This was first time that events of 1857-58 were termed as a ‘war’ for independence by Savarkar, or for that matter, by anyone.
Savarkar wrote that the ‘war’ against the British was universal because “men of different religions, men of different castes” fought unitedly.
This underscoring of nationalists of different castes combining to fight the emerging imperial power is of importance in the context of the Sangh Parivar’s struggles in forging pan-Hindu unity across caste lines.
In the late 1920s, by when Savarkar was released from jail but confined within the Ratnagiri district and disallowed participation in political activity, he played a leading part in the temple-entry movement, a campaign to permit ‘untouchables’ to enter Hindu temples.
An extensive exchange of letters between him and British officials followed; they accused that his speeches calling for temple-entry to all, implicitly called for raising a Hindu Sangathan, and thereby, was a political act.
The RSS, although its formation was inspired by Savarkar’s Essentials of Hindutva, did not for long work towards eliminating caste-based discrimination. Contrarily, its leadership was, and has been dominated by 'upper castes'.
All six Sarsanghchalaks (chiefs) of the RSS from 1925 onwards were (and are) from the so-called 'upper castes': five Brahmins and one Rajput. The second RSS chief, MS Golwalkar, at the organisation’s helm for the longest period (1940-1973), firmly believed in sanatani philosophy and the entrenched caste order.
His successor, Balasaheb Deoras, however, realised changing the social order and the need for the RSS to engage with the backward and Scheduled Castes, besides the Scheduled Tribes.
He elaborated his vision in a watershed lecture in Pune in 1974—and although the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, the RSS affiliate working among tribals, was revived in the late 1970s, the outreach to the "backward castes" did not happen till the Meenakshipuram mass conversion in 1981.
Hindutva's Electoral Footsoldiers: Mandal vs Kamandal
The 1980s was the decade of the Sangh Parivar’s emergence from the margins to electoral centrestage.
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) handpicked a Dalit activist to perform the shilanyas of the Ram temple in November 1989. This underscored that the 'lower castes' too shared the pan-Hindu sentiment of demolishing the Babri Masjid and constructing a Ram temple.
The 1991 Lok Sabha election was the occasion when the phrase ‘social engineering’ began being used while perusing the BJP’s candidate selection.
Kalyan Singh, a Lodhi Rajput becoming Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister in June 1991 after the BJP secured a majority, was manifestation of the party expanding its social base—a process guided by the RSS hands in the party and outside.
This move was a consequence of then Prime Minister VP Singh’s August 1990 decision to provide 27 percent reservations in jobs and public educational institutions for Other Backward Castes (OBCs), as recommended by the Mandal Commission a decade ago.
Consequently, upper caste anti-reservationists staged violent protests but could not turn the clock back, even judicially.
Indian politics changed inalterably with this, and the BJP and RSS affiliates made amends to its upper caste-centric politics. While the leadership remained in the hands of the upper castes initially, the number of lawmakers from backward castes began rising.
The party once again prevailed over the Mandal sentiment in 1992 on the so-termed Kamandal plank, a synonym for rejuvenating the Ram temple agitation.
Initially, in the 1990s, the BJP and Sangh Parivar allies were locked in a tussle with parties wedded to social justice. To acquire political power, the party temporarily back-benched Hindutva-centric issues but the Sangh Parivar’s real face was visible always, for instance, the VHP pressed the accelerator on the Ram temple, and this eventually triggered the Godhra carnage and Gujarat riots.
Following the defeat in 2004, one section of the party, paradoxically led by LK Advani, spoke the language of social justice and even found evidence of secularism in MA Jinnah’s politics. Contrastingly, Narendra Modi remained firm on the Hindutva course, sure that the ideology was popular, only required legitimacy, which he provided.
Modi on Caste Census
After 2014, Modi rode in on the the twin planks of welfarism (more so after 2019), and a combination of Hindutva-centric campaigns and legislations (like ending triple talaq and granting citizenship to non-Muslims from neighbouring nations).
Predictably, in 2022, when the demand for nationwide caste census began gathering support, the BJP as well as the RSS remained ambivalent, even opposing it.
In time, especially in the run-up to the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, the saffron brigade labelled the demand for caste census—most vocally championed for by Rahul Gandhi—in perjorative terms such as "destructive" and "divisive". Modi even alleged that the demand was on top of the agenda of "urban naxals".
The RSS and the BJP were opposed to the idea because they feared the nationwide caste survey would again pit various caste groups against each other and undermine pan-Hindu unity.
This was ironic because one of the factors behind the BJP’s electoral success after 2014 was its conscious decision to wean away several non-dominant sub-castes among the OBCs and Dalits.
Despite this, the Hindutva forces were anxious about the repercussions of the caste census—would the level of support for the Hindu majoritarian idea, which progressively increased over decades, get eroded in the wake of the exercise?
Modi's decision at this juncture, prompted in no small measure by the RSS brass, was impelled by two factors.
One, he and others in the political fraternity concluded that the idea’s time had come and it was increasingly becoming difficult for the BJP to keep stonewalling the demand. Further delay could have been advantageous for the Opposition, especially Rahul Gandhi.
Two, Modi and others within the RSS are increasingly of the opinion that the societal threshold of support for Hindutva—and correspondingly for Islamophobia or prejudice towards Muslims—has been reached.
Consequently, despite existing cleavages on caste lines, which may get temporarily deepened by the caste census and subsequent steps of the government, pan-Hindu unity will resurface as and when required.
For instance, after the gruesome terrorist strike in Pahalgam, a significant section responded as Hindus, members of a community whose representatives were gunned down after identification.
In the Modi era, the BJP has not just enhanced the number of its MPs and MLAs from the OBCs, but these castes also have a fair representation among the leadership.
The BJP adroitly used the fact that Modi’s Modh Ghanchi caste was included in the OBC state list in 1994 and in the central list in 1999 when Modi held no legislative or executive position.
The RSS leadership, however, remains predominantly 'upper caste' and after the government decision to enumerate caste along with the next census, it too shall have to follow suit. Whether the next Sarsanghchalak is from one of the 'lower castes' is to be seen; the pressure certainly shall be there.
Given that Gandhi has already demanded that the 50 percent reservation limit must be raised by required legislative change, it is probable that the government will move in this direction once census data is available, possibly in 2027 at the earliest.
But, to ensure that the Hindu identity remains paramount over individual caste identity, the Sangh Parivar will have to keep Hindutva issues actively in play.
The challenge would be to ensure the majoritarian sentiment not just remains overarching but also consolidates further.
This certainly shall pose new challenges nationally and usher in a different era of caste politics. Crucial in the emergence of the new order will be the response of minorities and the impact these changes will have on India’s political narrative.
(The writer is a veteran journalist based in Delhi-NCR and the author of books including 'The Demolition, The Verdict and The Temple: The Definitive Book on the Ram Mandir Project' and 'Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times'. His X handle is @NilanjanUdwin. This is an opinion piece. All views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)