Tamil Nadu politics has always thrived on drama. Cinema, street rallies, and personality cults have made the state a political theatre unlike any other in India. However, the current turmoil inside the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the principal Opposition party, is not flamboyant theatre but something grimmer—a slow-motion collapse.
Over the past year, the AIADMK has looked less like a disciplined opposition and more like a house divided, with one defection or expulsion following another. Senior leaders are leaving, veterans are being sidelined, and silent revolts are simmering at the grassroots. Taken together, this is not the spectacle of a party in battle mode but the sight of a once-formidable movement bleeding itself dry.
The latest act in this unravelling drama came with veteran leader KA Sengottaiyan, a loyalist since the days of MG Ramachandran. His crime was not corruption or betrayal but something more threatening to Edappadi K Palaniswami (EPS): he dared to call for reconciliation with expelled colleagues. For this, he was stripped of all party positions. The move was a loud declaration of the AIADMK’s new code: dissent is treason, unity is betrayal, and clinging to power is more important than preparing for victory. The immediate aftermath saw a mass resignation of Sengottaiyan’s supporters, reinforcing the image of a party intent on hollowing itself out.
A Leadership That Fears Unity
Why are senior leaders deserting the ship in ahead of the 2026 Assembly election? Nobody abandons a party they believe still has promise. Anwar Raja and Maithreyan are not rookies seeking the limelight; they represent decades of experience. Their desertion must therefore be read as a verdict on EPS’ leadership.
The issue is not merely EPS’ strategy against the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), but his refusal to heal the AIADMK family feud. Many veterans believe the party’s survival lies in bringing back sidelined figures like O Panneerselvam, VK Sasikala, or TTV Dhinakaran, however controversial their legacies may be. EPS, however, knows that admitting them would be his undoing.
Here lies the paradox defining the AIADMK today.
Unity might make the party electorally stronger, but it would weaken EPS personally. Sasikala still insists she is the rightful general secretary. OPS has loyalists dreaming of his restoration. Dhinakaran controls pockets of influence that EPS cannot command. Bringing them back might broaden the vote base, but EPS would certainly lose his throne. His choice, therefore, is the scorched-earth path: better to rule a shrinking tent than risk being dethroned in a larger one.
The BJP’s Shadow in Tamil Nadu
To see the AIADMK’s crisis only as a family feud is to miss the larger story. From the moment Jayalalithaa died in 2016, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has had its hand in Tamil Nadu’s opposition politics.
In February 2017, it was widely believed—and reported—that the BJP, through Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) ideologue S Gurumurthy, played a role in deepening the rift between Sasikala and OPS. Later, the same BJP stitched an uneasy truce between OPS and EPS. The then Governor, C Vidyasagar Rao, acted as mediator, ensuring the AIADMK government survived internal turbulence and completed its term.
At that time, the BJP’s priority was simple: no instability in a state with little organisational presence. The strategy paid off. The BJP did not openly run the AIADMK, but did not stop pulling the strings.
That pattern has since become unmistakable. Disgruntled AIADMK leaders often make “personal” trips to Delhi or embark on “pilgrimages” that end with meetings with Amit Shah, Nirmala Sitharaman, or other BJP leaders. Delhi decides who is rehabilitated, sidelined, and which faction receives oxygen.
The most telling example came recently, when Sengottaiyan, stripped of all posts, met Amit Shah and Nirmala Sitharaman in Delhi on 8 September.
The brazenness of the outreach raises obvious questions: will EPS now expel him altogether for “open rebellion” and “indiscipline”? And more importantly, does this not expose the BJP’s role in encouraging factionalism inside its ally?
This meeting also puts EPS in a direct bind. Will he dare to criticise Amit Shah for entertaining a rebel, thereby violating the “coalition dharma” both sides had promised in Chennai when the alliance was announced? If he does, he risks antagonising Delhi. If he does not, he exposes his helplessness before the BJP. Either way, the episode underlines a reality: EPS may be nominally leading the AIADMK, but Delhi is already playing succession games.
The Succession Question
Speculation is now rife about whether EPS is simply a placeholder. Is the BJP quietly grooming Sengottaiyan as a more pliable alternative? His seniority and recent act of defiance make him a convenient foil to EPS’s authoritarian streak. Adding fuel to this theory is Dhinakaran’s recent remark after exiting the National Democratic Alliance: he was open to “anyone but EPS” as Chief Minister. That statement, coming from someone with political capital, signals that EPS’ enemies are circling, and the BJP may well be egging them on.
