The Barak Saga
- India successfully conducted tests on LR SAM on December 30.
- Navy enhances anti-air warfare capability with maiden firing of newly-developed LR SAM – the Barak 8.
- Barak 8 can engage and neutralise incoming missiles and rockets upto 70 kms, and has a very advanced multifunction radar system.
India joined a select group of countries on December 30 when it successfully completed a series of tests on a long-range surface to air missile (LR SAM). The test was carried on the INS Kolkata – a frontline warship off the west coast of India in the Arabian Sea.
The Indian Navy today achieved a significant milestone in enhancing its anti-air warfare capability with the maiden firing of its newly-developed LR SAM wherein the missile successfully intercepted an aerial target at extended ranges.
Defence Ministry Official Release
This LR SAM, also referred to as the Barak 8, is the culmination of a joint India-Israel project that has three principal partners: the Indian DRDO, the Indian Navy and Israel Aerospace Industries. India had provided funding for this project.
India’s First Major Joint Venture With Israel
The distinctive characteristic of the Barak 8 is that this is the first major JV (joint venture) weapon-system that has been co-produced by India with Israeli partnership. An earlier example of such a successful joint venture is the Brahmos cruise missile with Russia.
The LR SAM can engage and neutralise incoming missiles and rockets upto a range of 70 kms and has a very advanced multifunction radar system, which allows for dynamic tracking of the incoming projectile and has a provision for multiple target identification. Extending the range to beyond 100 kms is on the design anvil.
This is cutting-edge anti-missile technology and is being retro-fitted on some Israeli corvettes. Once the Barak 8 is fitted on Indian warships – including the aircraft carrier – a major operational void would have been redressed. The Indian and Israeli partners are to be commended for their perseverance and the project’s success.
The Indian Navy had envisioned the need for an effective anti-missile system for their major principal surface combatants (PSC-s) as far back as the late 1990s, at which time the Israeli-made Barak 1 was an option. This missile provided point-defence and had a range of about 8 kms.
However the DRDO adopted a ‘dog-in-the-manger’ attitude and indicated that the indigenous Trishul - which was a work in progress - would be provided to the Navy. This did not materialise as promised and the net result was that Indian Navy ships were vulnerable to potential missile attacks – a capability that was denied due to the obduracy of the DRDO.
Need for an Anti-Missile System was Projected in 1995
Eventually, the DRDO reluctantly agreed to the import of a few Barak 1 systems – but it was a case of too-little, too-late.
Luckily for the navy, a few years later the possibility of teaming up with Israel for the advanced Barak 8 was mooted and this time the DRDO was prevailed upon to enter the tripartite cooperative effort with the Indian navy and the Israeli interlocutor. While this joint effort took over a decade to succeed, it provided India with very critical technology.
Herein lies a narrative that would be relevant to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his cabinet colleagues in relation to the need for appropriate political oversight of complex techno-strategic issues pertaining to national security.
The efficacy of missiles in naval warfare and the need for an effective anti-missile system came onto South Block’s radar in April 1982 when the UK and Argentina went to war over the disputed Falkland Islands. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi monitored these events closely and provided political support and encouragement to the Indian DRDO to embark on the IGMDP (integrated guided missile project) in 1983 when the country was under US-led sanctions. This was the foundation of the Indian missile effort.
There are many strands in the Barak saga that warrant objective review by Modi and his cabinet – the central one being the degree to which short-sighted or poorly informed political compulsions muddied the decision-making matrix in matters pertaining to national security.
Lessons for India’s Higher Defence Management
The Bofors-HDW submarine syndrome is relatively well-known for its tainted political contours – but the greater price has been the corrosive impact this experience has had on national military capacity. While the Barak 8 story has had a more positive ending as evidenced by the successful testing on December 30, it has many lessons for India’s higher defence management and the ultimate success of Modi’s make in India mantra.
Encouraging the individual service, in this case the Indian Navy, to become an active stakeholder in critical design and technology acquisition has yielded rich dividends. This is an experience that merits study and possible emulation by the other two services in the decades ahead and the Russian offer to co-produce military helicopters ought to be pursued diligently for mutli-vector optimisation.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar would be well-advised to study the Barak saga as he embarks on the ambitious task of enhancing India’s woefully inadequate indigenous defence design and production capacity – a worthy New Year resolution.
(The writer is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies.)
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