In a landmark judgment on 8 April 2025, the Supreme Court of India invoked Article 142 of the Constitution and declared the Tamil Nadu Governor’s denial to assent the passing of 10 Bills as unconstitutional.
The case emanated from a long standoff between the DMK-led government in Tamil Nadu and the Centre-appointed Governor RN Ravi. In total, the Assembly passed 13 Bills, out of which the governor withheld assent on 10 Bills or sent them back to the Legislative Assembly. The Assembly endorsed the Bills without any actual changes, but the governor yet again referred them for the President’s consent, which the court found illegal.
“We are left with no other option but to exercise our inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution for the purpose of declaring these 10 Bills as deemed to have been assented on the date when they were presented to the governor after being reconsidered by the state legislature i.e., on 18 November 2023,” the court declared.
Article 200 of the Constitution deals with the governor's duties regarding the Bills passed by the state legislatures. The governor can either withhold the Bill for three months, give assent within one month, or make a reference to the President for reconsideration within one month, setting time-bound guidelines by the Supreme Court’s recent judgment. However, once a Bill is returned, it is reiterated by the House with or without amendment, and the Governor cannot withhold any further assent.
Article 201 deals with the obligations of the President on the reservation of the Bill for her consideration. The President can either give assent or withhold the Bill and can direct the governor to return the Bill to the president with a message when it is not a money bill. Why is this ruling by India’s top court historic, and what can we learn from other parliamentary democracies across the world?
The Quint explains.
Explained: Can Supreme Court's TN Governor Ruling Reshape Indian Federalism?
1. Why is The SC Ruling Historic?
The Supreme Court’s judgment was historic as it is the first time that laws were passed without the assent of the governor or the President. The 141-page-long judgment has supposedly made the Centre uncomfortable as they appoint the state governors. On Thursday, 17 April, while taking a swipe at the Supreme Court’s judgment, Vice President and Rajya Sabha Chairman Jagdeep Dhankar said that judges in the country have no accountability and the law of the land does not apply to them.
“I have no doubt the Parliament cannot script a judgment of a court. I have no doubt about it. The Parliament can only legislate and hold institutions, including judiciary and executive, accountable, but judgment writing, adjudication is the sole prerogative of the judiciary as much legislation is that of the Parliament. But are we not finding this situation getting challenged?" Dhankar questioned.
"I am saying so because very frequently we are finding that executive governance is by judicial orders, when executive, the government is elected by people, the government is accountable to Parliament, the government is accountable to the people at election. There is a principle of accountability in operation. In Parliament you can ask questions, critical questions, because the governance is by the executive but if this executive governance is by judiciary, how do you ask questions? Whom do you hold accountable in the election?"
Jagdeep Dhankar, Vice President of IndiaIndia's democracy is intricately designed, and the roles of governors and presidents are tailor-made to uphold constitutional integrity and serve as impartial overseers. However, recent incidents show a constant surge in governors' abuse of power, leading to the erosion of the country's democratic principles.
While these offices are supposed to act as the guardians of federalism, their discretionary powers raise questions about their political power and influence. Tamil Nadu is one of the many cases of this pattern. The court ruled that the Tamil Nadu governor lacked ‘bonafide’ in his actions and behaved unconstitutionally.
Central governments have frequently replaced governors appointed by political rivals, deepening the politicisation of the role. A study of governors' tenures from 1950 to 2015 revealed that only 25 percent completed their full five-year term, with 37 percent serving less than a year. Party loyalists are often chosen for the position as a reward for their allegiance. Research by Professor Ashok Pankaj on governors during this period showed that 52 percent were politicians, 26 percent were retired bureaucrats, and the remainder included judges, lawyers, defense officials, and academics.
Breaking with tradition, the ruling party frequently appoints governors without consulting elected state governments, straining relations between federal and state authorities. Constitutional interpretation, unlike statutory interpretation, is bound to be panoramic and novel. The present judgment by Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan, demonstrates constitutional modernity, realism, and rationale.
“We take this opportunity to quote Dr BR Ambedkar’s concluding speech in the Constituent Assembly, which is as relevant today as it was in 1949 – ‘However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot’,” Justice Pardiwala said.
Expand2. What It Means For Opposition-Ruled States
The issue is not standalone, as after Tamil Nadu, the state of Kerala now awaits attention as it has previously moved to the court against President Draupadi Murumu’s act of withholding assent referred by the governor. Some important Bills in the list of withheld Bills include University Laws (Amendment) Bill 2021 and Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Bill 2021.
Other examples such incidents transpired in West Bengal as it complained about that the governor sitting on eight Bills, including crucial ones such as the West Bengal University of Health Sciences (Amendment) Bill; Aliah University (Amendment) Bill; West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) (Amendment) Bill, and called it subverting democratic good governance. Governors have been criticised for delaying assent to Bills passed by Opposition-ruled Assemblies, effectively stalling legislative processes.
In Maharastra, the top court alluded to the governor who called for a controversial confidence vote in the Assembly in 2022, leading to the fall of the government in the state. Uddhav Thackeray's regional Shiv Sena was the largest party in the coalition ruling Maharashtra. But defecting rebels split the party and cobbled together a new alliance with Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari called for a vote of confidence, but Thackeray resigned in June before the vote, "accepting" that his supporters had been reduced to a rump.
These actions, perceived as attempts to undermine elected governments, have led to accusations of governors acting as “proxies” for the central ruling party.
Expand3. Can India Learn From Other Democracies?
Drawing parallels, the United Kingdom, from which India has adopted several characteristics of political and constitutional features, offers a comparison. Even though the UK’s monarchy is symbolic, in 2019, Queen Elizabeth II’s approval of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s request to prorogue Parliament during Brexit negotiations was criticised as undermining democratic norms, but the Supreme Court came to the rescue.
