Seventeen years is a long time.
But despite the years, the Kargil War and its heroes have remained etched in the collective memory of the country. Ex-Major Manish Bhatnagar has penned down his experience of the Kargil War in a fictionalised account called Kashmir and Kargil: Betrayal, Battles and Beliefs. Bhatnagar had reported the Pakistan Army intrusion at Point 5770 in the Southern Siachen Glacier in January-February 1999 through official situation reports.
Following the war, he was court-martialled for his statement to Brigadier Devinder Singh, where he declared that his troops were unfit to undertake attack in Batalik sector on 15 June 1999. Through the characters of Amit and Rajwa, Bhatnagar has recounted his experience of the military judiciary as well as the Kargil War. The Quint brings you unedited excerpts.
Pakistan’s Initial Intrusions; How India Responded
A review of the progress of battle would show that the first major success was achieved soon after the sacrifice came to be known on 8 June 1999, when the tortured bodies were handed over to the Indian Army. It just took four days after the troops learnt about the sacrifice made by the six brave men, that on 13 June 1999, the enemy post at Tololing, one of the most preserved objectives of the intruders was mercilessly snatched by Indian troops from the enemy after fierce battle.
But India’s response to the initial intrusion was unsure. As the book describes it:
During the initial phase of eviction operations, there were serious apprehensions in the minds of intermediate commanders about loss of their appointment & position and possibly an inquiry against themselves, since it was the same formation and corps commanders under whose direct leadership the intrusions of such scale had taken place and they had claimed the same was without their knowledge. They had claimed ignorance to any such reports of detection of intrusions earlier than May 1999.
Did the narrative that the first intrusion was undertaken by jihadis hamper India’s artillery capacity and subsequently, its response?
The actions of these commanders displayed a picture that once the intrusions could not remain hidden, a situation was being painted to depict the intruders as handful of Jehadis. For such a projection to sustain, no demand for additional troops and additional fire power from outside the formation could be made by them, which was the absolute necessity.
Shifting of Troops From Siachen Counter-Productive?
Such a shifting of troops from South Siachen Glacier to Batalik was counter-productive otherwise also. The troops of SSH & South Siachen glacier were well conversant of their areas and mutually neighbouring areas. The troops from this area were ordered to be shifted to Batalik even when there was no emergency situation left for shifting of troops since same was not required any more after about third week of May ‘99. By last week of May ‘99 COAS had already mobilized adequate troops to the Drass & Batalik Sectors. Shifting of troops from Siachen Turtok area to Batalik was highly counter-productive and contrary to the military practices & teachings. This caused three major disadvantages in time & effort. The troops had to deinduct a long distance to reach their bases and then start for altogether a new area. Secondly they had to induct a long distance to a new area into the mountains. Thirdly they had to be given time for settling down and area & terrain familiarisation. All this, when a national emergency & war was on.
What Was Pakistan’s Game Plan?
Pakistan Army knew too well that Manali-Rohtang-UpshiLeh-Kargil-Drass was an untouched road axis big enough to sustain the army and civil population alone & was way beyond the reach of interdiction by Pakistan army even in dreams. Interdiction of NH1A alone would have increased the distance of supply routes a bit more. Pakistanis would have known this too well. However occupation of Point 5770 and Chalunka would have allowed them to alienate entire Sub Sector West and Southern Siachen Glacier. With their elements present in Turtok village for subversive operations & a possible link up with an infiltrating force from Pakistani positions close by, vacant Chalunka, and Point 5770 occupied, Pakistan was adequately poised to make its kill for Sub Sector West & South Siachen Glacier. The tactical weight of Point 5770 and Sub Sector West was balancing the occupation of entire intrusions in Drass & Batalik Sectors.
A Treacherous Terrain
The launch pads for attacks were in the base of the ridges, almost along the water course from where the attacking troops would begin their ascent after last light. They were almost 3000 to 5000 feet lower in altitude than the enemy positions they sought to attack. The estimation of time for traversing the unknown rocky territory during night climbing up almost 80 degrees mountain slopes with vast altitude difference with battle loads was not an easy task. Getting day lighted while still caught in the middle of the slope en-route to an enemy position on top of the ridge - out in the open with minimal cover would invite enemy fire of all sorts from multiples directions and enemy locations. The situation was a nightmare in a nightmare.