This is the first of a two-part reflective analysis drawn from the observations made in the BJP’s performance across recent Assembly elections, drawn in context to the party’s electoral evolution (and political adaptiveness) under the Modi-Shah leadership regime.
The rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from a Hindutva-driven entity to India’s most dominant political force marks one of the most significant transformations in the country’s electoral history. Notwithstanding that, this observed and recognised electoral transformation is far from seamless – revealing profound contradictions that raise pressing questions about the future of Indian democracy and the electoral dynamics at play for any key opposition player or bloc to take on the BJP.
Emerging in the 1980s as a party broadly representing primarily upper-caste Hindu urban voters, the BJP’s initial appeal was narrow and ideologically rigid, centered on the Ram Janmabhoomi movement.
This initial mobilisation strategy laid the foundational base for Hindutva and focused on garnering votes on religious identity-based markers. It helped (and still plays) a key role in the BJP’s rise, from first securing 120 seats in the 1991 elections with a 20.04 percent vote share to becoming the single largest party to win a majority in 2014, with a 31 percent vote share.
With Narendra Modi emerging as the party’s main leader since 2014 and Amit Shah leading the organisational apparatus of the party’s electoral strategy, by brute control and a centralised decision-making approach, this undisputable political combination has marked a paradigm shift for the party.
Note how the BJP won with 282 seats achieving India’s first single-party majority since 1984. Modi’s campaign emphasised nationalism, development, and anti-corruption, resonating across socio-economic groups and geographical boundaries. By 2019, the BJP expanded its base further, securing 224 seats and a 37.36 percent vote share.
While this growth reflects the party’s strategic brilliance, it also underscores an inherent paradoxical realisation: a party that rose to prominence through its religious-anchored Hindutva ideology now positions itself as an inclusive socio-political, economic force, appealing to historically marginalised and vulnerable groups such as Dalits, OBCs, and women (especially from low socio-economic groups) across states.
How Hindutva Meets Inclusive Electoral Outreach
At the core of the BJP’s dual identity lies a profound contradiction: its ideological commitment to Hindutva and its simultaneous attempt to court non-Hindu and lower-caste voters. Hindutva, rooted in the idea of seeing India only as a Hindu nation, has historically marginalised religious minorities and lower castes while observing women as mothers and child-bearers in derogating, patriarchal ways.
Yet, under Modi, the BJP has made significant inroads among these groups, in some cases of course with assistance from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or RSS (and its grassroot-level outreach in Hindi heartland states), securing 44 percent of OBC votes and 33 percent of Dalit votes in 2019.
Similarly, its attempts to appeal to Muslim women by advocating for the abolition of triple talaq coexist uneasily with anti-minority rhetoric and policies such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the revocation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. These contradictions are not merely rhetorical – they also reflect deeper tensions in the BJP’s governance model that threaten to undermine India’s secular and social fabric.
This adopted duality for electoral survival – and power – also challenges the BJP’s transactional, populist narrative of ‘empowerment’ which merely repackages entitled short-term welfare transfers as ‘opportunities for higher mobility’ without making substantive investments in human capital development, employment generation, and economic security for lower, middle, and lesser privileged classes.
This makes one also inquire: Does the BJP’s increased electoral support among Dalits and OBCs represent genuine inclusion, or is it merely transactional welfare politics?
Welfare schemes, often designed to create direct links between beneficiaries and the Central government, serve as powerful tools for voter mobilisation. The BJP’s appeal to marginalised groups, however, often stops short of structural reforms that would address entrenched inequalities.
Widening Party Reach for Regional Power Consolidation
The BJP’s rise as a pan-Indian political force is marked by its ability to adapt and dominate across diverse regional landscapes, leveraging socio-economic narratives and targeted outreach to secure its position.
From the Hindi heartland of the North to the politically resistant South of India, including its efforts in the eastern and western parts of the country, the party’s strategies have systematically reshaped India’s electoral map. The methods employed to achieve this dominance, however, also raise critical questions about the implications for federalism and India’s pluralistic fabric.
In the North, the BJP cemented its dominance by dismantling caste-based regional alliances. In Uttar Pradesh, constituencies like Phulpur, once symbols of Congress-era politics, now reflect the BJP’s consolidation of non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Dalits.
Its strategic marginalisation of the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has redefined caste dynamics, securing a loyal voter base. In Bihar, alliances with the Janata Dal (United) and hyper-local caste recalibrations have delivered victories in constituencies such as Gopalganj, breaking the Rashtriya Janata Dal’s (RJD's) longstanding grip.
