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Donald Trump Says the 'N-Word': How India & Pak's Nuclear Policy Isn't the Same

US President Donald Trump claims that the India-Pakistan conflict could have become nuclear had he not intervened.

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US President Donald Trump has doubled down on his claims of stopping a war between India and Pakistan. In a recent interview, Trump went to the extent of insinuating that the conflict could have escalated into the use of nuclear weapons.

“It was getting deeper and more, I mean, more missiles, everyone was ‘stronger, stronger’, so to a point where the next one's going to be, you know what? The N word," Trump claimed in an interview to Fox News.

"The N-word, that’s a very nasty word, right? In a lot of ways. The N word used in a nuclear sense, that's the worst thing that can happen. And I think they were very close," the US President added, claiming that this was a "bigger success than he will "ever get credit for".

"Those are major nuclear powers and they were angry.”

Neither India nor Pakistan has claimed publicly that the conflict between the two countries following the 22 April Pahalgam attack, could assume a nuclear dimension. On the contrary, both sides have been claiming that they were acting with restraint.

The only mention of the nuclear factor was during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's address to the nation that India won't give in to "nuclear blackmail".

In this context, it is important to look at the differences between the nuclear policies and arsenal of India and Pakistan.

India’s No First Use policy sharply contrasts with Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence, which includes tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use, increasing the risk of escalation.

Recent technological advancements, including India’s 2024 hypersonic missile test and Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities, have shortened decision-making windows to mere minutes. The Quint examines the arsenals, policies, historical context, and escalating dangers fueling this standoff.

Donald Trump Says the 'N-Word': How India & Pak's Nuclear Policy Isn't the Same

  1. 1. How India & Pakistan Became Nuclear Powers

    India had its first nuclear test at Pokhran, Rajasthan, with the code name of “Smiling Buddha” in 1974. During the 1980s to 1990s, India also developed advanced missile programs like Agni and Prithvi. Under the leadership of PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India became a nuclear weapons state after conducting five underground nuclear tests, including thermonuclear and fission devices.

    The Pokhran I testing triggered insecurity in Pakistan regarding the weapons India possessed. With external help, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan established Kahuta uranium enrichment programme in the 1970s.

    Following India's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan conducted 6 nuclear tests in Chagai, Balochistan and declared itself a nuclear nation like its neighbour.

    In the international community, fears of a nuclear war have always been raised each time there were tensions between India and Pakistan, such as following the 1999 Kargil War, 2001 Parliament Attack, 2008 Mumbai attack and the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. However, in none of these occasions did either side show any inclination to use nuclear weapons.

    Expand
  2. 2. The Difference in Nuclear Doctrine

    India's nuclear policy is centred around the “No First Use” principle, which states that India does not initiate a nuclear conflict. The policy is deeply rooted in India's Global aspirations, emphasising credibility and deterrence. However, there's a notable caveat with India reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a "major attack" on India or its forces involving chemical or biological weapons.

    Operation Sindoor, characterised as "focused, measured, and non-escalatory," exemplified India's restraint and commitment to preventing a wider conflict.

    Pakistan's "full-spectrum deterrence" doctrine, on the other hand, eschews the No First Use principle. Pakistan retains the option of using nuclear weapons first, including tactical nukes, to balance India's conventional superiority. This doctrine, fueled by Pakistan's fear of an existential threat from India, brings the nuclear threshold lower.

    We asked Dr Javed Alam, a research scholar specialising on nuclear policy, on whether there has been a change in India and Pakistna's nuclear doctrine.

    “No, both India and Pakistan have kept their nuclear doctrine intact since the overt nuclearisation. India has an NFU and a credible minimum deterrence posture. Pakistan has changed its nuclear posture, not the doctrine. The doctrine still follows a first-use option, but the posture is now full-spectrum deterrence. Technological advancements in both countries have occurred in both the conventional and nuclear domains. But there are no signs of a change in the doctrine. “
    Dr Javed Alam

    During the 2016 conflict with Pakistan following the Uri terror attack, the then Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar indicated that India should not “bind” itself to that policy, highlighting the conditions under which India would consider using nuclear weapons.

