General Ved Prakash Malik (V P Malik), India’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) from September 1997 to September 2000, was on an official tour to Poland and the Czech Republic when Pakistani soldiers, masquerading as local militants, infiltrated into the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in May 1999. The infiltration bid in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kargil came just months after the Lahore Declaration was signed between Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
In a telephonic conversation with The Quint, General VK Malik recounts his interactions with Mr Vajpayee at the time when India and Pakistan were engaged in an armed conflict. He shares how the former PM wasn’t a micromanager, and a man of few words.
Can you recall the first time you met Mr Vajpayee? Was it during the Kargil war or before that?
No, I had met him before. I was the Chief of Army Staff when he became the Prime Minister. I served under him until I retired in September 2000. As the Army chief, I had met him even before the war too.
Can you recall the moment when you realised that the war was the only option? What was Mr Vajpayee’s reaction when you told him about what was happening on the border?
When the news of infiltration came in, everyone in India thought that it was a regular infiltration bid in Jammu and Kashmir. I was abroad on an official tour to Poland and the Czech Republic. When I came back, I went to the headquarters of the Northern Command and Srinagar corps headquarter, before going to the ground. I came back and said that it wasn’t a normal infiltration bid. In the meantime, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had decided to meet in the operations room of the Army headquarters.
Before meeting Vajpayee, I met my colleagues of the Chiefs of the Staffs Committee (CSC). We worked out the plan and the military strategy. I briefed the CSC. There was hesitation even then. People didn’t want to use the airforce. But when I briefed, I had already consulted the chief of airforce. I said: “Look it’s a serious situation, and it’s more serious than we thought earlier. Therefore, we will be launching a tri-service operation, and we want your permission to use army, navy, and airforce together.” I also said that the situation was serious but we would overcome it.
He (Vajpayee) listened to everything. I, then, asked if we had his permission. He said: “Yes”. Brijesh Mishra, the National Security Advisor, was also there. Mishra suggested that we could launch the operation but not cross the Line of Control (LoC). Once he gave us the rider, we started our “Operation Vijay”. I think he (Vajpayee) was also convinced by that time that he had been stabbed in the back by Pakistan. Thereafter, he fully backed us. I think he rang up Nawaz Sharif the same evening and told him that we were not going to accept that any of their soldiers occupy our territories and would take a strong action.
Another instance that I can recall is when he announced in public the second time that he had ordered us not to cross the international border. It was a good political strategy for him, but it didn’t suit us. So, I told him that “Sir, we are following your orders, but request you not to mention this in public again.” We were walking in the corridor, and by that time, we had known each other well enough. He looked at me questioningly and asked why I didn’t want him to go public again.
I told him: “Sir, we are doing our best to undo what Pakistan has done and are following your orders, too. But suppose if I can’t do that from here, then, as a military man, I have no option but to cross the border.” So, he kept quiet. He didn’t say anything. He just kept walking. The same evening, he sent Brijesh Mishra to a TV channel, and Mishra announced that “not crossing the border or LoC holds good today, but we don’t know about tomorrow.”
Did Mr Vajpayee seek information regularly? Did he wish to be kept updated on every development that was taking place?
Look, he wasn’t a micromanager at all. He left the operational side totally with us. He left the military strategy to us, but he gave us clear instructions, whenever required.
I must say that the two wars that we have fought — the 1971 war and the 1999 war... In 1971, the then Chief of Army Staff, Sam Manekshaw and Indira Gandhi had an excellent rapport. I would say Mr Vajpayee and I also had an excellent rapport. He could ring me up, and I could do the same. We were meeting almost every day; sometimes even twice or thrice a day. I found Mr Vajpayee very approachable, very accessible. He was a great listener, would ask very few questions, and was a very alert man all the time.
During the course of the war, was there any moment when you and Mr Vajpayee were not on the same page or wanted to do things differently?
Towards the end of the war, the writing was on the wall. Nawaz Sharif had agreed to pull his troops back. And here (India), the Election Commissioner had announced elections. It was an interim government here when we fought the war. And I realised that everyone in the cabinet had started discussing elections, thinking that the war was ending. But I told Mr Vajpayee that there were still 2-3 places along the Line of Control (LoC), yet to be cleared. I added that if he wanted me to say that the war was over, I wouldn’t say that at the moment.
He asked what I wanted to do. I said we would have to clear those areas and recapture them. I wouldn’t say that there was any difference of opinion. But I had clearly said that before I went public that everything was clear, this needed to be done. He gave us the permission. We recaptured those places and Pakistan suffered massive casualties. And then I told him, “Now I can go public and say that we have completed the assigned task.”
Any memory of his immediate reaction...
He was very pragmatic. He said, yes go ahead (About going public). He, then, came to the headquarters to congratulate everyone. He had, in fact, asked if he could come to the headquarters.
He wouldn’t overreact to anything, would he?
No, not at all. He was a man of few words, but his expressions said everything.
Since you drew a parallel between the relationship that Sam Manekshaw had with Indira and you had with Vajpayee...
See, I will tell you why I said that. I have been saying it repeatedly because it is essential to have a good rapport between the chiefs and the political authority, in particular, the prime minister.
We wish to know if, over the past decade or so, the equation between the two most powerful institutions — the army and the Prime Minister’s office — has changed.
Yes, absolutely. The distance between the chiefs and PMO has increased, which wasn’t the case back then. When I became the chief of Army staff, Indra Kumar Gujral was the Prime Minister. And even when Gujral spoke to his counterpart in Pakistan, he would ring me up and keep me updated. “We discussed this yesterday,” he used to say. PM Vajpayee would also ring up. Not that often, though, but we had access to his office. And on my insistence, Mr Vajpayee started meeting us once in a month. There were occasions when we would meet, even in the absence of the NSA, Brijesh Mishra.
So there were no bureaucratic layers that would otherwise shield a Prime Minister?
Exactly! And Brijesh Mishra, a semi-political person, was also very helpful, and a great troubleshooter during the time.
Any fond memory that you have of Mr Vajpayee or something that will always remain close to you?
There are many. I can remember that once he went to Kargil during the war. We were at the helipad, and there was shelling in the town. We could hear and see it. I told him that nothing would happen here. While I was very alert, he kept chatting around.
When was the last time you met him?
He had invited me and my wife to a dinner on the night of my retirement in September 2000. I still carry the card with me. An invitation card on which “To bid farewell to the General and Mrs Malik” was written. My wife was sitting next to him, and she asked if she could have his autograph. So, he wrote: “Remembering Kargil”, and signed it.
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