In the East, the BJP’s surge in West Bengal, where its vote share jumped from 17 percent in 2014 to over 40 percent in 2019, highlights its ability to disrupt entrenched regional parties. Constituencies like Madarihat illustrate its success in blending Hindutva rhetoric with economic promises to appeal to both urban middle classes and rural labourers, particularly in tea gardens. Similarly, in Odisha, victories in constituencies like Dhamnagar underscore how welfare schemes and infrastructure commitments resonate with economically vulnerable voters.
In the South, the BJP faces more resistance but has made calculated inroads. Karnataka remains its stronghold, with constituencies like Bengaluru South showcasing its urban appeal. In Telangana, constituencies such as Munugode highlight its growing clout, fueled by anti-incumbency against the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) and welfare promises. In Tamil Nadu, where Dravidian politics dominates, the BJP’s focus on Tamil pride and heritage, coupled with alliances like that with the AIADMK, reflect a slow but deliberate strategy to establish itself.
In the West, the BJP has leveraged its partnership with the RSS to deepen grassroots connections. In Maharashtra, over 60,000 RSS-facilitated meetings ahead of recent elections secured strongholds like Pune and Nagpur, demonstrating the party’s unmatched organisational depth. In Haryana, the BJP’s victories in constituencies like Adampur highlight the RSS’s ability to galvanise rural voters.
Despite these successes, critics argue that the BJP’s strategies come at a significant cost. Its welfare outreach, while fostering development, is often selective, undermining the structural reforms needed for long-term change.
Furthermore, its use of divisive narratives – blending welfare promises with Hindutva and centralising power – threatens India’s pluralistic ethos and federal structure. The BJP’s dominance may secure electoral victories, but the broader societal consequences of these techniques pose serious challenges to the democratic integrity and inclusivity of India’s political landscape.
A ‘Surficial’ Politics Based on Selling Hope Than Ensuring Real Empowerment?
Central to the BJP’s electoral strategy is its extensive use of welfare politics (or welfare populism, as we call it before). Flagship schemes such as Ayushman Bharat, which provides health insurance to over 500 million people, and PM-KISAN, offering income support to farmers, have been instrumental in consolidating temporal support amongst larger percentage voting groups – from rural and economically disadvantaged voters.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, initiatives like the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana, which provided free food grains to millions of families, further solidified the BJP’s pro-poor image. These efforts have transformed voter perceptions, creating a direct connection between welfare benefits and Modi’s leadership.
This limited welfare-driven approach also exposes stark contradictions. Modi’s frequent criticism of “rewdi culture” (freebies) rings hollow when BJP-led governments have spent approximately $400 billion on welfare schemes. One of us has continuously argued that this persistent reliance on welfare politics highlights the party’s electoral pragmatism rather than a commitment to sustainable governance.
By prioritising short-term gains over long-term development, the BJP risks perpetuating dependency rather than fostering empowerment. Moreover, the selective application of welfare programmes raises concerns about politicisation.
Data suggests that welfare schemes are often concentrated in BJP-dominated regions, reinforcing electoral strongholds rather than addressing nationwide inequities.
This approach undermines the principle of equitable governance, creating a perception that welfare is not a universal right but a political reward. Such strategies, while electorally effective, erode the integrity of democratic governance, reducing citizens to beneficiaries rather than empowered stakeholders.
The Broader Implications: Indian Democracy at a Crossroads
The BJP’s dominance has profound implications for Indian democracy. By combining welfare politics with Hindutva-driven communal narratives, the party has redefined the contours of electoral politics – what works and doesn’t work in winning elections. The oppositional alliance or any credible electoral opposition would find it incredibly difficult to challenge its status quo.
The complex blend of projected inclusivism in electoral campaigns while continuing communally charged polarisation to protect (and secure) ideological objectives for the BJP – and those contesting against it – raises critical questions about the evolving nature of India’s democratic republic, which at this time, seems indifferently ignorant of the basic constitutional charter and its application.
A party that centralises power and relies on divisive narratives can sustain a diverse coalition without fracturing under the weight of its contradictions is also a question yet to be explored. Many thought with the outcome of the 2024 Lok Sabha Polls that a coalition-based political agenda may adversely affect the Modi-Shah brand of electoral politics. So far, there is no evidence of any form of deviation but rather more centered consolidation of power by the party in command, which remains vehemently unchallenged and undefeated in any large-scale, broad-based electoral agenda.
The next part in this series looks more closely at the electoral and political importance of ‘women’ in modern Indian elections.
(Deepanshu Mohan is a Professor of Economics, Dean, IDEAS, Office of Inter-Disciplinary Studies, and Director of Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), OP Jindal Global University. He is a Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, and a 2024 Fall Academic Visitor to the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Oxford. Ankur Singh is a Research Assistant with the Centre for New Economics Studies, OP Jindal Global University and a team member of its InfoSphere initiative. This is an opinion article, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)