For the BJP, this is a win-win. A weak EPS makes the AIADMK dependent on Delhi. A pliable alternative like Sengottaiyan could be propped up if EPS becomes a liability. Either way, the BJP ensures its grip tightens.
Short-Term Gains, Long-Term Ambitions
The BJP’s Tamil Nadu strategy operates on two tracks. In the short term, the AIADMK alliance is indispensable for the 2026 Assembly elections. Without AIADMK’s base, the BJP cannot hope for even a modest breakthrough in the state.
But the long-term ambition is far grander: to dismantle the Dravidian consensus that has defined Tamil Nadu’s politics for half a century.
By encouraging factionalism, keeping the AIADMK weak, and normalising its own role as the indispensable partner, the BJP positions itself as the power behind the Opposition. If the alliance succeeds, the BJP takes the credit. If it fails, a hollowed-out AIADMK becomes easier to dominate—or even replace—as the principal challenger to the DMK.
The Ideological Cost
For EPS, however, the calculations remain narrowly personal. He has chosen his chair over his party. The AIADMK still speaks of democracy, but it silences its elders. It preaches unity, but punishes calls for reconciliation. This hypocrisy has accelerated the exodus of veterans, many of whom now have nothing left to lose.
The irony is bitter: a party that once projected invincible strength, ruling Tamil Nadu for over three decades, today resembles a crumbling house with its loyalists queuing at the exit door.
The DMK could not have scripted it better. Every resignation, every rebellion, every splinter dilutes the anti-DMK vote. Rebels may speak of new alliances or speculate about tying up with newcomers like actor Vijay. But history is clear: star power cannot replace organisational muscle, and loose coalitions rarely deliver. With its disciplined cadre and stable allies, the DMK stands to gain from every fractured vote on the other side. Unless the AIADMK pulls off an unlikely reconciliation, the 2026 election is shaping up less as a contest and more as a coronation for MK Stalin’s party.
But what makes this crisis more than an internal squabble is the ideological cost. The AIADMK under MG Ramachandran, popularly called MGR, and Jayalalithaa embodied a unique mix of Dravidian pride, populism, and charisma. That identity gave it strength to rival the DMK for decades. Today, that ethos is being hollowed out.
Symbols speak volumes.
AIADMK figures presenting a silver spear to the RSS chief, or leaders openly sharing the stage with Sangh figures, would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. When BJP leader L Murugan recently remarked that he saw “no problem” with the RSS guiding the AIADMK, it was less an offhand comment and more a declaration of a new order.
The ideological shift is no accident. It is the outcome of sustained nudges from the BJP, which understands that to plant Hindutva in Tamil Nadu, it must first rewire Dravidian politics.
This is why the crisis is more than electoral. If the BJP succeeds in its long-term game, Tamil Nadu may not just see an AIADMK defeated—it may witness Dravidian politics’ slow dismantling. The BJP is not smashing the AIADMK overnight. It is killing it softly, eroding its spirit, reshaping its loyalties, and patiently waiting.
Choices for EPS, BJP, and the Cadre
EPS still has choices. He can risk his own leadership and attempt reconciliation with the splintered groups, or he can continue shrinking the party until it collapses around him. The BJP too has a choice: treat the AIADMK as a disposable vehicle for short-term arithmetic or as the laboratory for a cultural re-engineering of Tamil Nadu.
And then there is the cadre. AIADMK workers must decide whether to remain pawns in Delhi’s designs or return to the grassroots instincts that once made the party formidable.
Politics, after all, is about choices.
At the moment, EPS has chosen self-preservation over collective survival. The BJP has chosen strategy over sincerity. The DMK has chosen patience, confident its fractured opposition cannot touch it. And soon, Tamil Nadu’s voters will face their choice: watch one of their proudest movements become a pawn, or demand a new resistance rooted in the state’s ethos.
In all this flux, one thing is sure: if the AIADMK continues on its current trajectory, it will not just lose in 2026. It will lose itself.
(P John J Kennedy, educator and political analyst based in Bengaluru.This is an opinion article and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)