British Prime Minister Tony Blair told US President George W Bush eight months before the 2003 invasion of Iraq “I will be with you, whatever”, and relied on flawed intelligence and legal advice to go to war, a seven-year inquiry concluded on Wednesday.
It strongly criticised Blair on a range of issues, saying the threat posed by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction had been over-hyped and the planning for the aftermath of war had been inadequate.
Below are some of the report’s key findings:
- Unsatisfactory legal basis for war
- Flawed intelligence case
- Diplomatic options were not exhausted
- Britain warned about increased al Qaeda activity
- Short of strategic success
- Lack of post-invasion planning despite warning
It Was the Right Thing to Do - Tony Blair
Accepting full responsibility for the decision to go to war, Blair said, “I ask the British people to accept that I took the decision because I thought it was the right thing to do.”
He, however, rejected the argument that present-day terrorism stemmed from the invasion of Iraq.
The intelligence assessments made at the time of going to war turned out to be wrong. The aftermath turned out to be more hostile, protracted and bloody than we ever imagined. For all of this, I express more sorrow, regret and apology than you will ever know.Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister of UK
He also said he believed the world was a better place without Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who was toppled by the invasion.
Unsatisfactory Legal Basis For War
We have concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for United Kingdom (UK) military action were far from satisfactory.John Chilcot, Head of Inquiry
The report cited several shortcomings in the legal process, like following:
- The legal advice produced by the government’s top lawyer was presented to a cabinet meeting of senior ministers, but not discussed in detail.
- There was little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith (Attorney General) about his advice that the invasion was legal.
- No substantive discussion of the legal issues was recorded.
Intelligence Case
The report criticised the way Blair presented intelligence information to the public. The judgements made by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) differed from his statement.
The deliberate selection of a formulation which grounded the statement in what Mr Blair believed, rather than in the judgements which the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) had actually reached in its assessment of the intelligence, indicates a distinction between his beliefs and the JIC’s actual judgements.
The report also criticised the intel by pointing out that at no point was the proposition examined if “Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or the policy community.”
Last Resort
The report said that Britain chose to join the invasion of Iraq before peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted:
At the time of the parliamentary vote of 18 March, diplomatic options had not been exhausted. The point had not been reached where military action was the last resort.
Al Qaeda
Blair was warned about the threat of increased al Qaeda activity as a result of the invasion, the report said.
Mr Blair had been advised that an invasion of Iraq was expected to increase the threat to the UK and UK interests from Al Qaida and its affiliates.
It cited Blair’s response, made in a 2011 statement:
I took the view then and take the same view now that to have backed down because of the threat of terrorism would be completely wrong.
Strategic Failure
The Iraq of 2009 certainly did not meet the UK’s objectives as described in January 2003: it fell far short of strategic success. Although the borders of Iraq were the same as they had been in 2003, deep sectarian division threatened both stability and unity.Report
Post-Invasion Planning
The report criticised the government’s post-conflict ill-planning for Iraq despite the information available to UK government which clearly indicated the potential scale of damage.
When the invasion began, the UK Government was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq and to mitigate the risk of strategic failure.
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