The incident echoes India’s presidential controversies, such as the frequent imposition of President’s Rule in the 1970s and 1980s to topple opposition state governments.
Similarly, Canada's Governor General, appointed by the monarch, has been criticised for proroguing the Parliament at the advice of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, delaying the no-confidence motion. In Australia, the 1975 constitutional crisis saw Governor-General John Kerr dismiss Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s government, citing a parliamentary deadlock. This shocker move, much like India’s governor interventions, sparked debates about the overreach of unelected officials in democratic processes.
However, the Indian federal structure, with a vibrant political system in each state, unlike Australia and Canada, is even more diverse. Governors' intervention thus disrupts the delicate federal balance, beautifully designed in the Constitution of their country.
Expand
Why is The SC Ruling Historic?
The Supreme Court’s judgment was historic as it is the first time that laws were passed without the assent of the governor or the President. The 141-page-long judgment has supposedly made the Centre uncomfortable as they appoint the state governors. On Thursday, 17 April, while taking a swipe at the Supreme Court’s judgment, Vice President and Rajya Sabha Chairman Jagdeep Dhankar said that judges in the country have no accountability and the law of the land does not apply to them.
“I have no doubt the Parliament cannot script a judgment of a court. I have no doubt about it. The Parliament can only legislate and hold institutions, including judiciary and executive, accountable, but judgment writing, adjudication is the sole prerogative of the judiciary as much legislation is that of the Parliament. But are we not finding this situation getting challenged?" Dhankar questioned.
"I am saying so because very frequently we are finding that executive governance is by judicial orders, when executive, the government is elected by people, the government is accountable to Parliament, the government is accountable to the people at election. There is a principle of accountability in operation. In Parliament you can ask questions, critical questions, because the governance is by the executive but if this executive governance is by judiciary, how do you ask questions? Whom do you hold accountable in the election?"Jagdeep Dhankar, Vice President of India
India's democracy is intricately designed, and the roles of governors and presidents are tailor-made to uphold constitutional integrity and serve as impartial overseers. However, recent incidents show a constant surge in governors' abuse of power, leading to the erosion of the country's democratic principles.
While these offices are supposed to act as the guardians of federalism, their discretionary powers raise questions about their political power and influence. Tamil Nadu is one of the many cases of this pattern. The court ruled that the Tamil Nadu governor lacked ‘bonafide’ in his actions and behaved unconstitutionally.
Central governments have frequently replaced governors appointed by political rivals, deepening the politicisation of the role. A study of governors' tenures from 1950 to 2015 revealed that only 25 percent completed their full five-year term, with 37 percent serving less than a year. Party loyalists are often chosen for the position as a reward for their allegiance. Research by Professor Ashok Pankaj on governors during this period showed that 52 percent were politicians, 26 percent were retired bureaucrats, and the remainder included judges, lawyers, defense officials, and academics.
Breaking with tradition, the ruling party frequently appoints governors without consulting elected state governments, straining relations between federal and state authorities. Constitutional interpretation, unlike statutory interpretation, is bound to be panoramic and novel. The present judgment by Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan, demonstrates constitutional modernity, realism, and rationale.
“We take this opportunity to quote Dr BR Ambedkar’s concluding speech in the Constituent Assembly, which is as relevant today as it was in 1949 – ‘However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot’,” Justice Pardiwala said.
What It Means For Opposition-Ruled States
The issue is not standalone, as after Tamil Nadu, the state of Kerala now awaits attention as it has previously moved to the court against President Draupadi Murumu’s act of withholding assent referred by the governor. Some important Bills in the list of withheld Bills include University Laws (Amendment) Bill 2021 and Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Bill 2021.
Other examples such incidents transpired in West Bengal as it complained about that the governor sitting on eight Bills, including crucial ones such as the West Bengal University of Health Sciences (Amendment) Bill; Aliah University (Amendment) Bill; West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) (Amendment) Bill, and called it subverting democratic good governance. Governors have been criticised for delaying assent to Bills passed by Opposition-ruled Assemblies, effectively stalling legislative processes.
In Maharastra, the top court alluded to the governor who called for a controversial confidence vote in the Assembly in 2022, leading to the fall of the government in the state. Uddhav Thackeray's regional Shiv Sena was the largest party in the coalition ruling Maharashtra. But defecting rebels split the party and cobbled together a new alliance with Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Governor Bhagat Singh Koshyari called for a vote of confidence, but Thackeray resigned in June before the vote, "accepting" that his supporters had been reduced to a rump.
These actions, perceived as attempts to undermine elected governments, have led to accusations of governors acting as “proxies” for the central ruling party.
Can India Learn From Other Democracies?
Drawing parallels, the United Kingdom, from which India has adopted several characteristics of political and constitutional features, offers a comparison. Even though the UK’s monarchy is symbolic, in 2019, Queen Elizabeth II’s approval of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s request to prorogue Parliament during Brexit negotiations was criticised as undermining democratic norms, but the Supreme Court came to the rescue.
The incident echoes India’s presidential controversies, such as the frequent imposition of President’s Rule in the 1970s and 1980s to topple opposition state governments.
Similarly, Canada's Governor General, appointed by the monarch, has been criticised for proroguing the Parliament at the advice of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, delaying the no-confidence motion. In Australia, the 1975 constitutional crisis saw Governor-General John Kerr dismiss Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s government, citing a parliamentary deadlock. This shocker move, much like India’s governor interventions, sparked debates about the overreach of unelected officials in democratic processes.
However, the Indian federal structure, with a vibrant political system in each state, unlike Australia and Canada, is even more diverse. Governors' intervention thus disrupts the delicate federal balance, beautifully designed in the Constitution of their country.