    Expand
  3. 3. Nuclear Warheads and Missiles

    India's arsenal consists of short-range ballistic missiles such as the Prithvi-II (350 km) and medium-range Agni-II (2,000 km), which can target all of Pakistan. The Agni-V has a 5,000 km range. India employs these through mobile launchers and submarines such as INS Arihant, augmenting its second-strike capability.

    Dr Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, says that India and Pakistan's nuclear warheads are not comparable.

    “Agni V is very long-range and aimed at China. (Pakistan's) Babar is a slow cruise missile, but difficult to detect. Generally, such systems heighten risks. Since the impact of such weapons is smaller, the temptation to use them is greater.“
    Dr Manoj Joshi , Observer Research Foundation

    The modernisation of strategic forces and the increasing asymmetry in conventional forces between India and Pakistan is a factor that may increase the temptation of the use of nuclear weapons from the Pakistan side.

    However, there is no verifiable proof that the nuclear option was considered during the recent conflict. The only person who has been openly talking about it is President Trump.

    Expand

How India & Pakistan Became Nuclear Powers

India had its first nuclear test at Pokhran, Rajasthan, with the code name of “Smiling Buddha” in 1974. During the 1980s to 1990s, India also developed advanced missile programs like Agni and Prithvi. Under the leadership of PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India became a nuclear weapons state after conducting five underground nuclear tests, including thermonuclear and fission devices.

The Pokhran I testing triggered insecurity in Pakistan regarding the weapons India possessed. With external help, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan established Kahuta uranium enrichment programme in the 1970s.

Following India's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan conducted 6 nuclear tests in Chagai, Balochistan and declared itself a nuclear nation like its neighbour.

In the international community, fears of a nuclear war have always been raised each time there were tensions between India and Pakistan, such as following the 1999 Kargil War, 2001 Parliament Attack, 2008 Mumbai attack and the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. However, in none of these occasions did either side show any inclination to use nuclear weapons.

ADVERTISEMENTREMOVE AD

The Difference in Nuclear Doctrine

India's nuclear policy is centred around the “No First Use” principle, which states that India does not initiate a nuclear conflict. The policy is deeply rooted in India's Global aspirations, emphasising credibility and deterrence. However, there's a notable caveat with India reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a "major attack" on India or its forces involving chemical or biological weapons.

Operation Sindoor, characterised as "focused, measured, and non-escalatory," exemplified India's restraint and commitment to preventing a wider conflict.

Pakistan's "full-spectrum deterrence" doctrine, on the other hand, eschews the No First Use principle. Pakistan retains the option of using nuclear weapons first, including tactical nukes, to balance India's conventional superiority. This doctrine, fueled by Pakistan's fear of an existential threat from India, brings the nuclear threshold lower.

We asked Dr Javed Alam, a research scholar specialising on nuclear policy, on whether there has been a change in India and Pakistna's nuclear doctrine.

“No, both India and Pakistan have kept their nuclear doctrine intact since the overt nuclearisation. India has an NFU and a credible minimum deterrence posture. Pakistan has changed its nuclear posture, not the doctrine. The doctrine still follows a first-use option, but the posture is now full-spectrum deterrence. Technological advancements in both countries have occurred in both the conventional and nuclear domains. But there are no signs of a change in the doctrine. “
Dr Javed Alam

During the 2016 conflict with Pakistan following the Uri terror attack, the then Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar indicated that India should not “bind” itself to that policy, highlighting the conditions under which India would consider using nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Warheads and Missiles

India's arsenal consists of short-range ballistic missiles such as the Prithvi-II (350 km) and medium-range Agni-II (2,000 km), which can target all of Pakistan. The Agni-V has a 5,000 km range. India employs these through mobile launchers and submarines such as INS Arihant, augmenting its second-strike capability.

Dr Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, says that India and Pakistan's nuclear warheads are not comparable.

“Agni V is very long-range and aimed at China. (Pakistan's) Babar is a slow cruise missile, but difficult to detect. Generally, such systems heighten risks. Since the impact of such weapons is smaller, the temptation to use them is greater.“
Dr Manoj Joshi , Observer Research Foundation

The modernisation of strategic forces and the increasing asymmetry in conventional forces between India and Pakistan is a factor that may increase the temptation of the use of nuclear weapons from the Pakistan side.

However, there is no verifiable proof that the nuclear option was considered during the recent conflict. The only person who has been openly talking about it is President Trump.

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